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Since the 1990s, participation has become the dominant method for multinational mining 
corporations to contain conflict with people affected by mining. Yet conflict, including violent 
confrontation, remains prevalent. The literature documents a wide range of outcomes of 
participatory mechanisms – they may produce compromise, exacerbate conflict or even 
create new opportunities for conflict – yet there is little literature explaining such variance. 
This thesis explains this diversity in terms of (a) factors involved in the design and 
implementation of participatory mechanisms by multinational miners and (b) factors 
determining how, when and why people affected by mining participate or not. I use the 
‘modes of participation’ framework to analyse how institutional and ideological foundations 
for participation shape who can participate, on what issues and when. I argue that 
participatory mechanisms including corporate social responsibility (CSR) and community 
development are neither simple outcomes of corporate ethics nor merely greenwashing 
strategies, as they are often presented. Rather, participation is a mechanism of rule to both 
contain manifestations of conflict risky to corporate profitability and create social relations 
amenable to extractive accumulation.  
Qualitative data are drawn from fieldwork across three case studies in Indonesia – the 
proposed coastal Kulon Progo sand iron mine in Yogyakarta, Newcrest’s Gosowong gold mine 
in North Maluku and Rio Tinto’s ex-Kelian gold mine in East Kalimantan. These cases are 
placed within an analysis of global corporate self-governance that has arisen in response to 
broader crises of legitimacy. Findings highlight the importance of historically constituted 
social relations and contestation across local and global scales in shaping participation. 
Particularly important for how people affected by mining participate are their control of land, 
histories of organisation, alliance structures and ideologies. These factors shape the desire 
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Chapter One: Introduction to Mining, 
Crises and Participation   
Large-scale corporate mining has an extraordinary ability to generate controversy. The 
exploration for, extraction, processing, transport and distribution of coal, metals and minerals 
is inextricably associated with environmental pollution, land-grabbing, human rights abuse, 
poor governance, inequality, and violent conflict. Yet the global mining industry continues to 
enjoy enormous support. Its promise of economic development and modernisation appeals 
across national borders and social classes (J. Nem Singh and Bourgouin 2013a). Indeed, most 
of the current conveniences and technologies that we enjoy would be in short supply without 
the resources mining provides.  
The positive and negative sides of mining stem from its ability to generate rapid economic, 
social, and political change. Land-grabbing and rapid changes in land use – from sites of 
subsistence, small scale mining, agricultural production, ecology or residence to sites of 
resource extraction – disrupts and demands new social relations of production and 
reproduction (Leifsen et al. 2017). This can threaten the basis of people’s livelihoods (Ballard 
and Banks 2003).  Large mines come to dominate local economies and can cause localised or 
national inflationary pressures and exacerbate inequalities (Devi and Prayogo 2013; Perreault 
2018). These changes inevitably produce winners and losers according to the distribution of 
impacts and opportunities. Even within villages or geographic communities, various “sets of 
sub-groups and individuals” (Horowitz 2011, 1385) develop differing opinions about the 
benefits and costs of development projects. The resultant contestation needs to be managed 
by corporations or states lest it manifest in forms of conflict that threaten the profitability of 
capital.  
Multinational mining corporations are continuously reforming and refining their social and 
environmental practices in response to crises of legitimacy and conflicts with people affected 
by mining. Since the 1990s, multinational miners, along with their political allies and financiers, 
have developed a global network of self-regulatory standards and organisations to 
reconstitute their legitimacy as responsible corporate actors. Together with international 
financial institutions, they have developed new participatory conflict management 
mechanisms to contain and manage conflict with people affected by mining and other critics 
Chapter One  
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(Hatcher 2014). Yet, in 2019, twenty years since the mainstreaming of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), participation and community development in the mining sector, 
controversy, violence, and environmental destruction persist.  
This thesis is concerned with the rise, forms and effects of corporate modes of participation 
as a mechanism for managing community relations and containing risky manifestations of 
conflict around large-scale mines. It develops theoretical and analytical frameworks to explain 
the diverse and often unpredicted outcomes of participation as a conflict management 
strategy. I present two related arguments. Firstly, multinational mining corporations develop 
participatory mechanisms to contain and manage multi-scalar conflicts with people affected 
by mining and NGOs (Non-Government Organisations).1 At international scales this takes the 
form of a global network of self-governance standards and associations. At local scales, these 
mechanisms include participatory CSR, community development, environmental monitoring 
and consultative committees. These mechanisms all have implications for the distribution of 
political, social and economic goods and power. Secondly, people affected by mining will 
secure most benefits from participatory mechanisms or most effectively resist them through 
their control of land, histories of organisation, alliance structures and ideological conceptions 
of the world. Together, these factors underpin the capacity and desire of groups of people 
affected by mining to participate in or resist mining developments.  
Crises in Global Mining and the Significance of Participation  
Mining corporations began to employ participatory approaches to CSR, community 
development, consultation and environmental management in the late 1990s following 
increased media and NGO attention on sustainability, human rights, environmental 
devastation, and even civil-war (Kirsch 2014; Cochrane 2017). Significant controversies 
developed from local campaigns as NGOs rallied against the lack of regulation, transparency, 
and accountability of mining companies in their overseas operations, especially in 
                                                     
1 Throughout this thesis, I use the term NGO to refer to private (non-state), not-for-profit formal 
organisations, organised around a social purpose such as environmentalism, human-rights etc. 
NGOs may operate at sub-national, national, or international scales and may be made up of 
branches or affiliates across places. I therefore distinguish NGOs from business associations that 
represent the interests of profit-maximising firms and from less formalised local organisations or 
activist groups.  
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authoritarian contexts (Bünte 2018). Beyond reputational damage, several cases resulted in 
multinational miners being sued in their home jurisdictions and NGO campaigns to create 
regulations that would hold multinational miners’ foreign operations to the standards that 
apply in their home states (Atkinson and Hudson 1998; Macdonald 2004; Kirsch 2014, 84–126; 
Bünte 2018). Conflict with communities affected by mining are immensely costly for 
corporations, if they develop into blockades, injunctions or other actions that delay or cancel 
projects. Franks et al. (2014, 7578) show that “as a result of conflict, a major, world-class 
mining project with capital expenditure of between US$3 and US$5 billion was reported to 
suffer roughly US$20 million per week of delayed production in net present value terms,” 
while cancellation of projects runs into billions of dollars of lost capital.  
Reputational damage, regulatory risk and conflict with local communities represents the loss 
(or failure to establish) a social license to operate –  the “ongoing acceptance by society of a 
company carrying out its activities” (Brueckner and Eabrasu 2018, 218). Sustained 
reputational, regulatory and community opposition to multiple projects and corporations 
within the industry culminated in crises of legitimacy. In Gramscian terms, a crisis of 
legitimacy2 occurs when a dominant class loses the consensus for its ideological leadership 
and risks being subjected to the regulation of other actors (Filippini 2017, 99; Chapter Four). 
This can occur independently of, yet is related to, the dominant class’s structural power, 
which may be asserted through more coercive means to keep control. In this case, 
multinational mining corporations as a collective were threatened with increased state 
regulation and community intervention in their operations while the use of coercive measures 
is precisely what had led to the loss of legitimacy. Crises of legitimacy and their material cost 
were not limited to multinational miners but extended to their financiers and political 
supporters, notably the World Bank Group (Fox and Brown 2000; Danielson 2002; World Bank 
2003; Hatcher 2014; Kirsch 2014).  
Multinational miners and their financiers sought to address their collective crisis of legitimacy 
through forming a global network of associations, organisations and standards for the self-
regulation of the environmental and social dimensions of mining (Chapter Four). Significant 
examples are the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), The Equator Principles, 
                                                     
2 Also synonymous with crisis of authority, confidence or hegemony, see (Gramsci 1971, Q13§23; 210-
211). 
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The Kimberly Process, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the IFC’s Compliance 
Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), and the UN Global Compact (Kirsch 2014; Hatcher 2020). 
Ideological fragments and practices from critics and allies – including sustainability, good 
governance, participatory development, and community empowerment – were incorporated 
into new self-governance standards. Together these form the ideological basis and 
institutional structures for new ‘modes of participation’ (Rodan 2018). More specifically they 
promote non-democratic consultative and particularistic ideologies of representation to 
restore legitimacy without conceding structural power (see Chapter Three). At the project 
level, corporations employed new participatory mechanisms based in internationally 
constituted modes of participation and in response to local risks to directly engage people 
affected by mining.  
These strategies have not eliminated problems of environmental devastation, human rights 
abuse, violence or corruption. Of recent infamy is BHP’s fight against liability and 
compensation claims following the collapse of the Samarco mine’s tailings dam, 50% owned 
by BHP, that destroyed the Brazilian village of Bento Rodrigues (Ong 2016; Ferguson 2016). In 
Australia, both the corporate sector and government promote Australian mining corporations 
as world leaders in best practice associated with all aspects of extractives and extractive 
development (AusAID 2011; DFAT 2014). However, Australian mining companies have been 
involved in a significant number of mining related conflicts and subject to significant criticism 
by NGOs and media (Parfitt, Bryant, and Barrett 2012). Indonesian examples include when 
three activists were killed by police while resisting gold exploration in Bima by Arc Exploration 
(Kendari 2011) and the ongoing violence between police, non-state militias (preman) and 
community groups over sand-iron mining in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta, by Perth based Indo 
Mines Ltd (JATAM 2009; Chapter Seven). Before BHP sold its huge Kalimantan ‘Indomet’ 
concession in June 2016, it had attracted significant media attention about the project’s 
anticipated impact on rainforest ecosystems, climate, and traditional owners (Rompas 2013; 
Jacobson 2015; Republika Online 2016).  
Together, global self-governance networks and local participatory mechanisms have been 
effective strategies to entrench the power of multinational miners in the face of challenges. 
Their interests and responsibilities have expanded to include the social and environmental 
dimensions of mining. With corporations becoming more involved in community 
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development programs, environmental monitoring and stakeholder consultation, incentives 
are created for people affected by mining to engage with corporate actors. The forms that 
conflict takes are continuously changing as participatory mechanisms evolve in response to 
ongoing contestation with critics and people affected by mining. Indeed, the main effect of 
CSR programs is to change the dynamics of conflict, rather than eliminate it (F. Li 2015). 
Participatory mechanisms shape and contain conflict, but often in quite unpredictable ways, 
in some cases opening up new opportunities for conflict (Arellano-Yanguas 2011; Leifsen et 
al. 2017).  
Explaining divergent outcomes 
While there is a wealth of literature describing the reactions of people affected by mining to 
participatory mechanisms, there is very little that explains why and how people affected by 
mining choose to participate or not in corporate mechanisms. Groups of people affected by 
mining make strategic decisions to embrace, co-opt, resist or subvert attempts to elicit their 
participation (J. Nem Singh and Camba 2016; Conde and Le Billon 2017). Participatory 
mechanisms can be manipulated by groups and individuals to accommodate desires they 
were not designed for (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007b; Horowitz 2015). Benefits can be 
extracted through each strategy. The ability of groups to extract greater benefits is related to 
their relative bargaining power (O’Faircheallaigh 2015) – or power to resist. Mechanisms of 
participation exist in the shadow of legalised and illegal deployable violence (Leith 2003; 
Arellano-Yanguas 2011; Welker 2014). To be sure, the prevailing political climate, risk of 
violence, and promises of development goods affect these strategic calculations. Yet what 
determines the capacity and desire of groups of people affected by mining to participate or 
not and how?  
This lacuna can be explained by the tendency of literature to adopt a methodological or 
epistemological focus on particular sites or scales (national institutions, international 
organisations, individual corporations etc) of conflict and participation to the exclusion of 
others. While institutional approaches produce compelling accounts of the regulatory 
structures and governance of the social dimensions of mining, they take institutional reform 
prima facie and ignore expressions of conflict that occur outside of formal institutional 
structures (see Chapter Two). On the other hand, post-structuralist and constructivist 
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accounts provide descriptions of contests and power relations between actors but tend to 
ignore political economic structures that shape conflict. Likewise, there are few accounts of 
participation and conflict in extractive industries that analyse how local, national and global 
contestation over the social and environmental dimensions of mining overlap and constitute 
each other (cf Kirsch 2014). To understand both how, when and why multinational miners 
deploy participatory mechanisms and how groups of people affected by mining participate or 
not and the ways these two decisions are related, we must move past methodological focus 
on specific scales, sites and institutions.  
The key contribution of this thesis is to develop empirical and theoretical understandings of 
how and why groups embrace, co-opt, or resist participatory mechanisms and their diverse 
outcomes. This is achieved by situating mining conflict – and the formal and informal 
institutions emerging from such – within broader processes of economic, political and social 
transformations across local, national and global scales and across state, corporate and 
autonomous sites of participation. 
Modes of Participation and Scales of Contestation 
Extractive industry developments do not occur in a vacuum. The politics of extractives are 
inextricably linked to the broader political economies of the societies in which they operate. 
The conflicts surrounding extractive industries are also inextricable from broader dynamics of 
economic development and political change. I therefore conceptualise extractive projects as 
precipitating, triggering and/or transforming both the basis of social conflict and expressions 
of conflict rather than simply causing conflict. Mining corporations often become embroiled 
in conflicts that predate their presence but may have found little visible expression before the 
development of a mine. This is because social, economic and political divisions pre-exist 
extractive developments, including class, ethnic, gendered relations and political tensions 
(Borras and Franco 2013; A. Bebbington 2011; Arellano-Yanguas 2011). Histories of 
dispossession, colonialism and marginalisation may become entangled, especially where 
mining affects Indigenous people (Coumans 2008; Angelbeck 2008; Guichaoua 2012). The 
analytical task then is to unmask the dynamics of conflict, the role extractive developments 
play and how expressions of conflict are managed or perpetuated through corporatized 
participatory mechanisms. 
Introduction to Mining, Crises and Participation 
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To explain the forces behind participation, its governance, the forms that it takes, and how 
groups of people affected by mining respond to participatory mechanisms, I adopt the ‘modes 
of participation’ framework. Modes of participation are “the institutional structures and 
ideologies that shape the inclusion and exclusion of individuals and groups in the political 
process” (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007a, 774). The framework was developed to analyse how 
state actors use participation as a technique for securing legitimacy and containing challenges 
from various groups. It explains particular forms of participation emerging at given moments 
and sites as the result of contestations over capitalist development (Rodan 2018). The modes 
of participation framework is a specific application of social conflict theory which understands 
society as made up of groups of actors who pursue their interests in competing versions of 
development.3 Visible forms of conflict are treated as manifestations of contestation and the 
contradictions rooted within processes of capitalist development. The advantage of this 
approach is the focus on historically constituted social forces and the root causes of conflict, 
not merely its visible and institutional manifestations.  
In this study, I adapt the modes of participation framework to examine corporate-sponsored 
sites of participation and how they are constructed against state-sponsored and autonomous 
sites of participation. This simply reflects the increasing trend and need for mining 
corporations to contain contradictions and conflicts resulting from extractive developments 
– particularly from acts of primitive accumulation or land grabbing. Beyond simply reacting to 
conflict, mining corporations use participatory mechanisms, CSR and particularly 
participatory community development work to construct social relations of production 
favourable to large scale mining. Here, ‘social relations of production’ is meant in the broad 
sense, as “everyday patterns of behaviour involved in the production and consumption of 
physical goods as well as the discursive institutional and cultural tactics established to ensure 
the hegemony of existing social relations” (Bieler and Morton 2018, 37), and includes social 
relations of reproduction (Chapter Three). 
The second adaptation I make, given that participatory mechanisms operate largely at local 
scales while standards for their implementation and ideological legitimacy are enshrined at 
                                                     
3 This approach, based in Marxist and Gramscian sociology, when applied to political economy has also 
been referred to as ‘structural political economy’ (Hutchison et al. 2014) or ‘the Murdoch school of 
critical political economy’ (Hameiri and Jones 2020). 
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international scales, is to combine the modes of participation framework with a ‘politics of 
scale’. In political geography, the concept of scale refers to the spatial level (from local, 
metropolitan and provincial to national, regional and global) of social, political and economic 
activities (N. Smith 2008). The production of scale, along with the issues governed at any 
particular scale, is never given a priori but is the result of capitalist development, 
environmental factors, and political contestation (N. Smith 2003, 181–90; Swyngedouw and 
Heynen 2010; Allen 2018). For Smith (2008, 181–90), scale is reproduced through dynamics 
of capitalist development. Local scales have traditionally been sites of production and 
socialisation. Provincial scales are reproduced through the mechanics of distribution. National 
scales are reproduced through the support, defence and coordination of capital.4 Following 
this, in this study I use ‘local scale’ or simply ‘local’ to refer to the areas surrounding a mine 
site that are directly impacted by or impact extractive developments. The local scale then is 
an outcome of capitalist development but always involves political contestation over who 
should be considered local for the purposes of community development, compensation or 
preferential employment amongst other befefits. 
Because different opportunities, allies and resources are available at any given scale, actors 
strategically contest issues at scales, or across multiple scales, that are the most beneficial to 
their interests (Hameiri and Jones 2015, 56; Allen 2018). For example, social movements often 
attempt to ‘jump scales’ to the national or international where they can access allies, 
resources, media and invite public scrutiny (Escobar 2001; Kirsch 2014). Alliances which 
operate across political scales are a crucial factor in how effectively people affected by mining 
can campaign if they decide to reject participation – or how much knowledge and support 
they can receive to participate.5   
I use the term ‘people affected by mining’ or ‘groups of people affected by mining’ and 
generally avoid ‘local community’ to signal that in any given locality, different individuals and 
groups of people will be affected and react differently. A micro political economy approach 
to community formation emphasises localised relationships that enable production and 
distribution of resources as a process of community creation (Roseberry 1989; Tania M. Li 
                                                     
4 Ecological factors can also influence the production of scales of conflict and governance. 
5 Indeed, in all three cases in this thesis, people opposed to mining sought to create alliances with 
groups who could help attract national and international resources and legitimacy. 
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1996). Critically then, the very act of proposing a mining project can play a role in creating or 
splitting new scales and sites of political, economic and social relations as various actors and 
groups organise to contest or benefit from resource extraction. 
In this approach, participatory mechanisms are not merely an ethical imperative or 
greenwashing exercise (eg Mzembe and Downs 2014; see: O’Faircheallaigh 2008). Rather, 
they are a political tool for multinational corporations to manage conflict and risk generated 
by rapid changes in social relations of production and reproduction generated by the 
development of large-scale mining. Conflicts are not limited to local scales or sites of 
production but spill over national and global scales through alliances of critics, supporters, 
and governance networks. It is this complex, multi-scalar conflict over the institutional and 
ideological bounds of participation that determines the diverse outcomes of participatory 
mechanisms.  
In turn, people affected by mining’s capacity to participate or not depends on their access to 
economic and political resources, their strategic assessment of negative and positive impacts 
of mining and their ideological receptivity to forms of participation on offer. Communities, or 
sub groups within communities, will gain more concessions and compensation when they 
organise to increase their power outside of and regardless of CSR programs, community 
development agreements and other forms of participation. Their power and agency to do so 
is rooted in their historically produced social relations. More specifically, groups’ capacity to 
embrace, co-opt, resist or subvert participatory mechanisms are based on their control of 
land, history of organisation, alliances and ideologies. These four factors were identified 
through empirical fieldwork and are not meant to be an exhaustive or limiting list. Of these 
factors, ideology plays a special role. Ideologies are influenced by and influence how people 
conceive of their relationship to land, their organisation of production and social reproduction 
and their choice of allies. Indeed, each are internally related and coproduced through 
historical evolution of the social relations of production and reproduction (on the philosophy 
of internal relations see: Bieler and Morton 2018). I argue that understanding these factors 
explains why and how groups of people affected by mining often respond differently in what 
appear to be similar situations.  
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Methodology and Methods 
This study applies and extends the modes of participation framework to explain why the 
participatory mechanisms of multinational mining corporations produce wildly divergent 
outcomes in apparently similar situations. Social conflict theory, on which the modes of 
participation framework is based, employs an historical sociological analysis to understanding 
transformations producing “the global set of class relations attending capitalism, and the 
manner in which these relate to locally variegated patterns of investment, production and 
consumption, as well as geopolitical contestation” . It is sensitive to how: “Even the most 
localised contest is ultimately nested within a wider set of power relations that now span the 
globe” (Hameiri and Jones 2020, 16). 
I therefore adopt a methodology that places individual and group decision making within a 
broader structural political economy analysis. Or, as Welker (2009, 168) argues: 
If we hope to understand how capitalism plays out on the ground, we must tease apart these 
alliances (community-company) and attend to the different political-moral frameworks that 
animate various actors – in defence of as well in opposition to capital. 
Struggling with a similar question of local variability within political and economic structures, 
Horowitz (2008; 2011) combines wide-angle political economy analysis with focused micro-
political ‘actor oriented’ approaches. Such a methodology strikes a balance between the 
equally distasteful economic determinism and political spontaneism that conceptualise actors 
as either without agency or unbounded by structural factors and takes as its unit of analysis 
‘actors-in-context’ (Murdoch and Marsden 1995). This methodological approach places this 
research in critical realist epistemology that “takes the middle road through positivism and 
constructivism in asserting the existence of fixed structures within which society functions, 
while acknowledging that we have the capacity to exert influence through the constructions 
that result from social interaction” (Birks 2014, 20) 
Here, Bieler and Morton (2018, 49) provide a useful warning about treating agency and 
structure as separate ontological categories that interact and influence each other externally 
when “Capitalist social relations of production shape the various structuring conditions as 
well as engender social class forces as key collective agents.” Analysis, therefore, “commences 
with a focus on the structuring conditions of capitalist social relations of production, which by 
default implies that structure matters” (Bieler and Morton 2018, 44). The same danger of 
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reification applies to political scales, which are not separate realms but coproduced and 
internally related through the historical globalisation of capitalist relations.  
Case study methods provide the opportunity to examine how political economic structures 
change through multi-scalar conflicts and changing social relations. Furthermore, qualitative 
case studies are an ideal research strategy to explain ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 2003, 6). 
They allow detailed examination of phenomena, including localised dynamics, without losing 
sight of trends and pressures across societies. Multiple-case studies help to produce 
theoretical replication across cases with different political outcomes (see Yin 2003, 47).  
The research methodology draws from a single country case – Indonesia – and applies within-
case comparisons with three local cases chosen to demonstrate the diversity of corporate-
community participation. In selecting three cases, a balance was struck between replication 
of theoretical explanations of divergent outcomes while still having the time and resources 
for sufficiently detailed investigation. Each of the three cases, introduced below, represent 
one of Yin’s three categories: Kelian is a critical case, Gosowong a typical case and Kulon Progo 
an extreme case.6 Furthermore, several insightful single or dual case studies of social conflict 
and mining in Indonesia have been written (Bachriadi 1998; Welker 2014; Peluso 2016; K. 
Robinson 2016). I build on their insights while producing a greater level of replication.  
Each case study is primarily explanatory, focussing on how and why participatory mechanisms 
are used by multinational corporations and how and why people affected by mining react to 
them. Yet each case study also has exploratory elements examining factors determining the 
capacity and desire or groups of people affected by mining to participate or not.7 This reflects 
                                                     
6 Robert Yin (2003, 40) outlines the utility of the critical case for “testing a well-formulated theory”; 
the extreme or unique case where an occurrence “may be so rare that any single case is worth 
documenting and analysing”; (2003, 41) and the representative or typical case where “lessons 
learned from these cases are assumed to be informative about the experiences of the average 
person or institution” (2003, 41). He also identifies revelatory and longitudinal cases as the fourth 
and fifth rationales for selecting cases. Although these rationales are more applicable to single-case 
study designs, I identify that selecting critical, typical and extreme cases helps to demonstrate 
theoretical replicability over different case types as opposed to, for example, testing three typical 
cases.  
7 Yin (2003, 6) explains that exploratory case studies (or any other exploratory research method) are 
those that ask “what”, “who” and “where” questions – “In contrast, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are 
more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories and experiments as the 
preferred research strategies”. Thus, case studies, along with a small handful of other qualitative 
research strategies are uniquely placed to test theories that explain why and how particular 
outcomes arise.  
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the inductive/deductive split in my research questions. It is deductive because I apply the 
modes of participation framework to provide explanations for how multi-scalar contestations 
shape participatory mechanisms. It is inductive in that it was through fieldwork and analysis 
that the factors determining the capacity and desire of affected groups to participate – control 
of land, histories of organisation, alliance structures and ideologies. The questions in Table 1 
guided my four-year investigation across the three cases in Indonesia, each involving 
Australian-based mining corporations. 
Table 1 - Research Questions 
 Research Questions 
1. How do multinational mining companies attempt to control risks posed by conflict 
with people affected by mining? 
2. What factors explain when, why, how, and the degree to which multinational mining 
corporations use participatory mechanisms to manage conflict with people affected 
by mining? 
3. How do participatory mechanisms shape, contain or change the forms that social 
conflict takes? 
4. How and why are participatory mechanisms contested, co-opted, embraced or 
ignored by grass-roots and non-government organisations?  
5. What factors, including access to resources, land use, alliance structures and 
strategies, or ideologies affect responses to participatory mechanisms by people 
affected by mining? 
Research methods involved literature review, document analysis, participant observation, 
and most importantly, in-depth semi-structured interviews in Indonesian or English. Semi-
structured interviews create space for participants to make observations not predicted or 
anticipated by the researcher (Fife 2005), while participant observation helps "ensure the 
[interview] questions reflected the respondents’ concerns and assumptions, not those of the 
researcher” (Mills 2014, 38). Participant observation allows researchers to observe and 
confirm data that participants have divulged. For example, by observing community events 
or protests, a researcher can gain an understanding of how factors such as age and gender 
affect participation.  
Fieldwork was conducted across three case study locations plus the Indonesia capital, Jakarta, 
between 2015 and 2018 with a total of 15 months spent in-country. I conducted formal 
interviews with 80 unique individuals – some were interviewed multiple times, to check back 
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and update data over time. Formal interviews were supported by many more conversations, 
participant observation and fieldnotes. Most participants were people affected by mining, 
with a range of pro, contra or neutral voices included from each area. Representative 
sampling was used to ensure that different opinions and voices were included, including 
representation of people of different ages, genders and ehtnicities, where relevent and 
possible. Snowball sampling aided in reaching data saturation amongst each group. 
Triangulation of data was also provided by interviews with company employees, managers, 
and government officials.  
Sometimes difficulty in obtaining data can be illuminating. In the case of Kulon Progo, the 
Australian parent company declined offers to be interviewed while community relations staff 
in the Indonesian subsidiary initially agreed but later cancelled arranged interviews. In 
Gosowong and Kulon Progo, women and men were both represented in formal interviews 
with people affected by mining, whereas in Kelian all 15 interviews were with men. This 
reflects the painful history of gendered violence associated with the Kelian Gold Mine and the 
ethical imperative to not force participants to revisit past trauma (see Chapter Five). Table 2 
provides a summary of formal interviews. 
Table 2 - Formal Interviews 
Case Type Number of formal interviews 
Kelian gold mine 
West Kutai, East Kalimantan 
Rio Tinto 
People affected by mining 4 
Local organisers 2 
Regency and village government 
officials 
3 
District and provincial NGO 
workers and activists 
2 
Company employees 3 




People affected by mining 4 
Local organisers 1 
Provincial, regency and village 
government official 
9 
Provincial NGO workers and 
activists 
2 
Company employees 1 
Kulon Progo iron sand mine 
Kulon Progo 
Yogyakarta 
Indo Mines Ltd 
People affected by mining 25 
Local organisers 5 
District and village government 
officials 
5 
Provincial NGO workers and 
Activists 
5 
Company employees 0 
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Data analysis involved constant ‘zigzagging’ between literature, data collection, analysis, 
theoretical development and drafting. Early drafts of chapters based on case studies 
(Chapters Five, Six & Seven) were translated into Indonesian and copies provided to key 
informants during follow up fieldwork in 2018, providing further opportunities for informants 
to approve quotes, correct information or provide further details. The final section of Chapter 
Three outlines the analytical procedure applied to each case study. Appendix 1 provides a 
detailed description of data collection processes, ethical considerations and positionality. 
Case Study Selection 
Indonesia presents a meta case containing three location-based cases. Each case then 
includes several embedded cases (Yin 2003, 52) – different groups of affected people who are 
offered different forms of participation or react differently to the same participatory 
mechanisms. Indonesia presents an ideal country to study contestation over the social and 
environmental impacts of mining for several reasons. From 2013 until July 2019, mining made 
up 15.66% of Indonesian exports and 4.77% of GDP (Bank Indonesia 2019b; 2019a see 
Chapter Three for more detail). According to Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
reporting, mining contributed 3.35% of state revenue in 2016, down from 4.14% in 2015 (EITI 
Indonesia 2018). This means the extractive sector is significant but not disproportionately 
dominant, unlike in countries such as Mongolia, Peru or the DRC where government revenue 
is dependent on extractive industries. This allows examination of the extractive sector as part 
of broader phenomena in political economy and suggests Indonesia presents a typical case, 
like countries with significant extractive sectors such as the Philippines, Chile or Australia.8  
Secondly, Indonesia is a significant country for metal and mineral extraction, ranked seventh 
in the world for value of metallic minerals and coal extracted (ICMM 2018b). Extractive 
industries have been involved in many forms of conflict, from armed separatist wars to 
political protest and high-profile legal cases. Indeed, in Indonesia, high profile cases 
contributed to global crises of legitimacy for multinational miners as well as generating 
national and local crises (Guáqueta 2013). Freeport's Grasburg mine in West Papua is 
                                                     
8 Mongolia, Peru and the DRC are ranked 16th, 21st and 2nd by the ICMM (2018b) in 2018 in terms of 
mining’s contribution to the economy and government revenue. The Philippines, Chile and Australia 
were ranked 61st, 35th and 32nd. Indonesia was ranked 50th.  
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notorious for its links with the Indonesian Military (TNI), clashes with organised labour and 
toxic waste (Bachriadi 1998; Leith 2003). Exxon’s gas field development played a role in 
independence conflicts in Aceh (G. Robinson 1998; Harker 2003; Aspinall 2007). The terrifying 
Lapindo mud volcano, triggered by drilling in a gas well, focused world attention on 
extractives and corruption in post-New Order Indonesia (Tapsell 2012; Tingay 2015). The 
Buyat Bay WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, The Indonesian Forum for 
Environment) case against Newmont resulted in high profile arrests (Symon 2007). While the 
Canadian owned Sorowako mine in Sulawesi has created dispossession and intra-community 
conflict (K. Robinson 2016).  
Finally, archipelagic Indonesia presents a diverse range of political and social contexts within 
which extractives operate, allowing a bounded comparative study. There is a range of 
techniques used by corporate and state actors to manage conflict and a diversity of reactions 
from people affected by mining. This allowed the selection of case studies where different 
strategies are employed within the same national regulatory environment. Indeed, the three 
cases in this thesis are from geographically disparate areas of Indonesia: Kalimantan, Java and 
Maluku. The following subsections introduce each of the three cases. 
The recent (since 2014) rise of resource nationalism in Indonesia has spurred the return of 
debates about developmentalist state (J. D. Wilson 2015; Warburton 2016; Gellert 2019; 
Tilley 2020; Chapter 4). Indonesia therefore presents a peculiar dynamic – as power is 
rebalanced between domestic conglomerates, the National Government and multinational 
corporations. Indeed, the selection of Indonesia during the resurgence of ‘resource 
nationalism’ shows that corporations remain the dominant governors of social dimensions of 
mining despite this assertion of state power. If this is the case in an increasingly 
developmental oriented state, it will hold even more so in more neoliberal oriented states.  
Kelian Equatorial Mining – Rio Tinto’s legacy 
Rio Tinto’s former gold mine on the Kelian River in East Kalimantan operated from 1991 until 
2005. It provides a rare insight into the conflict management strategies applied before and 
after modes of participation emerged globally. The case is especially critical because of Rio 
Tinto’s leadership role in developing self-governance standards and associations. Human 
rights abuses and extreme inequality characterised the relationship between local 
communities and Rio Tinto’s subsidiary, Kelian Equatorial Mining (KEM) until local activists 
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were able to form national and international alliances and force KEM into negotiations. Then, 
following the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime in Indonesia, space opened for 
organisations to campaign at local and national scales. Pressure on Rio Tinto, across multiple 
political scales, resulted in an expansion of participatory community programs, including the 
negotiation of compensation for evicted families and victims of human rights abuse. It 
therefore presents as a critical case – because of the timing at the creation of new democratic 
political regime domestically and new global governance regime globally – providing insight 
into the conflicts that spurred the creation of new regimes. 
 
Map created by the author using open source data in QGIS 
Nusa Halmahera Minerals - Newcrest's Gosowong Gold Mine 
Nusa Halmahera Minerals’ (NHM) Gosowong mine, majority owned by Newcrest Mining 
Limited presents a typical representative case of a multinational mining corporation following 
international standards to respond to conflict with people affected by mining. The Gosowong 
mine in North Maluku has been producing gold and silver since 1999. In contrast to KEM, 
NHM employed community development programs from the beginning. However, this did 
not stop the mine becoming embroiled in violent conflict between politicians over the spoils 
of Indonesia’s decentralisation process. However, after the conflict ended, NHM was able to 
shape social relations amenable to extraction through extensive community development, 
Figure 1 - Case Study Locations 
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and negotiations with local leaders. One percent of annual revenue from the mine is spent on 
community development projects “based on proposals developed by village teams elected by 
the communities” (Fletcher 2012). This kind of participatory community development 
program is typical – and can be taken to be representative of contemporary participatory 
mechanisms implemented by multinational miners. This holds despite local variability 
explaining the success in participation containing violent manifestations of conflict. 
Jogja Megasa Iron - IndoMine's Kulon Progo Sand Iron Proposal 
Finally, the case of Jogja Magasa Iron presents an extreme or rare case (Yin 2003, 40) where 
a group of peasants9 overcame the odds to successfully resist the mining company. This 
project was a joint venture between Australian mining company Indo Mines Ltd, the Royal 
Family of Yogyakarta and domestic conglomerate Rajawali Corp. The association of shoreline 
farmers (Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai – PPLP) refused and actively obstructed attempts to 
elicit their participation and even disrupted community development projects and 
consultation sessions. The rare success of a group of peasants refusing to participate and 
overcoming an elite coalition tests the theoretical framework in a case that deviates from the 
typical or representative case. Being a rare outcome, it also provides crucial insights into the 
factors that contribute to the capacity and desire of groups to resist mining.  
Organisation of this thesis 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters, including this introduction and the conclusion. 
Chapter Two reviews the dominant approaches to conflict and participation in literature on 
extractive industries. It moves from a critique of ‘problem-solving theory’ to ‘critical theories’ 
(Cox 2009). Problem-solving theories include various forms of institutionalism and 
managerialism that assume negative social and environmental impacts of mining result from 
institutional failure or poor corporate practice and can be resolved through reform. 
Institutional and managerial approaches provide the assumptions that underpin emergent 
modes of participation in the extractive industries. Critical approaches seek to understand 
how current structures came about and how they might change. Reviewing critical political 
                                                     
9 In this thesis, I use ‘peasant’ to refer to agrarian smallholders. Following Lucas and Warren (2013, 27) 
I translate the Indonesian ‘petani’ as ‘peasant’, “implying traditional village ties and semisubsistance 
household based economic orientation” as opposed to “a more commercially oriented ‘farmer’”.  
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economy approaches to social conflict and participation, I argue that only by combining macro 
and micro versions of critical political economy can various forms and outcomes of 
participation be explained.  
Chapter Three details the theoretical framework that guides my research and analysis. The 
modes of participation framework is combined with a politics of scale to understand how 
contestation over governance, ideology, and the disruption of primitive accumulation result 
in a variety of participatory mechanisms. Social reproduction theory explains how conflict 
generated by mining is not limited to formal political institutions or sites of production but 
encompass social relationships that sustain and reproduce livelihoods. The Gramscian 
concept of ‘common-sense’ is used to explain the ideological receptivity of people affected 
by mining to participation.  
Chapter Four provides an account of how crises produced global self-governance networks 
for the social and environmental dimensions of mining, using the International Council on 
Metals and Mining as a demonstrative example. Mechanisms based in international standards 
are implemented at local scales, extending, and entrenching the power of multinational 
corporations. Across domestic regimes there is a trend towards minimal regulation of the 
social dimensions of mining as governments accept the modes of participation established by 
multinational corporations at the global scale. This is certainly the case in Indonesia where an 
analysis of the political economy of mining reveals that because of opportunistic alliances 
between domestic oligarchs, foreign capital, senior bureaucrats and politicians, corporations 
are left to self-regulate. Nevertheless, space has opened for people affected by mining and 
their allies to contest the social and environmental impacts of mining. Increased opportunities 
for alliance building, defending land and building autonomous organisations means there is a 
vast array of reactions by people affected by mining towards participation and mining.  
Chapters Five, Six and Seven analyse fieldwork data from case studies in Kelian, Gosowong 
and Kulon Progo, respectively. Each chapter explains how participatory mechanisms came 
about, who participated, on what terms and who was excluded. Each case demonstrates the 
power of the modes of participation framework to explain diverse outcomes. In Kelian, 
participatory mechanisms were employed in reaction to threats to mining. As local groups 
increased in power, they were demanded forms of participation in their interests. However, 
the outcomes of participatory mechanisms reflected the balance of power between the 
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actors involved. In Gosowong, modes of participation offered by NHM were compatible with 
pre-existing common-sense understandings of political participation and were easily 
integrated into pre-existing structures. NHM secured the support, or at least non-opposition 
of key local leaders and regional politicians. Various groups were able to organise to extract 
benefits from NHM based on ideologies of indigeneity, cross-class alliances and physical 
blockades, although the mine’s operations were never seriously threatened. In Kulon Progo, 
the mining company and government allies failed to present forms of participation that 
agreed with local actors’ common-sense understandings of the world. Because of their 
independently organised modes of production and strong communitarian relations of social 
reproduction, peasants were powerful enough to resist the mine’s development. In fact, the 
experience of marginalisation, resistance and alliance formation has strengthened the 
peasants’ organisations and given rise to more equal gender relations across five villages.  
Finally, Chapter Eight serves as a conclusion, extending the analysis and argument developed 
throughout the thesis while identifying limitations. New modes of participation, enshrined 
through networks of global governance, provide the institutional and ideological structures 
with which multinational mining companies respond to contemporary and future conflicts 
with local communities. These structures are not static but continue to evolve in relation to 
ongoing multi-scalar conflicts with people affected by mining and their allies. This is a 
significant analytic model for corporations, state actors, activists and NGOs to understanding 
and develop strategies in relation to current and emerging struggles over mining 
developments. Further empirical research could illuminate these dynamics from other 
perspectives. Non-traditional comparative work between authoritarian and democratic 
contexts or between developing and developed economies is promising for testing the limits 
of the theoretical and empirical generalisations made here. While the expansion and 
globalisation of capital and mining corporations from China, India and Russia is an established 
phenomenon, it is yet to be seen whether corporations from these countries will integrate 
and modify existing modes of participation, whether they will face a similar crisis of legitimacy 
to established multinational corporations, or whether they will produce alternative and 
competing global standards to manage the environmental and social dimensions of mining. 
The modes of participation framework contains the potential for further analysing, predicting 
and understanding these and other emerging developments in the global extractive industries.
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Chapter Two: Debating mining, conflict 
and participation  
It is frustratingly common that, as Fabiana Li (2015, 10) observes, “the term ‘conflict’ gloss[es] 
over the intricacies of what [is] being described, often obscuring more than it reveal[s].” This 
is a call to investigate the complex causes of conflict in order to move past formulaic 
institutional responses. Any theoretical approach adopted will affect the treatment of every 
aspect of conflict. Different theoretical approaches emphasise or gloss over some causes 
while different groups of actors and sites of conflict are brought to the forefront or ignored. 
Most importantly, interventions and conflict management strategies are based in theoretical 
understandings, even if these foundations are not always explicit. The task, then, is to uncover 
what is being described or glossed over by ‘conflict’ to reveal the assumptions, problems and 
implications of significant theoretical approaches. 
In this chapter I review and provide a critique of the main theoretical approaches to conflict 
and participation in literature on mining and explain how these underpin different models for 
intervention. The key distinction that I draw is between approaches that consider conflict an 
aberration from normal functional social order and those that conceptualise visible conflict 
as expressions of constant but changing contestations between social groups with conflicting 
interests over development outcomes. This distinction roughly corresponds to the famous 
distinction made by Robert Cox (2009, 316) between ‘problem-solving’ theory, which seeks 
to find practical solutions within current structures and ‘critical theory’ which seeks to explain 
how current structures came about and how they might be changed.  This distinction is 
particularly important to make because of the persistence of violent conflict and human rights 
abuses surrounding mining, despite decades of reform and innovation. The potential for 
systemic change must be identified.  
While each approach contributes something to our understanding of conflict and 
participation in mining, none can satisfactorily answer the questions posed in this thesis. I 
move from approaches most influential in practices of institutional and corporate conflict 
management, towards approaches that come closer to identifying systematic contradictions. 
Firstly, the resource curse debate has been influential in framing the problems of mining and 




conflict on national scales. While largely focused on questions of resource extraction’s 
contribution to ‘development’ and ‘conflict’, the idea of the resource curse is taken up as a 
problem addressed by neoinstitutionalism, the second approach critically evaluated here. 
Neoinstitutionalist approaches consider development as a public good and normatively 
privilege private-sector led development. They are therefore concerned with forms of conflict 
that threaten private development and corruption. These assumptions have underpinned the 
response of international organisations to conflicts over the benefits and impacts of large-
scale mining,  in particular that of the World Bank Group, in designing institutional ‘fixes’ and 
‘good governance’ reform. Third, and sharing many assumptions about the inherent good of 
private-sector led development, managerial approaches have driven the responses of 
corporations to conflicts with local communities through Corporate Social Responsibility 
programs which aim to establish or maintain a social licence to operate by appropriating 
concepts from sustainability and participatory development theory and practice. Together, 
these three approaches are important to understand and critique because of their influence 
over current practices of conflict management in relation to mining. The critique of their 
application is taken up again in Chapter Four.  
The fourth approach considered, historical institutionalism, is less concerned with private 
sector led growth as a normative good. Instead, authors are more concerned with the ways 
that institutional endowments structure the distribution of benefits and impacts of mining. 
For them, conflict between communities, corporations and states can generate institutional 
change. Yet ultimately, because of a methodological and ontological focus on institutions, 
their understanding of conflict fails to explain where change originates from. Next, post-
structuralist approaches offer valuable insights into the dynamics of power and conflict 
outside formal institutions. Activist and NGO literature, while not sharing a common 
theoretical understanding, share an agenda of advocacy for radical institutional reform, 
including enshrining human-rights and free prior informed consent (FPIC) in legislation. These 
two sets of approaches move into the realm of critical theory in that they examine how 
underlying contestation between actors becomes manifest and some of the ways that this 
might change. Finally, it is critical political economy that best explains the emergence of 
conflict, its management through participation and responses of people affected by mining 





through a combination of micro and macro critical political economy that multi-scalar 
conflicts and governance of mining can be understood.  
The Resource Curse 
The ‘resource curse hypothesis’ emerged in the 1990s, in an attempt to explain decades of 
ambiguous economic and social development, along with high rates of conflict in resource 
rich countries. Most famously associated with Auty (1993), Ross (1999; 2018), and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), the hypothesis is that large natural resource endowments and high 
contributions of natural resources to total exports are correlated with more durable 
authoritarian regimes, ineffective bureaucracy, corruption, weak rule of law, slower economic 
development, civil war and violent conflict (Sachs and Warner 1999). Largely based in cross-
country econometric and statistical analysis, the methodology of the earlier versions of the 
resource curse literature focuses on proving or disproving statistical relationships between 
social-economic indicators and various indicators of resource abundance or wealth (for 
example: Sachs and Warner 1999). 
More recent applications show how poor development outcomes are particularly severe for 
minorities, indigenous people and women (Kotsadam and Tolonen 2016; Ross 2018).  The 
curse is traditionally associated with diamonds and oil, but has been applied to gold (Elbra 
2017), copper, and ‘conflict resources’1 in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (Matti 2010; Haufler 2017). The role of aid, environmental degradation and localised 
social conflict have also come to the fore in discussions of the resources curse (Morrison 2012; 
Banks 2014). Geographically, the resource curse is strongly associated with African countries, 
yet has been modified and applied across a range of contexts, including Indonesia (Rosser 
2007) and Australia (Brueckner et al. 2014). 
Debate continues over explanations for the correlation, however it can be summarised in 
three elements: first, high levels of resource exports during temporary booms appreciate 
exchange rates and decrease long-term competitiveness of other sectors of the economy 
(Sachs and Warner 1999). Second, the concentration of ownership, capital investment and 
                                                     
1 The idea of conflict resources is especially associated with the protracted civil war in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and neighbouring countries where tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold extraction 
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revenue lead to increased inequality, corruption and rent-seeking. Finally, tax and royalty 
rents available to states mean they can become less reliant on broad-based tax regimes, 
insulated from popular discontent and democratic accountability which entrenches rentier 
states (Elbra 2017, 40). Furthermore, concentrated resource rents can both generate 
grievances and provide lucrative incentives for armed rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
The resource curse is magnified where state institutions are weak or underdeveloped and 
therefore unable to manage the distortions or corrupting influence of an overreliance on 
natural resources (Grzybowski 2012, 7). As such, while resource extraction is seen as a 
significant cause of conflict, it is ultimately the institutional environment – weak governance, 
corruption, a narrow tax base and so on that is seen to entrench conflict and weak 
developmental outcomes. 
The resource curse literature is a rebuke to the idea that mining would drive development in 
post-colonial countries from the 1950s, through the commodity booms and shocks of the 
1970s  (Matti 2010; Elbra 2017, 16–17). The persistence of the resource curse is also a rebuke 
to the World Bank’s mining code revisions in the 1980s and 90s which deregulated and 
privatised mining sectors (J. Nem Singh and Bourgouin 2013c) – alongside the IMF’s structural 
adjustment programs – which entrenched conflict, most infamously with the Philippines 1995 
Mining Act (see Moody 2007, 19–24; and Elbra 2017, 17–18 for a full account).  
The resource curse literature has been valuable for highlighting structural contradictions of 
extractive led development strategies. However, the majority the literature does not consider 
either domestic social conflicts or global economic structures in aggravating or ameliorating 
the effects of the resource curse (Rosser 2007). The role of multinational corporations and 
globalisation is also overlooked (cf Elbra 2017, 36). Because of its preoccupation with the 
national scale, and economic statistical analysis, it does not consider how resource conflicts 
traverse multiple political scales and the full range of actors involved.  
With its successful framing of problems associated with natural resource dependence, and its 
focus on the role of state institutions, the resource curse hypothesis has been influential in 
institutional responses to conflict, poor development and weak governance in resource rich 
countries. It has influenced the World Bank’s ‘social-development‘ approach to extractive 
developments and governance (Fanthorpe and Gabelle 2013; Hatcher 2014). The 





interventions that penalise rent-seeking and corruption and promote good governance and 
participation (Kolstad, Wiig, and Williams 2009).  
Neoinstitutionalism and participatory development  
Neoinstitutionalist2 approaches to political economy grew out of new institutional economics, 
which rejected laissez-faire economics with the recognition that institutions play important 
roles in shaping human behaviour and the need for markets to be supported by institutional 
structures (North 1990; 2005; Stiglitz 2003). Following this, international institutions and 
states require the capacity to create and support markets and confront threats to their 
effective operation. Development is seen as a public good, not a as contested process of 
resource distribution (Hutchison et al. 2014). In this view, conflict is an aberration from 
normal social functioning, created by vested interests or institutional failure and visibly 
manifests as corruption, anti-market sentiment, violence, demonstrations, or war. In 
response to threats to private-sector led development, neoinstitutionalists advocate 
problem-solving reforms that increase privatisation, transparency, ownership, accountability, 
participation and stability to promote private-sector led economic growth and “compel 
national elites to deploy resource revenues for productive investments” (J. Nem Singh and 
Bourgouin 2013c, 31).  
Neoinstitutionalism increased in influence following mounting opposition to and decreasing 
legitimacy of the deregulation agenda of the ‘Washington-consensus’ in the 1990s.3 This led 
to the so-called ‘post-Washington consensus’, typified by the World Bank Group’s ‘social turn’ 
and ‘good governance’ agenda (Doornbos 2001; Hatcher 2014; Carroll and Jarvis 2015). The 
World Bank Group’s ‘social-development model’ entailed a renewed focus on poverty 
reduction along with social and environmental concerns (Hatcher 2015, 323). The current 
concept and practice of participatory development emerged as a protest or correction to 
earlier ‘top-down’ expert led modes of development that were disempowering intended 
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institutionalism (below). 
3 Development practice, modernisation theory, and associated IMF/World Bank shock therapy were 
undergoing a crisis of legitimacy through the 1980s and 1990s (Leal 2007).  




beneficiaries (S. C. White 1996; Cooke and Kothari 2001, 5; Leal 2007). Development is then 
best supported by institutions that promote ‘ownership’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, 
‘engagement’ and, ‘accountability’ (Guggenheim 2006; Tania M. Li 2007). In this view, with 
‘correct’ institutional design, conflict will be avoided altogether. However, when participatory 
techniques are employed “as a technical method of project work rather than as a political 
methodology of empowerment” (Hickey and Mohan 2005, 242), the differing interests of 
beneficiaries are ignored in favour of a project’s ‘success’. Accordingly, participation, 
especially when participation is not based on democratic principles, is used as a tool to co-
opt rather than confront continued challenges to inequitable development. This critique is 
relevant for private-sector led resource extraction where the success or profitability of the 
mine is placed above all other considerations.  
Neoinstitutionalism’s influence in relation to extractive industries parallels and appropriates 
from these broader shifts in approaches to development. World Bank-sponsored privatisation 
and deregulation of the 1980s and 90s had failed to produce expected development 
outcomes (see above). In Southeast Asia, the pattern of deregulation continued through the 
1990s so that: 
By the end of the 1990s, all the major mineral-rich countries in Southeast Asia had embarked in 
a race for reforms which would bring them to compete against each other for the most 
deregulated and liberalised mining regime (Hatcher 2020, 327) 
Problems highlighted by the resource curse literature above, as well as proliferating 
opposition to large scale extractivism by affected communities and NGOs destabilised the 
hegemony of development through deregulation and liberalisation.  
Neoinstitutionalism is the most influential approach that underpins international 
organisations’ current approach to participation, conflict and extractive industries (for 
example: World Bank 2003; 2014; Fanthorpe and Gabelle 2013; Ali et al. 2017). Emblematic 
of this is the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review (2003) which famously recommended 
the standard of Free Prior Informed Consent, while the World Bank Group in fact adopted the 
lesser Free Prior Informed Consultation.4 The social-development approach also underpins 
the United Nations’ understanding of conflict (Grzybowski 2012), initiatives such as the 
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Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Kimberley Process (Haufler 2017), and 
the World Bank’s support for sovereign wealth funds (J. Nem Singh and Bourgouin 2013a, 7). 
Through such reforms, the World Bank Group and other international organisations were able 
to (partially) restore legitimacy for their involvement in the industry and contain risks to its 
investments. The politics of these institutional interventions are the subject of Chapter Four, 
for now it is enough to note that Neoinstitutionalists propose participation as a technocratic 
problem-solving technique while excluding democratic and rights-based forms of 
representation.  
Business studies and discourses of corporate social 
responsibility 
While neoinstitutionalism has been the most influential body of literature on the governance 
and regulation of mining, interdisciplinary business studies and managerial approaches are 
dominant in corporate practices. Rather than a coherent theoretical approach, 
managerial/business studies approaches are a collection of pragmatic considerations of 
business risk and strategy, informed by insights from various theoretical traditions and 
disciplines including management, public relations, sociology, economics, political science, 
anthropology, and sustainability. These approaches have influenced discourses and practices 
of CSR, community relations, sustainable community development and the ‘social license to 
operate’ (O’Faircheallaigh and Ali 2008; Osburg and Schmidpeter 2013; McKenna 2015). What 
binds interdisciplinary business studies and managerial approaches together is the 
fundamental belief that large-scale corporate mining can be made responsible and 
sustainable through reforming business practice (for examples see: McKenna 2015; Bice 2016, 
xv; Ali et al. 2017). Like neoinstitutionalism, it is thoroughly problem-solving in orientation. It 
is no coincidence that discourses about CSR became mainstream around the same time as 
the World Bank’s ‘social turn’ in the 1990s and early 2000s (Bice 2016). Both ‘turns’ responded 
to a series of controversies and crises of legitimacy in the mining industry and its governance.  
Managerial approaches to conflict are primarily concerned with manifest forms of conflict 
that either pose some form of risk or threat to corporate profitability. Alternatively, authors 
and organisations may construct business cases to convince corporate actors to adopt more 
ethical policies and practices. Hence, managerial approaches identify immediate and specific 




causes and manifestations of conflict (McKenna 2015, 7). Exemplifying this, Davis and Franks 
rank conflict “broadly along a continuum, from low-level tension to escalated situations 
involving a complete relationship break-down or violence” (R. Davis and Franks 2011, 3; see 
also: Laplante and Spears 2008). Conflict could then take the form of informal or formal 
complaints, legal proceedings, political advocacy, protests, blockades, sabotage, or violent 
confrontation.  
In the critical literature on CSR, key debates concern the benefits of voluntary codes versus 
mandatory regulation (Phillips 2012) and the efficacy of national versus international 
regulation (Schumacher 2005; Sethi et al. 2011). Another concern is the risk that poorly 
regulated ‘Community Development’ programs can be used by local elites to extract tax and 
rent from mining corporations with little transparency for how the funds are used (Devi and 
Prayogo 2013). O’Faircheallaigh (2008, 2) divides the literature on CSR into three categories 
on the question of authenticity: authors that approach CSR as a cynical exercise in public 
relations; others that conceptualise it as a “part of a rational calculation of self-interest” for 
long-term profitability and; those that emphasise the ethical and moral decision making by 
individuals running corporations.  
Managerial approaches are eclectic because they appropriate concepts and practice from 
critics and disciplines such as sustainability. The ‘social license to operate’ is a key concept 
developed by business in the late 1990s in response to the increasing salience of 
‘sustainability’ (Brueckner and Eabrasu 2018). It is a way of operationalising social legitimacy, 
which can be as important as formal legal, environmental and political licences (Bice, 
Brueckner, and Pforr 2017). Obtaining a ‘social license’ is a subjective process, yet represents 
a shift on the part of corporations to actively manage and establish their social credentials, 
independent of their political allies and licences issued by state institutions (Prno and 
Slocombe 2012). Activists and other critics consciously attack the ‘social licence’ or public 
legitimacy of mining projects they oppose, just as they might challenge environmental 
permits through courts (Brueckner and Sinclair 2020). A chief strategy for securing social 
licence is with the participation of people affected by a project through consultation or 
community development programs (Prno and Slocombe 2012).  
There are two broad practices emerging from business studies that are relevant for managing 





assessments give corporations understandings of the risks to a specific development while 
community-based agreements attempt, through the participation of some people affected by 
mining, to mitigate and control these risks (Barrow 2010). Impact assessments may involve 
the participation of people affected by mining or may simply be produced by experts. Either 
way, impact assessments provide the baseline of knowledge for negotiating community 
agreements, although usually only include those impacts deemed technically manageable or 
rational (McKenna 2015, 145).5  
To sustain the assumption that ‘win-win’ solutions are possible, the premise of mining 
development and land grabbing are excluded from the range of impacts considered to cause 
conflict (for example, see: Barrow 2010; Bice 2016, 90). The literature consistently argues that 
risk of conflict and negative impacts will be minimised with greater and more equal 
participation in negotiations by people affected by mining (Barrow 2010). Ali (2003) goes so 
far as to argue that a corporation’s approach to negotiations and participation is the most 
important factor in determining resistance to or acceptance of mining developments. Even 
for the most critical authors in this approach, mining may be questioned, but it must never 
be rejected; in the words of Bice, “To reject mining is to reject modern life” (2016, 1–2). 
People affected by mining or critics who reject participation or mining are therefore written 
off as irrational or pre-modern. 
This business studies literature has led to improved practices and outcomes in the social and 
environmental impacts of mining. However, its ability to address structural roots of conflict 
remains limited as it upholds that profitability and efficiency drive development which is a 
value-neutral good (McKenna 2015, 3). O’Faircheallaigh (2015, 200) criticises the literature 
on negotiations for a “strong tendency … to focus on factors internal to the negotiation 
process … and to pay little attention to wider, structural factors that shape the context in 
which individual negotiations occur.” As with neo-institutional approaches above, 
participation is conceptualised as a technocratic problem-solving technique, not as space for 
enforcing rights or questioning the premise of corporate mining developments. The negative 
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impacts of mining and resultant forms of conflict are still viewed as unfortunate but 
manageable side-effects of mining, not as inherent contestation between competing interests 
in development.  
Historical Institutionalism 
Like the above approaches, historical institutionalism is largely a ‘problem-solving’ approach 
(cf A. Bebbington 2011), yet it responds to a broader set of problems. While in 
neoinstitutionalist and managerial approaches the key problem is how to best facilitate 
private-sector led growth, historical institutionalism can be harnessed to consider political 
regimes, democracy, inclusive development, human-rights, and social equity beyond narrow 
goals of economic growth. They do share a concern for the tendency of extractive industries 
and dependence on them to undermine governance institutions through corrupt practices or 
‘economic distortions’ (Thorp et al. 2012; A. Bebbington, Bornschlegl, and Johnson 2013). 
Historical institutionalists recognise that there can be a fundamental conflict between the 
goal of states to generate revenue through extractive developments or facilitate private 
sector growth and protect the rights of citizens, promote democracy, or address inequality 
(Thorp et al. 2012; D. H. Bebbington 2011).  
According to this approach, various formal and informal institutions have evolved in particular 
historical contexts to mediate this and other conflicts of interest. Historical institutionalism is 
concerned with the path dependency, layering and sequencing of institutional reform and 
how institutions are enmeshed in broader historical-social contexts. Institutions operate at 
various cultural, corporate or state sites at subnational, national or international scales 
(Angelbeck 2008; Elbra 2017). Historical institutionalist theories focus on explaining 
institutional change and stasis, based on the assumption that institutions shape subjects’ 
behaviour. They can be divided into epochal and gradualist variants. Epochal approaches pose 
that institutional configurations are path dependent and institutional change is subject to 
great inertia that is only overcome in periods of crisis or rupture. Gradualist approaches, as 
the name suggests, assume that institutional arrangements change gradually following 
changes in political, social or economic context and “focuses on active agency within 





little understanding of what kinds of context or crisis produce institutional change, with 
‘context’ becoming a kind of ‘deus ex machina’ (Hameiri 2019). 
The most valuable contribution of historical institutionalism to understanding extractive 
conflicts is the recognition that institutions and interventions develop from the evolution of 
social norms, discourses, and conflict. Some historical institutionalist accounts recognise 
institutional change as “a product of a series of conflicts” that then favour “certain actors, 
strategies and perceptions,” (J. T. Nem Singh 2010, 1415) and shape ongoing strategic action. 
Following this, actors may compete for dominance of institutions, sites and scales that best 
represent their interests. For example, Elbra’s (2014; 2017) contribution is to understand how 
multinational mining corporations deploy forms of power to legitimise global self-governance 
standards and avoid state regulation. She argues that contestation between MNCs and states 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are structured by institutional legacies and economic histories of 
colonial and capitalist development, which have left international corporations powerful vis-
á-vis post-colonial states (Elbra 2017). 
For historical institutionalists, the evolution of strong institutions is needed to resolve conflict 
between competing actors. Kristiansen and Sulistiawati (2016, 215) argue that land conflicts 
are triggered by “rising land values” and “unclear borders” – the result of weak and competing 
institutionalisations of land-rights in Eastern Indonesia. Here, there is conflict between adat6-
based mechanisms and state institutions embodying communal and commercial conceptions 
of land-rights respectively. To decrease the prevalence of land conflicts, both between 
villagers and between villagers and corporations, including mining corporations, they propose 
that adat needs to be integrated into state institutions, these institutions strengthened, and 
the boundaries clarified. However, the context in which this could occur and the actors who 
would drive this change are not identified.  
Placing more of a focus on local actors in conflict, contributors to a collection edited by 
Anthony Bebbington (2011) ask a fundamental question: can social conflict around extractives 
generate institutional changes (including through participation) that reduce social inequalities? 
This could occur when states, corporations or development agencies respond to conflict that 
becomes too hard to ignore or when people affected by mining force their way to the table. 
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For the contributors to that project, cautious hope that it can is tempered by observations 
that institutional reform can just as easily trigger new conflicts; for example, if opportunists 
respond by contesting the distribution of compensation payments (Arellano-Yanguas 2011). 
This approach considers that institutions are “the most critical factor in determining the final 
disposition of costs and benefits” and hence in shaping conflict (A. Bebbington, Bornschlegl, 
and Johnson 2013, 5).  
Similarly, Kathryn Robinson’s (2016) detailed analysis of conflict between a Canadian mining 
company and elements of the local community in Sorowako, South Sulawesi, concludes that: 
“Much of the conflict over land has its roots in the lack of clarity, or lack of enforcement, of 
the legal instruments that permit mining, including regulation of the entry of foreign miners” 
(K. Robinson 2016, 141–42). That is, the roots of conflict are given to be institutional failure, 
not the conflicting interests of groups over resources. In this view land conflict and human 
rights violations could be avoided through improved legislation, better enforcement and 
more participation. 
Despite rich empirical and historical investigation, these examples are limited by their 
methodological and ontological choices regarding institutions. Firstly, historical 
institutionalism suffers from normative assumptions that state institutions are or should be 
neutral actors which regulate development and mediate conflict. Secondly, it ignores or 
provides no explanation for political change and conflict that occurs outside formal 
institutions. Thus, the methodological and ontological privileging of institutional politics 
overlooks the origins of the conflicts that are thought to generate institutional change.7 For 
example, the lack of clarity in and enforcement of mining regulation in Indonesia is not simply 
the result of poor design but the product of corporate oligarchic power in the legislative and 
political process (Rosser and Edwin 2010). Stated differently: “HI tends to give institutions 
primary causal status, while institutions themselves are only weakly explained as a legacy of 
historical development” (Hameiri and Jones 2020, 13).  
This is not to claim that institutions have no effect on how conflict manifests. Rather, my 
critique of historical institutionalism is that the institutional change is always bound up in the 
                                                     





conflicting interests and powers of different actors in resource extraction. O'Faircheallaigh's 
research in Australia shows that:  
Mining agreements will be limited in their ability to assist in protecting Aboriginal cultural 
heritage unless Aboriginal peoples can identify ways of enhancing their bargaining power vis a 
vis [sic] mining companies (2008, 30). 
And that they might do this by forming alliances with NGOs or regional Aboriginal land 
organisations or otherwise altering the structural context within which participation occurs 
(O’Faircheallaigh 2015, 202). Similarly, Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor (2016) point to 
asymmetries of technical knowledge between state and indigenous participants in Bolivia and 
Peru as the major barrier to “effective participation” in consultations over hydrocarbon 
developments. The UNDP-LEAD pilot program in North Maluku (Chapter Six) is an example of 
historical institutionalism instrumentalised. 
Post-structuralism: power and knowledge  
Post-structuralism provides alternative analyses of knowledge, conflict and participation that 
begin from bottom up micro-relations of power. It provides a useful critique of the reification 
of institutions and political economic structures through examining the origin of power in 
social relations. Drawing on Foucault:  
political actions, regimes, violence, and everyday practices ought neither to be understood as 
simply emanating from the intentions of rulers or participants nor, on the other hand, as driven 
by either material conditions or ideology (W. Brown 2015, 115). 
Instead, ‘political rationalities’ are constitutive of both subjects and their governance, 
defining the realm of possibility for action (Tania M. Li 2006; W. Brown 2015). Post-
structuralist scholars therefore:  
Begin from below, in the heterogeneous and dispersed micro-physics of power, explore specific 
forms of its exercise in different institutional sites, and consider how, if at all, these were 
articulated to produce broader and more persistent social configurations (Jessop 2007, 148). 
Within post-structuralism, governmentality is the most important concept to study these 
actual practices of subjugation and colonisation as forms of rule. In his first lecture on 
governmentality, Foucault (2002, 206) referred to both a science and an art of government 
that is aimed towards coalescing and directing power through society: “In the art of 
government the task is to establish a continuity, in both an upward and downward direction”. 
Governmentality is concerned with the: 




ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as 
its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security (Foucault 2002, 219–20). 
In other words, the knowledges, rationalities and strategies that are required not only to 
manage the economy of a population but also to constitute the very subjects who will 
function in the economy. Of course, governmentality is not only employed by state actors but 
by any organisation seeking to exert control over a population through manipulating flows of 
power.  
In relation to extractive conflicts, post-structuralist scholars begin with how mining 
companies, NGOs, and state actors create, control, maintain and marginalise kinds of 
knowledges, rationalities and strategies to constitute supportive discourses, ‘truths’ and 
populations (Wesley and MacCallum 2014). For Fabiana Li, institutions are not the most 
critical determinant of conflict, the power to produce knowledge is: 
Instead of taking transparency and participation as the end point of the analysis (the desired 
outcome that will prevent or reduce the incidence of conflicts), I consider how mechanisms of 
audit, environmental management, and accountability take shape and become enmeshed in the 
controversies. What I am proposing is an analysis that gets beyond common sense 
understandings of the 'conflicts' as a failure of state and corporate accountability (2015, 12). 
Strategies of corporate miners to control and reframe knowledge involve the power to turn 
political and moral grievances into technical problems which are “technically manageable 
based on the solutions and interventions that [are] on offer” (F. Li 2015, 32). Indeed, through 
techniques of corporate management, standard setting and audit, the ways in which 
legitimate knowledge is defined is changing.  
Authors refer to this collection of practices as ‘audit culture’ where “audits not only monitor 
performance, but come to define efficiency, quality and good practice” (F. Li 2015, 11; also 
Kirsch 2014, 168–72). For Welker (2014, 188): 
The proliferating standards, indicators, and metrics adopted by [mining companies] tend to 
bureaucratize, depoliticize, and render technical the social, environmental, and economic 
impacts of business. Many are developed through consensus-based "multistakeholder" 
processes; civil society participants lend these processes and their products legitimacy and 
hegemonic force, even when they may not endorse the results. 
In this view, participation is a technology for defining legitimate knowledge and forming 





accept the bounds of legitimate knowledge explicitly or implicitly contained within the terms 
of participation. As a power relation that defines knowledge and legitimacy, participatory 
mechanisms interrupt and reshape conflict. Furthermore, through participation, persuasion, 
seduction, and manipulation, corporations and states create new ‘extractive subjectivities’ 
(Frederiksen and Himley 2020). 
Within technocratic frameworks, there may be struggles about what information is correct, 
for example over different methods for measuring toxicity or differing calculations of 
compensation payments. The point is that technocratization provides rules for what kinds of 
knowledge count as legitimate. ‘Deviant’ subjects who insist on maintaining political, moral 
or cultural arguments in the face of technocratic rationality are ignored or repressed. That is 
not to suggest that a solid line is successfully drawn between rational and deviant subjects. 
Indeed, the technocratic rationalities legible in the extractive sector are based both in critical 
discourses of sustainability and the scientific disciplines required for mining – engineering, 
geology and law (Kirsch 2014). It is during this dynamic process that rationality comes to be 
defined. 
If institutionalists overemphasise the institutional rules and structures as a determining factor 
in conflict, post-structuralists underemphasise political economic structures within which 
power operates. However, post-structuralist approaches are not unique in studying conflict 
from below or the micro-relations of power. Gramscian concepts of ideology and ‘common-
sense’ also explain how particular ‘rationalities’ (or conceptions of the world) are produced 
through historical processes and provide frameworks for possible action (Gramsci 1971; 
Rupert 2006; Chapter Three). Social reproduction theory explains the ideological and material 
historical constitution of changing subjects (Chapter Three). Ultimately, while post-
structuralist approaches offer rich descriptions of conflicts surrounding extractive industries, 
and are sensitive to the way legitimate knowledge is produced, their explanatory power is 
limited by the focus on knowledges and discursive power at the expense of structural power 
within changing capitalist relations of production. 
NGO and activist approaches 
NGO and activist approaches to conflict and participation are not a coherent theoretical 
approach yet have been influential in popularising critiques of resource extraction and 




participatory practices of international organisations, states and corporations. The works of 
activists like Roger Moody (1992; 2007) has been particularly influential in connecting 
industry practices across time, people affected by mining, and NGOs to create global alliances. 
Indeed, institutional and managerial approaches to and practices of participation often 
develop in reaction to NGO and activist criticism or proposals for strict regulation (see Chapter 
Four).  
Rights based activism advocates enshrining rights in enforceable legal mechanisms and other 
institutions, especially prominent is advocacy for FPIC (Szablowski 2010). Yet activists tend to 
fetishize particular kinds of visible conflict, such as protest, demonstrations, blockades, 
statements, sabotage and petitions and are relatively unconcerned with less legible forms of 
contestation. Likewise, with the focus on social movement organisations and activist leaders, 
the agency of less obviously organised groups of people is overlooked. 
Activists with radical democratic, environmentalist and post-colonialist approaches 
frequently advocate for institutional reform as a response to conflict. For example, a report 
authored by the Centre for International Environmental Law and the Indonesian Centre for 
Environmental Law argues that: 
Community-based property rights by definition emanate from and are enforced by communities. 
The distinguishing feature of CBPRs is that they derive their authority from the community in 
which they operate, not from the nation-state where they are located. Formal legal recognition 
or grant of CBPRs by the state, however, is generally desirable and can help to ensure that CBPRs 
are respected and used in pursuit of the public interest (Lynch and Harwell 2002, 3 emphasis in 
the original). 
Beyond its normative argument that community-based property rights should exist and 
should be based in community consent, the report does not investigate the methods for 
communities to assert or enforce their Community Based Property Rights. Similarly, 
Community Aid Abroad (CAA, now Oxfam Australia) established a 'Mining Ombudsman' in 
20008 in response to the lack of regulation of Australian mining companies operating abroad 
by the Australian government. CAA invoked various international declarations including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to advocate for a formal complaints mechanism and 
stricter standards for Australian corporations (Macdonald 2004). These institutional 
strategies applied by CAA and the Centre for International Environmental Law clearly provide 
                                                     





platforms for communities with grievances to address greater audiences and could help 
create regulatory tools for people affected by mining.  
FPIC, enshrined in the United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (2008), 
is a human-rights based veto for people affected by development projects because consent 
must be free of coercion and based on all relevant information presented in an appropriate 
manner, understandable to the affected group. FPIC is simultaneously a reform agenda for 
extractive industry governance, a standard by which regulations can be measured, a 
rhetorical discourse, and a voluntary code for mining corporations (or financial institutions) 
to follow (Szablowski 2010). Some proponents argue that FPIC in itself is not strong enough. 
To be effective, Laplante and Spears argue for an institutionalised FPIC, which “In addition to 
being free, prior, informed and consensual, FPIC must be enduring, enforceable and 
meaningful” (2008, 71). Flemmer and Schilling-Vacflor identify that indigenous people must 
have: “(1) considerable ownership of consultation practices; (2) the possibility to substantially 
participate in these arenas; and (3) the opportunity to shape the design and the execution of 
planned activities” (2016, 175).  
FPIC must be accompanied by an equalising of power relationships and a recognition of values 
across difference, between corporations and the people affected by mining. However new 
attempts to institutionalise rights such as FPIC fail to understand that in creating new 
institutions, they are just as vulnerable to capture and will be beset by the same power 
relations as exist elsewhere. That is, despite radically different normative objectives, like 
institutionalist approaches above, NGO and activist approaches often overlook the roots of 
conflict in evolving social relations and how underlying social relations might be changed.  
Critical Political Economy  
Critical political economy overcomes many of the problems identified in the literature thus 
far. For critical political economists, conflicts over mining takes place within broader 
historically produced structures and social relations. Conflict is inherent in contestations over 
the benefits and negative impacts of development and between competing pathways of 
development (Chapter Three). Explanations for conflict are found in the political, social, and 
economic relations surrounding mining within capitalism (Colley 2001; Hanlon 2008; J. Nem 
Singh and Bourgouin 2013b; Hatcher 2014). Interventions into conflict are not created ex 




nihilo but are driven by social groups with interests in particular kinds of solutions. Critical 
political economy therefore rejects the idea that development is a value neutral good or 
institutions can be reformed to produce ‘win-win’ solutions. However, critical political 
economy remains divided between macro and micro variants. This artificial division has 
implications for which social forces and conflicts at which political scales are thought to drive 
political and economic change. This artificial division needs to be overcome to understand the 
multi-scalar contestations that drive the governance and implementation of participation as 
a conflict management strategy.  
The macro, or structural variant,9 best represented by Veltmeyer, Petras and colleagues’ 
research into ‘the new extractivism’ is concerned with how ongoing crises in global capitalism 
and neoliberal modes of accumulation drive imperialist quests for cheaper resources 
(Veltmeyer and Petras 2014b). For them, new models of ‘imperialism’ or ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ are enabled by national political regimes and involve: 
development with international cooperation and social participation as the means of weakening 
resistance (social movements) by providing the ‘rural poor’ (the semi-proletarianized or landless 
peasant farmers) an alternative to social mobilization and a direct confrontation with class 
power as a means of bringing about substantive social change (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014a, 9). 
With less of a focus on political regimes and more on technological change within the industry, 
Dougherty (2016, 6) argues that:  
By placing the emphasis on the industry, we suggest that industrial change is the force of origin 
for much of what characterises the new extraction. The political, territorial, and environmental 
struggles all follow from transformations in global mining industries. 
Thus, in structural political economy, development, resource extraction and processes of 
governance, participation, and corporate responsibility are driven by “dynamics of power 
relations between states, on the one hand and international financial institutions and private 
capital, on the other” (J. Nem Singh and Bourgouin 2013a, 5). Macro political economy is 
concerned with actors who operate at national and international political scales and how: 
Multinational corporations, the governments of the home countries of extractive industry 
companies, bilateral donors, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), non-government 
organisations (NGOs) and activists – are involved in shaping, promoting and challenging the 
modes of governance that oversee extractive industries (Hatcher 2020, 319) 
                                                     





Hatcher argues that the World Bank’s enshrining of participation within national mining codes 
results from mining investors’ need for “participatory schemes as a management tool to 
circumscribe the risks faced” (2015, 340). Likewise, the emergence of CSR programs is the 
result of global forces and the need to contain conflict within the corporate logic of private 
sector led development, reducing the threat and risk to capital accumulation (Hanlon 2008).  
Structural critical political economy thus provides an analysis of the national and international 
drivers of governance, institutions and contestation and is therefore a powerful explanation 
of why (but not necessarily when and how) participation emerges as a conflict management 
strategy. However, the macro scale of structural political economy tends to over-emphasise 
the power of actors who are dominant within international and national political and 
economic structures (for example, oligarchs, MNCs, states, political parties, and international 
organisations) while underestimating the agency and power of people affected by mining. 
The privileged analytical position given to national and international scales often 
overshadows how developments in social relations of production shape both structure and 
agency (Bieler and Morton 2018). This becomes problematic when global forces, including 
economic crises, technological change and political regimes are given primary causal status 
within structural analysis. Furthermore, because of its macro approach, it offers less 
explanation for the variation of participatory mechanisms that emerge within the same or 
similar jurisdictions. It also offers no explanation for why people affected by mining take 
wildly divergent responses to participatory mechanisms.  
In contrast, the micro variant of critical political economy is a collection of critical approaches 
to studying conflict from below. These approaches intersect with and draw from political 
ecology (Horowitz 2011; Peluso 2016; Allen 2018), sociology, critical agrarian studies (Lucas 
and Warren 2013; Bachriadi and Suryana 2016; Lahiri-Dutt 2018) and more recently have 
given rise to the ‘everyday political economy’ approach (Hobson and Seabrooke 2001; Elias 
and Rethel 2016). They build on classic work on subaltern actors’ agency such as Scott’s (1985) 
Weapons of the Weak, Peluso’s (1992) ‘repertoires of resistance’, and Kerkvliet’s (1990) 
Everyday Politics. 
These approaches give methodological and analytical weight to the agency, strategy and 
relations of non-elite or ‘local’ actors and argues that by:  
Stressing the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups, we are able to understand how 




ordinary people devise their livelihood and resistance strategies as they become integrated in 
global circuits of production and consumption (J. Nem Singh and Camba 2016, 51). 
Here, local social relations10 are taken to shape how economic and political change manifests 
(Elias et al. 2016). Nem Singh and Camba (2016) use this approach to show how some 
communities resisting mining in the Philippines are more militant while others are more 
legalistic. These approaches also sensitise analysis to the influence that gendered and 
racialized social relations can have on conflict and participation (Mahy 2011; Lahiri-Dutt 2012). 
They do this by privileging a broader array of actors – peasants, workers, village officials, sub-
national NGOs, religious organisations, individual corporations, community relations 
managers and so on – and adopt greater sensitivity to how company-community conflicts play 
out around the mine site, including how gender, ethnicity and religion shape relations 
between groups. Through the focus on local social relations, micro approaches provide strong 
explanations for how and when participatory mechanisms are implemented, the specific 
forms they take and how and why people affected by mining participate or not.  
The danger and limitations here are reversed. Micro approaches to political economy can give 
too much weight to the agency of actors at local scales and underestimate the barriers and 
opportunities presented by established governance regimes and powerful economic actors. I 
have called this divide artificial because it is more often a matter of methodological and 
analytical emphasis than conceptual disagreements. The macro structural variant of critical 
political economy need not ignore local social relations just as the micro everyday variant 
must place local social relations within their global context. Because of the multi-scalar nature 
of mining conflicts, it is critically important not only to recognise that conflicts between 
multinational mining corporations and people affected by mining are embedded in local, 
national and global capitalist social relations but analyse the ways in which sets of relations 
at each scale shape each other.  
While the following chapter develops my theoretical framework and the previous chapter 
introduced my case study methodology, for now it is enough to highlight the danger of 
reifying particular social actors, scales, sites or manifestations of conflict. Combining macro 
and micro critical political economy approaches conceptualises scales, sites, structures and 
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agencies as internally related parts of a social whole. For example, Chapter Four provides an 
historical analysis of how local-scale company-community conflicts led to the emergence of 
new modes of participation at the global scale which in turn shape local participatory 
mechanisms – the capitalist relations at each scale are sides of the same coin. Likewise, Kirsch 
(2014, 2) looks to emerging global alliances that “make international resources available to 
new categories of actors” and new technologies of communication can be deployed by actors 
as potential levers of power to either make conflict more visible or to seek a resolution. It is 
in this dynamic that we can find explanations for when, how and why corporate participatory 
mechanisms emerge and how people affected by mining choose to participate or not. The 
flowing chapter develops the critical political economy framework used in this thesis and 
introduces some more specific analytical concepts – ‘modes of participation’, ‘social 
reproduction theory’, ‘politics of scale’ and ‘common-sense’. 
Conclusion 
The approaches considered in this chapter all proceed from the observation that mining has 
failed to realise the promises of development, let alone sustainable or equitable development, 
and that negative consequences of mining are too serious to ignore. On this, there is 
consensus. Despite decades of incremental improvements in the regulation and practice of 
community relations and environmental management, conflict, human-rights abuses and 
environmental destruction have intensified. Indeed, new technologies such as non-
conventional gas extraction and mountain top removal dramatically increase both the 
impacts of mining and the number of affected people.  
Reviewing the most common and influential approaches in the literature, I have dismissed 
‘problem-solving’ approaches that propose institutional fixes without critically analysing the 
structures within which conflicts occur. These approaches are unable to provide 
comprehensive answers to the research questions posed in this thesis because of their 
methodological or ontological focus on particular sites, manifestations, causes or scales of 
conflict. It makes sense that international organisations would adopt institutional approaches 
and corporations would adopt managerial approaches or that NGOs and activists adopt 
approaches focused human-rights. Each actor adopts the approach that focuses on reforming 
what is within their control and interests. However, each approach excludes causes and sites 




of conflict that are inconvenient to their interests and therefore cannot explain why, how or 
when participatory mechanisms are employed as conflict management strategies by 
multinational corporations.  
Neoinstitutionalists propose technocratic forms of participation and dismiss rights-based or 
democratic alternatives and, by extension, only consider forms of conflict that are deemed 
manageable within technocratic frameworks. Their insistence that win-win solutions are 
possible means that the inherently conflictual nature of establishing mines – including land 
grabbing – is ignored. The possibility to fundamentally challenge the rationale for mining or 
the power structures surrounding corporate-community engagement is placed outside 
permissible contestation. Likewise, managerialist approaches overlook that development is a 
contested process between competing development pathways that are beneficial to some 
interests and detrimental to others. Such assumptions are anti-democratic as they limit 
legitimate political participation to questions of how to benefit from a pre-selected pathway 
of development.  
Historical institutionalists, despite considering a broader range of problems and conflicts, 
because of their ontological conception of institutions as the primary determinants of social 
relations, fail to understand the broader social context within which institutions operate or 
adequately account for conflicts that occur outside and produce changes in institutional 
structures. The paradox is that even as institutions are viewed as embedded in society, they 
are reified as interventions into the same dynamics from which they were born. Rights-based 
approaches also suffer from an emphasis on the manifestations of conflict – human-rights 
violations – that could be avoided through democratic or international institutional reform 
and thus overlook the roots of conflict within changing social relations. Governmentality and 
post-structuralist approaches bring a welcome focus on the construction, agency and power 
of people affected by mining and their allies. This leads to more detailed investigations into 
the lives of people affected by mining and how they engage in conflict and participation. 
However, the focus on the micro relations of power often comes at the expense of 
understanding the structural context of conflict.  
Critical political economy approaches explain both how, when and why mining corporations 
implement participatory mechanisms and how people affected by mining decide to 





political economy that place the causes of conflict and responses to it within the evolving 
social relations of capitalist development. To explain why participation has emerged as the 
dominant form of managing conflict with people affected by mining across the globe and the 
different forms that it takes across time and space, we need analyses that can understand 
how governance and reforms driven at global or national scales are shaped by local political 
economic and social conditions and vice versa. We need approaches that dig beneath visible 
manifestations of conflict to understand the structures and agencies that drive them.  
It is to this task that I turn in the next chapter. I apply a social conflict theory of critical political 
economy with particular sensitivity to how changing relations of production and social 
reproduction generate conflicts that play out across multiple political scales and sites. The 
modes of participation framework is used to understand how and why participatory 
mechanisms emerge in response to challenges. The ideological receptivity of people affected 
by mining, coproduced through social relations of production and reproduction explains their 
desire and capacity to participate or not. Social conflict theory goes beyond the limitations 
identified above by arguing that institutions remain entangled in the same conflicts and 
power asymmetries that produce them. Gramscian analysis understands how ideologies and 
conceptions for the world operate within, indeed are codetermined with, political economic 




Chapter Three: A Social Conflict 
Approach to Mining and Participation  
This chapter establishes the theoretical framework for understanding and interpreting the 
empirical findings in later empirical chapters. It also advances concepts for understanding 
conflict and participation in extractive sectors more generally. Following the critique 
presented in the previous chapter, the theoretical framework combines macro and micro 
critical political economy analyses with a social conflict theory approach, wherein visible 
forms of conflict are treated as manifestations of contestation rooted within capitalist 
development. The centre piece of this approach is the ‘modes of participation’ framework 
which builds on social conflict theory to explain why forms of participation emerge at given 
moments and places. More specifically, participatory mechanisms are viewed as responses to 
conflicts generated by extractive developments. That is, participation is regarded as a political 
technique to contain and transform undesirable manifestations of conflict and create new 
sites for contestation that (re)define boundaries for legitimate social and political conflict.  
As set out in the introduction, this thesis answers five related questions: 
1. How do multinational mining companies attempt to control risks posed by conflict with 
people affected by mining? 
2. What factors explain when, why, how, and the degree to which multinational mining 
corporations use participatory mechanisms to manage conflict with people affected by 
mining? 
3. How do participatory mechanisms shape, contain or change the forms that social conflict 
takes? 
4. How and why are participatory mechanisms contested, co-opted, embraced or ignored by 
grass-roots and non-government organisations?  
5. What factors, including access to resources, land use, alliance structures and strategies, or 
ideologies affect responses to participatory mechanisms by people affected by mining? 
To present the theoretical tools to answer these, this chapter first provides an account of 
institutions, development and contestation from a social conflict perspective. Social conflict 
theory’s advantage over other approaches is that it looks to the social roots of conflict, not 





in different pathways of development, the second section covers contestations and manifest 
forms of conflict that are distinctive, but not unique, to extractive capitalism. Land grabbing, 
primitive accumulation, changing modes of production, and the disruption to social 
reproduction are features of extractive capitalism that explain the roots and manifestations 
of company-community conflict. The third section introduces the politics of scale because 
extractive conflicts are not limited to scales and processes of production but take on multi-
scalar dimensions as groups seek to resolve conflicts across various fora. Together, these 
three sections explain contestations over extractive developments, manifest as various forms 
of conflict at different sites and scales.  
Moving on from an analysis of the contours and dynamics of contestation, the fourth section 
turns to consider participation through the ‘modes of participation’ framework (Rodan 2018) 
which I adapt for use in the private sector across multiple scales. This framework allows us to 
understand, across a range of geographic and institutional contexts, why, how, and when 
multinational miners implement particular participatory strategies. It emphasises how 
ideologies of representation establish the legitimacy of modes of participation and the 
institutional structures that are deployed in attempts to contain, transform or depoliticise 
undesirable forms of conflict. In the fifth section, to understand the reactions of people 
affected by mining to attempts to elicit their participation, I turn to Gramscian concepts of 
ideology and common sense. The ways in which people affected by mining understand the 
world, and therefore their ideological receptivity to modes of participation, shapes the ways 
in which they are likely to participate or not. That is, where there are congruencies between 
their common-sense understandings and ideologies of representation, people affected by 
mining are more likely to participate. In turn, common sense understandings are both 
influenced by and influence the ways in which people affected by mining control land, 
organise production and politics, and find and select allies. The final section outlines the 
analytical framework used to apply these theoretical tools to the proceeding case study 
chapters.  
Social conflict theory  
The theoretical approach deployed in this thesis is based in social conflict theory. This broad 
approach understands society as made up of groups of actors who pursue their interests in 




struggles over how power and wealth are produced and distributed.1 Following Hutchison et 
al. (2014, 79), "development is never merely a public good, but is rather a perpetual process 
of resource redistribution that is fought over by class-based groups." Social and political 
change is then understood as driven by conflict between competing social groups. 
Contestation often occurs between class-based groups or class fractions, while gender, 
indigeneity, ethnicity and religion are also important social categories that can demark 
conflicting interests. Visible forms of conflict are treated as manifestations of contestation 
and contradictions generated through processes of capitalist development. The advantage of 
this approach is the focus on social forces and the root causes of conflict, not merely its visible 
and institutional manifestations.  
This has ontological implications for how the state, institutions and even corporations are 
conceptualised. States and institutions are not taken as pre-existing facts, unified subjects, or 
tangible objects standing apart from each other (Jessop 2007, 123). Rather they are mutually 
constituted with society and permeated by conflicts between groups of actors with different 
interests. More precisely, institutions are understood as both the outcomes of and terrain for 
political and social conflict (Rodan, Hewison, and Robison 2006; Hameiri and Jones 2014, 5). 
This insight allows us to disregard the idea that institutions and the regulations they produce 
can be objectively ‘neutral’ or ‘good’. Rather, institutions embody particular sets of power 
relations that shape access to and control over resources (Rodan 2018, 21). Specifically, 
because of their ability to shape and limit manifestations of conflict, dominant institutions are 
a key mechanism for political rule. In this view, institutions shape political contestation and 
the form that conflict takes but do not elevate politics above society (Hutchison et al. 2014, 
80). Institutional configurations are not static but change as new social forces or conflicts 
emerge (Nguyen 2014).  
Institutional mechanisms and practices that attempt to contain conflict may be designed by 
powerful actors, yet often, as in the case of ‘sustainable development’ and corporate social 
responsibility, they are adapted and co-opted from critics. In this way, various mechanisms of 
rule are tested and the ones that work survive in an ongoing “evolutionary process of 
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variation, selection [and] retention” (Jessop 2006b). This often means that critics and critical 
discourses are included within new practices in order to either pacify or co-opt opposition. 
However, none of this is to claim that institutional containment of conflict is always 
‘successful’, as oppositional groups can use institutional inclusion to open up conflict over 
broader issues of inequality or resource distribution (Rodan 2018, 218).  
The social conflict approach is useful in analysing the political power of multinational mining 
corporations because it rejects the reification of governance institutions, markets and even 
corporations. Instead markets, institutions and corporations are sites where different actors 
come together in cooperation and conflict. Social conflict theory recognises participatory 
mechanisms as an institutionalisation of relations between mining corporations, states and 
people affected by mining that shape contestation and embody particular sets of power 
relations. Therefore, analysis remains focused on how groups of actors in corporations, NGOs, 
people affected by mining and their allies contest the social impacts of mining and how such 
contestation is shaped by participatory institutions.  
In no way is social conflict theory limited to the study of institutions or institutionalised 
conflict. Indeed, the approach opens analytical space to examine conflict that occurs around 
and outside formal institutions and the agency of subaltern actors.2 Conflict may occur at sites 
of production, social reproduction, governance or regulation. This is important for mining 
conflicts as many critics of large-scale mining  refuse to “work within parameters of reform 
set by industry participants and state actors” (J. Nem Singh and Camba 2016, 50). 
Furthermore, acts of resistance may go unnoticed or be illegible to corporate or state actors, 
may be organised or spontaneous, can be collective or individual and occur across multiple 
political scales. The actions, ideologies and understandings of people affected by mining are 
critical to how conflicts evolve either within or outside institutional bounds.  
This thesis applies insights from social conflict theory to corporate spaces, processes, and 
institutions. There is a growing interest in studying corporations as political actors or 
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reproduction theory (Bhattacharya 2017) are entirely consistent with how social conflict theory is 
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governance institutions3 (Wilks 2013; Mikler 2018; Sinclair 2020). Corporate interests and 
strategies – like other institutions – change through contestation with state and other actors.4 
Marina Welker, an anthropologist of corporations, examines how corporations are re-
constructed through contestation with people affected by mining: 
Without denying profit as a motivation, … people enact corporations in multiple ways, and that 
these enactments involve struggles over the boundaries, interests and responsibilities of the 
corporation (2014, 1). 
On the other hand, there is the recognition that ‘corporate actors’ may have interests outside 
those of the corporation – employees may also belong to affected communities or activist 
groups (Filer and Le Meur 2017, 23–25). The crucial point for a critical analysis of participatory 
mechanisms, which function at intersections between the state, corporations and society, is 
how they institutionalise and contain undesirable forms of conflict or open spaces for new 
contestations to emerge. Because social conflict theory understands such institutions and the 
social forces that contest them as historically and socially constituted, I first outline some 
dynamics specific, if not unique, to conflict and contestation in extractive capitalism.  
The political economy of mining conflicts: Land as a social 
relation 
Extractive developments embody particular kinds of capitalist relations.  Large-scale mining 
requires massive long-term investments “prone to windfall booms and busts” (J. Nem Singh 
and Bourgouin 2013a). State actors wanting to attract international investment will ensure 
favourable conditions for capital investment governance arrangements including tax-
exemptions, secure land tenure and favourable environmental regulations (J. Nem Singh and 
                                                     
3 Corporations can be considered political actors in as far as they act politically and socially to secure 
their economic interests. They can be considered as governance institutions when they actively 
create governance standards, networks or regulation either collectively or in partnership with state 
actors (Wilks 2013; Sinclair 2020).  
4 Scholars from various traditions have problematised the idea of corporate personhood – the legal 
fiction that corporations are people – pointing out the conflicting interests within corporations 
between owners, executive management, shareholders, financial mangers (who control stock on 
behalf of investment funds), workers and other stakeholders (Wilks 2013, 13–15). The balance of 
these interests change with national legal frameworks, corporate structures and shifting patterns of 
ownership and managerialism. Nevertheless, it is often a convenient simplification to treat 
corporations as unitary actors - and an heuristic simplification that I will use throughout this thesis 





Camba 2016). At the local scale (scale of production) the distinctive feature of extractive 
capitalism is competition and conflict over land use, and especially ‘land-grabbing’ (Perreault 
2018). Mining corporations must expropriate land, through legal, economic or violent means 
and repurpose it from its previous use – most often agrarian, traditional indigenous uses, 
small-scale extraction or protected ecosystems (Leifsen et al. 2017). Large mines come to 
dominate local economies and subsume livelihoods “redirecting and circumscribing them 
according to extractivist logics and practices” (Perreault 2018, 346). This can generate positive 
impacts, yet even positive opportunities disrupt social, political and economic relations as 
“new sources of income can give rise to major problems because they are often distributed 
unevenly” which in turn can “generate social tension through its impact on existing structures 
of authority” (O’Faircheallaigh 2015, 44). It is this disruption to local economies, politics and 
culture that produces most of the conflict between corporate miners and the people affected 
by mining. Contestation takes the form of struggles over the ideological basis for development 
and participation as well as control over means of production (land). 
Land grabbing is a type of ‘primitive accumulation’ 5  whereby resources previously 
unincorporated – or only partially incorporated – into capitalist economic systems are 
appropriated by corporations, states or development agencies (D. Hall 2013; Bachriadi and 
Suryana 2016). The term describes not merely the dispossession of one group of actors to the 
benefit of others, but a repurposing – a commodification and marketization – of land itself 
and the development of capitalist relations (Marx 1990, 873–76; Federici 2004, 12; Veltmeyer 
and Petras 2014b). Roche et. al. (2019) have coined the term ‘extractive dispossession’ in 
recognition of the way that accumulation by dispossession plays out in relation to extractive 
projects. According to them, land grabbing by extractive corporations is typically 
accompanied by: rising gendered inequality; fraudulent consent; displacement; destruction 
of sacred sites; epistemicide; displacement of traditional economic activities; environmental 
and social impacts; and militarisation. For previous land users – peasants, indigenous people 
or small-scale miners – land might have served multiple uses and values. It might have 
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accumulation and  under-consumption.  
 




provided a place of residence, source of income, provided for subsistence needs, served as 
spiritual or religious sites and/or served ecological functions. 6  Repurposing land means 
changing social relations which surround that land. That is, changes in the function of land 
entails not only a change in relations of production but also relations of social reproduction 
of people affected by the mine. 
To analyse and explain these changes and resultant conflict, I turn to social reproduction 
theory (SRT), which considers how relations of production are coproduced with relations of 
social reproduction (Bhattacharya 2017).7 As changes in one set of relations will produce 
contradictions and conflict with the other and precipitate change, this approach provides 
further insight into the terrains of conflict that emerge around extractive development. In SRT, 
‘production’ involves the production of commodities while social reproduction: 
Embodies several overlapping but contradictory meanings, including human biological 
reproduction, the socialization of children, the reproduction of labour power, and the 
reproduction of the mode of production or of the society as a whole. (Bezanson and Luxton 
2006, 27) 
Reproduction therefore includes health care, education, food, care work, shelter, pensions, 
leisure facilities and so forth (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner 1994, 357; Bhattacharya 2017, 7). 
It also involves the development and transmission of knowledge, social values, and cultural 
practices and the construction of individual and collective identities8 (Bezanson and Luxton 
2006, 3). While these functions may be carried out by individuals, collectives, families, state 
institutions or private corporations, they are often performed by women as unpaid or low-
paid domestic labour (Bezanson and Luxton 2006, 3). 
Silvia Federici’s (2004, 63) contribution to the debate on primitive accumulation is that it 
involves not merely “the divorcing of the workers from the means of production”, 
expropriation of land from the peasantry “and the formation of the ‘free’, independent [male] 
worker.” It separates commodity production from social reproduction, which also becomes a 
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and sold!’ (Tanah adalah hubungan sosial, tidak bisa dijual-beli!)  
7 As an extension of Marxist theories of production (eg. Engels 1986), SRT shares a common heritage 
with Social Conflict Theory, both resist deterministic and reductionist interpretations of Marxism. As 
conceptualised in this thesis, they are complimentary theories for considering how social conflicts 
exceed sites of production. 






terrain for control and resistance.9 For Federici, primitive accumulation creates new gendered 
divisions of labour where women are “increasingly confined to reproductive labor at the very 
time when this work was being completely devalued” (2004, 74). Social reproduction theory 
then provides a focused lens to analyse how changes in social, economic and political relations 
can be gendered and racialized.  
Indeed, Atkinson (1998, 35) notes how following the development of large scale mines, 
inequality grows between those employed at the mine and those in informal or subsistence 
occupations, as well as between men and women as “the [increasing] cost of basic necessities 
led to more traditional subsistence and cooperative economic activities being regarded as 
inferior to having a job at the mine.” Inequality and disruption to social relations of production 
and reproduction can create new conflicts, including between employees and those in 
subsistence or informal sectors, between locals (sometimes indigenous people) and 
newcomers, between men and women and between the dispossessed and the corporation.  
People dispossessed of their land – their means of subsistence, production and reproduction 
– must find new ways of securing their income and subsistence needs. This situation may 
result in some people variously finding employment at the mine, opening land elsewhere, 
‘illegal’ mining, engaging in other forms of precarious employment or demonstrating against 
and making demands of the corporation. Tania Li (2011, 286) asks, in relation to plantations 
in Indonesia: what happens when local people’s land is needed but their labour is not? This 
question is even more pertinent in relation to land grabs for mining where labour 
requirements are smaller and more specialised than in plantation agriculture. The answer is 
often: poverty, inequality and conflict between the dispossessed, migrant labourers and 
corporate actors and, Li argues, government intervention is needed to manage these negative 
effects. That is to say, it is not always the immediate and direct effects of mining 
developments or land grabbing that produce conflict, the social changes and any inequalities 
produced may create secondary conflicts between different groups of people affected by 
mining.    
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traced back to Rosa Luxembourg and through the work of Marxist-feminists including Lise Vogel 
(Čakardić 2017). 




State – or corporate – institutions then take on the role of “chief supervisor of the 
reproduction and disciplining of the workforce” (Federici 2004, 84). State and corporate 
actors intervene through public assistance and social control programs to avoid forms of 
social reproduction that could produce recalcitrant populations (Sears 2016). Mining 
corporations need to produce, in their local areas, social relations conducive to extractive 
activities. To avoid threats to their operations – blockades, demonstrations, ‘illegal mining’, 
theft, sabotage and so on – they must manage some of the inequalities and disruption 
involved in changing relations of production and reproduction. They do this through a wide 
range of strategies including: discipline and violence, establishing patronage networks, 
inviting the participation of potential opponents, sustainable community development work, 
promoting cash cropping and market economies, education, and ideological intervention. 
Thus, participatory mechanisms are not only about containing risky forms of conflict but 
establishing new relations of production and reproduction amongst people affected by 
mining so that such disruptive manifestations of conflict are not generated in the first place.  
The capacity and desire of people affected by mining to participate or not is largely influenced 
by their histories of organisation – by their relations of production and social reproduction – 
which are not always separate but always related. It is true that “the ways in which people 
produce, allocate, and consume the products of human labour are central to shaping their 
social relations and social organization” (Bezanson and Luxton 2006, 24).10 Contradictions and 
conflict are produced when the ways that people produce, allocate and consume change 
(following primitive accumulation), yet social relations and their common-sense 
understandings were produced historically in earlier contexts. This follows Rebecca Hall (2016, 
102) in “theorising the shifting, mutable relationship between social reproduction, non-
capitalist subsistence production and capitalist production” which can all become sites for 
exploitation and resistance. For example, where the organisation of production and 
reproduction are more communal, less integrated into state or corporate hierarchies, and less 
determined by market relations, people affected by mining will likely be less willing or able to 
integrate into corporate forms of production or participation. Where social organisation is 
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more hierarchical or fractured by class, gender, ethnicity or age, participation or resistance 
will reflect this.  
Control of resources, and especially the means of production (land), is perhaps the most direct 
factor in determining the ability of people affected by mining to resist land-grabs. Control of 
land is practical and can be divided into physical control or the ability of groups to exclude 
other actors; claims which may be based in agrarian law or tradition (adat); and legal title or 
certification. The point is that histories of social organisation of production and reproduction 
are codetermined with the way that relations with land are organised. There is of course an 
ideological dimension to production and reproduction, which is explored further below. First, 
it is necessary to zoom out from local scales to consider how conflicts around extractives are 
multi-scalar.  
The politics of scale 
Conflicts around extractive industries rarely remain confined to sites of production and social 
reproduction. Indeed, they often take on national and international dimensions as one or 
more actors attempt to resolve conflict in their favour through international campaigning or 
institutional fixes. It is at national and international scales where questions of governance, 
regulation, rights and alliances become significant. An explicit analysis of the political scales 
across which conflict occurs allows an understanding of how seemingly separate conflicts are 
enmeshed in historical contestations over governance, rights and development. It also avoids 
the reification of institutions that operate at particular scales. 
In political geography, the concept of scale refers to the spatial level (from local, metropolitan 
and provincial to national, regional and global) of particular social, political and economic 
activities (N. Smith 2008). The production of scale, along with the issues governed at any 
particular scale, is never given a priori but is the result of capitalist development, 
environmental factors, and political contestation (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2010; N. Smith 
2003, 181–90). For Smith (2008, 181–90), scale is reproduced through dynamics of capitalist 
development: local scales have traditionally been sites of production and socialisation; 
provincial scales are reproduced through the mechanics of distribution and; national scales 




are reproduced through the support, defence and coordination of capital.11 Political scales 
then, are related, part of a single social whole, not separate ontological categories. Following 
this, here I use ‘local’ to refer to the areas surrounding a mine site that are directly impacted 
by or impact extraction. The local scale then is an outcome of capitalist development but 
almost always also involves political contestation over who should be considered local for the 
purposes of community development or preferential employment. 
Just as scale is not given a priori it is not simply determined by structural and environmental 
factors but is also the outcome of political and social contestation and strategic decisions (N. 
Smith 2003; 2008, 229; Hameiri and Jones 2015, 56; Allen 2018, 16). The politics of scale 
involves conflicts over the appropriate scale, or construction of new scales, at which 
contestation and governance occur (Jessop 2006a; Hameiri, Hughes, and Scarpello 2017, 69). 
Because different opportunities, allies and resources are available at any given scale, actors 
may attempt to contest issues at scales, or across multiple scales, that are most beneficial to 
their interests (Hameiri and Jones 2015, 56). For example, social movements often attempt 
to ‘jump scales’ to the national or international where they can access allies, resources, media, 
and invite public scrutiny (Escobar 2001; Kirsch 2014). Targeting investors, particularly 
governments, churches and public funds, can be effective where they might be more 
receptive to arguments or sensitive to public opinion than the operating company might be 
(Kirsch 2014, 82). Alliances which operate across political scales are a critical factor in how 
effectively people affected by mining can campaign if they decide to reject participation – or 
how much knowledge and support they can receive to participate.12   
Likewise, multinational miners use scalar strategies to relocate sites of governance from 
domestic to global scales – where corporations and their associations can control the agenda 
more effectively than governments (Hatcher 2014; Elbra 2017). 13   They simultaneously 
attempt to re-localise conflicts with people affected by mining. Participatory mechanisms can 
                                                     
11 Ecological factors can also influence the production of scales of conflict and governance. 
12 Indeed, in all three cases in this thesis, people opposed to mining sought to create alliances with 
groups who could help attract national and international resources and legitimacy. 
13 The following chapter details how organisations such as the International Council of Mining and 
Metals, standards such as the Equator Principles and institutions such as the UN Global Compact do 







contain threats to multinational miners’ international reputations by separating people 
affected by mining from their national and international allies. While participatory 
mechanisms operate on local political scales, global self-governance establishes their 
institutional guidelines and ideological legitimacy. The institutional frameworks and 
ideological support for participation constitute ‘modes of participation’ which shape who can 
participate on what issues when (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007a; Rodan 2018).  
The modes of participation framework 
Participatory mechanisms are a major tool used by mining corporations to attempt to contain 
and depoliticise undesirable forms of conflict. To understand contestations over who can 
participate on which issues, when, this section details the theoretical approach that is 
adopted towards participation – the modes of participation framework. Developed by 
Jayasuriya and Rodan (2007a) and extended by Rodan (2018), this framework analyses how 
state actors use participation as a technique for securing legitimacy and containing challenges 
from various groups. It provides a conceptual understanding of why particular forms of 
participation emerge at given moments and sites. The modes of participation framework is 
concerned with “the institutional structures and ideologies that shape the inclusion and 
exclusion of individuals and groups in the political process” (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007a, 774). 
Modes of participation range from individual to collective and state-sponsored to 
autonomous (Rodan 2018, 34). Yet, across various regimes, there has been a growing 
emergence of state-sponsored extra-parliamentary modes of participation which bypass 
traditional or autonomous modes of contesting politics such as political parties and workers’ 
unions. The growth of new modes of participation and ideologies of representation is 
explained by the need to contain conflicts that emerge from processes of capitalist 
development and crises (Rodan 2012; Bal 2015a). Examples include: public grievance 
processes, consultative councils, petitions and social movements – as opposed to authorised 
and accountable democratic representation.  
The legitimacy of modes of participation are established when potential participants accept 
their ideological foundations. The legitimation of ideologies of representation has “profound 
implications for whether or not persistent unequal social, political, and economic 
relationships are subject to scrutiny and potential political mobilization” (Rodan 2018, 23). In 




other words, legitimated ideologies come “to define what is realistic and to drive certain goals 
and aspirations into the realm of the impossible, the realm of idle dreams, of wishful thinking” 
(Scott 1985, 326). Ideologies are not merely imposed by dominant groups but gain the 
consent of participants through making concessions as “previously germinated ideologies 
come into contact and confrontation with one another, until only one of them – or, at least, 
a single combination of them – tends to prevail, to dominate” (Gramsci 1996, 2:Q4§38; 180).14 
The modes of participation established by multinational mining corporations’ appropriate 
ideological fragments from critics, including ideas of sustainable development and human 
rights. Yet these are subsumed under an overarching ideology of representation and 
corporate-led development.  
In the latest iteration of the framework, Rodan (2018, 29) identifies four ideologies of 
representation – democratic, populist, consultative, and particularist. 15  These are not 
mutually exclusive, and particular participatory mechanisms may draw on multiple ideological 
sources. Ideologies of representation are also linked to broader historically situated 
ideological struggles. The participatory mechanisms in the extractive industries are based in 
and reinforce consultative ideologies, although they may also draw on particularist ideologies 
and other ideological support. Particularist  ideologies “emphasize the rights to 
representation of discrete communities and identities based on ethnicity, race, gender and 
culture” (Rodan 2018, 32). It is now widely accepted that people affected by mining have 
rights to be consulted and that corporations have an obligation to consult with stakeholders 
(Chapter Four). Yet these normative rights exist in tension with and often come at the expense 
of more democratic forms of participation: 
Consultative ideologies of representation emphasise the problem-solving utility of incorporating 
stakeholders, interests, and/or experts into public policy processes to ensure the most effective 
functioning of economic, social, or political governance. These ideologies privilege such problem 
solving over political competition, thereby limiting the political space for contending normative 
                                                     
14 In this note, ‘Relations between structure and superstructure’, Gramsci is theorising moments in the 
historical formation of hegemony. However, I avoid using the term ‘hegemony’ because I am not 
considering the hegemony of a dominant class over society in general. I am simply considering a 
single moment – the domination of multinational corporations over the management of social 
impacts of mining. 
15 These are “conceptual categories”, not the “complete range of ideological perspectives” (Rodan 
2018, 28). In democratic ideologies of representation, representatives should be elected or 
appointed; populist ideologies “emphasize direct links between ‘the people’ and the leadership of 





positions over the fundamental objectives of public policy through spaces of technocratic 
governance (Rodan 2018, 30). 
In addition, pro-corporate ideologies such as neoinstitutionalism support the creation of 
corporate sites of participation. Participatory mechanisms then incorporate social groups – 
usually through representatives – in corporate problem-solving processes without conceding 
democratic rights.  
For this thesis, I adapt the modes of participation framework to examine corporate-sponsored 
modes of participation and how they are constructed against state-sponsored and 
autonomous modes of participation. This simply reflects the increasing trend and need for 
mining corporations to contain contradictions and conflicts resulting from extractive 
developments. The second adaptation I make, given that participatory mechanisms operate 
largely at local scales while standards for their implementation and ideological legitimacy are 
enshrined at international scales, is to combine the modes of participation framework with a 
politics of scale.  
Table 3 shows the matrix of sites of participation adapted from Rodan (2018, 34). The middle 
column ‘corporate-sponsored’ sites of participation is my addition. The level of inclusion may 
be individual or collective, with collective levels of inclusion incorporating various styles and 
forms of representation and group participation. This is a typology, not an exhaustive 
categorisation of sites or examples. The categories are not mutually exclusive and are not 
intended to represent a sharp delineation between sites, indeed, they are often constituted 
against each other (Bal 2015a, 224). For example, political participation that begins in 
autonomous sites, as protests or individual expression, may shift to corporate or state 
sponsored sites of participation as corporate or state actors recognise a need to contain 
challenges. Sites of participation may be co-sponsored by a combination of corporations, 
states, NGOs or international organisations. Actors may simultaneously participate in 
corporate fora while maintaining autonomous sites of expression, as is the case when a group 
enters negotiations with a corporation while maintaining independent protest activity. 
Likewise, affected people may choose between available corporate and state sites of 
participation – for example in negotiating directly with corporate actors versus suing them in 
court. Thus, the potential for particular sites of participation to manage conflict and distribute 
benefits is partially determined by the opportunities available at other sites. Each site of 




participation may involve any type of participant. Corporations can participate in state-
sponsored sites, state actors may organise protests, and corporations may participate in sites 
sponsored by other corporations.  
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The advantage of this approach is that it explains the forms, sites and ideologies of 
participation in the mining sector as the result of conflicts outlined above. Indeed, 
participatory mechanisms are always situated within broader social relations and processes 
of national, regional and international capitalist development (Nguyen 2014). Participation is 
neither the result of a universal ‘corporate responsibility’ nor simply a public relations 
exercise – it is the product of multi-scalar contestation with people affected by mining and 
other critics. Furthermore, it is concerned with the development of ideological support and 
institutional structures that legitimise some forms of representation and participation over 
others.   
The participatory mechanisms of multinational miners are usually collective, although 
individual grievance mechanisms are also common. Participatory environmental monitoring, 
sustainable community development programs, consultative committees and negotiations 
over compensation are all ways in which groups of people affected by mining participate 
either directly or via representatives. Through societal incorporation, defined groups of 





particular ways) and NGOs participate in the delivery of predefined objectives (delivering 
community development, environmental monitoring) “rather than to engage in an open-
ended debate” (Rodan 2018, 38-39). Participatory mechanisms may also intervene in the 
political and economic relations of the target groups by privileging particular actors as 
representatives, redistributing resources, providing education, and ideological interventions.  
Through particularistic and consultative ideologies of societal incorporation, conflicts with 
people affected by mining are (partially) contained within the expanded bounds of 
corporations. Yet, the concessions made through consultation are influenced by alternative 
sites of political participation available – autonomous or state – and their ideological 
legitimacy must be defended against or make concessions to competing ideologies. When 
groups are dissatisfied with the consultative boundaries of participation, they may find either 
more autonomous forms of political participation – such as protests – or turn to state 
institutions – such as the court system. Participants or represented groups may also attempt 
to challenge the terms of participation to expand the issues or actors included (Rodan 2018, 
34; Bal 2015a).16 
Ideologies of representation also involve struggles over who has the power to represent 
whom. Societal incorporation relies on corporations’ ability to render communities legible, to 
determine both the groups that should be represented and who has authority to represent 
them and then police these boundaries. Often esoteric and complex social relationships are 
flattened and simplified through bureaucratisation (Borras and Franco 2013). This 
simplification can trigger new inter-communal conflicts. While discussing representation of 
communities in the oil rich Niger Delta, Guichaoua laments “who is entitled to represent the 
now-reified 'communities'. In practice, such asymmetrical procedures favour the emergence 
of brokers co-opted by oil companies or state agents, following a logic recalling the selection 
of indigenous auxiliaries of colonialists” (2012, 148). Likewise, drawing on case study research 
in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, Matthew Allen (2018, 119) shows how struggles over 
who has the right to represent groups of landowners developed following:  
'trustees' and 'landowners' failing to share proceeds of rental payments and surface access fees, 
intensified land disputes and struggles over the control of landowner associations, stark 
asymmetries of knowledge and information, and the marginalisation of women from decision 
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making and benefit-sharing.  
So, while corporations will attempt to select representatives of groups most favourable to 
their interests, this too is subject to contestation by members of represented and excluded 
groups.  
Problems of representation are particularly salient given generational and gender divides 
within represented groups – especially when, as is often the case, representatives are older 
men. Allen’s (2018, 65) research shows how interests of a supposedly homogenous groups 
were divided along gender and generational lines:  
Generally speaking, I found that women throughout Bougainville were more likely to speak 
about these sorts of issues [negative impacts on land, subsistence agriculture and village 
livelihoods - how they would feed their children] in relation to the Panguna question, while men 
tended to focus on compensation and benefit-sharing. 
Therefore, compensation, negotiation and participation can reinforce pre-existing political, 
social and economic hierarchies by selecting already powerful figures – older men, village 
officials, etc – as representatives. Yet it can also open new lines of contestation, for example 
as women demand to be included as representatives or participants.  
Modes of participation also define the scale, or create new scales, at which participation can 
occur, again limiting who can participate and the availability of resources. For example, 
through localised grievance mechanisms and consultative committees, mining corporations 
create scales of political participation that might be more accessible to people affected by 
mining and bypass NGOs and state institutions such as courts. Of course, corporate grievance 
mechanisms can limit the exposure of corporations to litigation or negative publicity. 17 
Participatory practices developed at the ‘local’ scale have been enshrined in global 
governance networks that entrench consultative and corporate ideologies and institutional 
forms as modes of participation.  
In the following chapter I detail how organisations such as the International Council of Mining 
and Metals do less to regulate corporate power and more to establish the legitimacy and 
ideology of corporate self-regulation. Curiously, this creates a split between sites of 
participation, which are largely local, and the governance and ideological defence of 
corporate participation, which takes place at international scales. Through this dual scalar 
                                                     





strategy, participation and consultation has become the new orthodoxy, if not hegemony, to 
the exclusion of democratic and rights-based forms of political participation. Immediately, 
participatory mechanisms aim to manage local conflicts to smooth extractive accumulation 
while modes of participation attempt to facilitate a wider national and international 
legitimacy for the mining sector. 
The modes of participation framework, as presented here, provides explanations for why 
forms of participation emerge at given moments and sites; it explains why, how and when 
mining corporations implement participatory mechanisms. It also explains how ideologies of 
representation and participatory mechanisms are constructed against and evolve through 
broader ideological contests. Yet it does not explain where the ideology of people affected by 
mining comes from. While this could be left as a given, to understand the diversity in 
participatory strategies, we must understand the diversity in ideology of people affected by 
mining. To add this level of analysis, I turn explicitly to Gramscian conceptualisations of 
ideology and common sense.  
Ideological receptivity and common sense 
So far in this chapter, I have mentioned the ideological dimensions of social conflict, extractive 
capitalism, scale, and modes of participation. This section explicitly elaborates how ideology 
and common sense are understood in this thesis. Here I draw on Gramscian 
conceptualisations of ideology as historically produced conceptions of the world which 
“’organise’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness 
of their position, struggle, etc.” (Gramsci 1971, 377; Q7§21). In this schema, ‘common sense’ 
is ideology in its least developed, most incoherent and contradictory form, yet comprises “the 
‘raw material’ of a new conception of the world, since it also contains the seeds of the new 
‘systems of ideas’” (Filippini 2017, 20). Organisations and actors struggle to emphasise 
elements within common sense and develop ideologies that best serve their interests as they 
understand them. In this way, there exists an ideological terrain on which conflicting ideas 
compete for legitimacy and dominance.  
The modes of participation framework provides a typology of ideologies of representation 
that legitimise forms and sites of participation (Rodan 2018, 29). Ideologies of representation 
may intersect and draw support from yet should not be confused with a wide range of broader 




ideologies, such as neoliberalism, corporatism or nationalism. I identified that in the mining 
industry consultative ideologies of consultative corporate-social incorporation are the most 
prevalent – although administrative incorporation and particularist ideologies are also 
relevant. While this situation supports and is produced by corporate power, these ideologies 
are influenced by the broader political environment and must respond or adapt to ideological 
challenges.18 
To analyse how people affected by mining accept or resist participatory mechanisms I 
consider how their ideologies are receptive to, or contradict, ideologies of representation in 
general, and consultative ideologies of corporate-social incorporation in particular. Where 
these ideologies are incompatible with extractive capitalism or participation, it is far more 
likely that the group will be opposed to participation. Where there is common ground, even 
if tactical or opportunistic, groups may accept participation, even if they attempt to change 
the terms of participation. While I identify four factors – control of land, histories and forms 
of organisation, alliance structures, and ideology – that determine if and how people affected 
by mining participate, the role of ideology is key. It is through ideology that people affected 
by mining understand their tactics and agency, relationships to land, how they construct 
organisations, and select allies. 
While ‘ideology’ connotes a singular coherent world view, Gramscian scholar Mark Rupert 
provides a definition of common sense as: 
an amalgam of historically effective ideologies, scientific doctrines and social mythologies … a 
syncretic historical residue, fragmentary, and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations and 
potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and political projects (2006, 93–
94). 
Because common sense contains contradictory and competing ideas of the world, it becomes 
further terrain for social conflict as competing actors emphasise ideas and practices that 
favour their interests. E P Thompson (1978, 156) referred to “an amalgam of the cultural 
debris of many different ways of thinking”  from which people select “those parts most 
calculated to defend their present interests” (Thompson 1978, 154). It is also through 
common sense (and critique of common sense) that people understand their interests.  
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The dynamics of conflict over ideologies within common sense is a matter for detailed 
empirical investigation. The theoretical point is to view people affected by mining as 
“historically situated social agents whose actions are enabled and constrained by their social 
self-understandings” (Rupert 2006, 93). Common sense understandings enable or privilege 
some courses of action over others, influencing social organisation, relationships with land, 
and dispositions towards alliance partners, state and corporate actors. Yet this is a two-way 
process, the development of common sense is profoundly influenced by histories of social 
organisation of production and reproduction.19   
Common sense understandings provide an array of material potentially supportive of a range 
of ideologies and actions. Which element becomes dominant and which others are discarded 
is the result of competition and cooperation between different external and internal actors. 
For Gramsci (1971, Q11§12; 323-343), intellectuals, organisers, political parties, and leaders 
play the role of critiquing ‘common sense’ to develop critical and coherent ideologies. 
Ultimately, it is the elements which become dominant within common sense understandings 
that preclude or predispose people to iterations of participatory mechanisms. The forms that 
participatory mechanisms take will also be determined by the contradictions between the 
common-sense understandings of people affected by mining and corporate ideologies.  
Analytical considerations 
This final section outlines an analytical method based on the theoretical framework which will 
be applied across the following chapters. While detail on methods and the data analysis 
process are given in the Appendix, this section establishes specific questions – both inductive 
and deductive – used to interpret empirical data. As established in the introductory chapter, 
the methodology employed in this thesis utilises case studies to examine the contours of 
conflict occurring at the local scale as embedded within national and global relations between 
people affected by mining, corporations and various other actors. This method was employed 
specifically to avoid the reification of sites and scales of conflict while examining the 
interrelation of agency and structure. Specifically, attention is given to the ways that agency 
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– particularly how it manifests as opposition and conflict – produces changes in the 
governance and regulatory structures of the social dimensions of mining.  
The first task then is to establish the global and national (Indonesian) context – the 
governance regimes, regulations, economic trends, powerful actors, and ongoing 
contestations that each preceding case in embedded within, a task undertaken in the next 
chapter. The analysis shows that these political and economic structures are not static 
outcomes of corporate or state power but rather of ongoing conflicts that bubble up from 
local scales through alliances. To be sure, the current configuration of legislation, regulation, 
governance and economic structures present opportunities and barriers to actors in 
contestation today. Yet these structures are as likely to change in response to ongoing 
contestation as they are to provide hard limits to permissible contestation.  
Following this, analysis of the case studies (Chapters Five, Six, and Seven) proceeds along the 
lines suggested by the theoretical and methodological frameworks. Each follows a narrative 
of evolving conflict that emerged from data collection – particularly the stories shared by 
interviewees – confirmed through documentary evidence and participant observation. Whilst 
each case study demonstrated and illuminated different aspects of contestation, for all the 
analysis proceeds broadly along several sets of questions.  
First, how did the development of the mine disrupt or change historically produced pre-
existing social relations? Answering this question reveals the immediate source of conflict – 
while historical analysis reveals that some of the conflicts or tension may have pre-existed the 
development of the mine and been triggered or exacerbated by extraction – this is particularly 
the case where conflict has an intercommunal dimension of class, gender or ethnic divisions.  
Second, how did the mining company respond and attempt to manage the conflicts and 
disruptions following the initial act of accumulation by dispossession? What balance of 
coercion and participation were employed? Using the modes of participation framework 
means identifying the ideologies and institutional structures that legitimise and structure 
participation. To what extent were these based in global standards, national regulatory 
requirements or influenced by international organisations? How did they fit with participation 
in state or autonomous sites of participation? Who was able to participate on what issues 





contain risky manifestations of conflict, or did the corporation attempt a more proactive 
approach to establishing favourable social relations? 
Third, what factors influenced the desire and capacity of people affected by mining to 
participate or not? The theoretical framework here advances the argument that the capacity 
and desire of people affected by mining to participate or not is conditioned by historical and 
evolving social relations of production and reproduction, including their common-sense 
understandings of the world. Fieldwork across the cases identified that the specific factors 
include: control of land, forms of organisation, alliance structures and common-sense 
understandings of the world. As this analysis began to emerge from the data, I returned to 
the field with more detailed questions. From this, analysis focuses on the ways that actors 
perceive their interests and devise strategies to maintain or improve their social relations of 
production, reproduction and subsistence. By striking a balance between allowing data to 
emerge through an open engagement with research participants and this analytical 
framework, each case study presents a rich investigation of the unique contours of evolving 
conflicts while maintaining the ability to draw tentative empirical generalisations and robust 
theoretical replication.  
Control of land may include legal title, direct possession, claims to traditional custodianship, 
or the ability to exclude other actors. Assessing the level of control of land and the ability to 
enforce it is a matter of empirical investigation and cannot be assessed through only checking 
legal titles. Control of land may be physical or consist of various discursive claims. Closely 
related to control of land in agrarian communities is forms of organisation. Here the 
important questions are how integrated any organisational forms in hierarchical state and 
capitalist structures are. Do any independent associations exist? To what extent is the 
organisation and relations of production dictated by state or corporate actors? How do 
gender, ethnicity, age and class affect individuals’ ability to organise? These factors are most 
immediately relevant to a groups’ ability to respond to a mining proposal. Where control of 
land and forms of organisation are independent of state and capital control, they will be more 
able to form associations that support, demand or resist participation.  
Alliances – either with other groups of people affected by mining or activists and NGOs – play 
a special role in increasing the capacity of people affected by mining to participate or resist. 
Alliances can alter the balance of power by providing groups with increased knowledge, 




expertise and resources. National and international alliances are the most common 
mechanism through which conflicts ‘jump-scales’ by accessing media, resources and fora 
previously unavailable. Which allies groups affected by mining select and the ways that they 
employ scalar strategies is partially a matter of opportunity and circumstance but is also 
shaped by ideology. Like with corporate participatory mechanisms, where allies and affected 
people share common-sense understandings (ideological receptivity) they will more easily 
work together. Allies can also facilitate ideological development and critique.  
Ideology provides an important link between the corporate participatory mechanisms, 
alliances, and the desire of people affected by mining to participate or not. Ideology is also 
the most difficult factor to assess. While control of land can be observed, alliance structures 
investigated through interviews and documents, and histories of organisation are assessable 
through written and oral histories – it is rare that research participants are able or willing to 
articulate their ‘ideology’. This is largely because conceptions of the world, especially of 
subaltern people in post-authoritarian states like Indonesia, often exist in a ‘hidden transcript’ 
which is not expressed publicly for fear of reprisals from more powerful actors (Scott 1985; 
Hutchison and Wilson 2020). Neither are they singular or necessarily a coherent system, 
rather  ‘conceptions  of the world’ may be “disjointed and episodic” and “imposed by the 
external environment” (1971, Q11§12; 626-627) as common sense. For Gramsci (1971, 
Q10§17; 344), people’s conceptions of the world are not only expressed as ideas but are 
implicitly contained in their practical activity. Analysis then takes a dual perspective of 
investigating the common-sense expressed by people affected by mining and observing the 
ways they act. It also involves an historical investigation into previous modes of production 
and social reproduction, forms of organisation, alliances and beliefs. 
While the relative importance of each of the above factors varies between cases, the key 
analytical insight is that they are all created through historically evolving social relations of 
production and reproduction. Disruptions to local social, political and economic relations 
need to be managed by the corporation lest it result in forms of conflict risky to profitability. 
The importance of identifying specific factors for NGOs, activists and allies of people affected 
by mining is that these are the elements that could be strengthened to improve the ability of 






Participatory mechanisms are based in modes of participation and global governance 
standards but respond to specific local conflicts. Mining companies have developed 
participatory mechanisms for three interrelated reasons: in response to crises of legitimacy, 
both global and local; to attempt to control risky forms of conflict that emerge from extractive 
developments and; to create social relations of production and reproduction conducive to 
extractive developments. That is to say, participatory mechanisms are developed by 
multinational mining corporations in response to threats to profitability as methods of 
accommodating dissent in order to continue accumulating wealth. They therefore have the 
potential to prolong underlying contestation and inequality. 
The theoretical framework established here conceptualises visible forms of conflict as 
manifestations of the conflicting interests within extractive developments and between 
extractive and competing modes of production. This includes land grabbing, ideological 
contradictions, conflict over environmental pollution, inequality between mine employees 
and others, inequality between men and women, and changing relations of social 
reproduction. The implementation of participatory mechanisms and the forms that they take 
are explained by the modes of participation framework as techniques for managing these 
conflicts, contradictions and inequalities. Yet modes of participation are subject to 
contestation over both their material effects and ideological legitimacy. The ways that the 
common-sense understandings of people affected by mining intersect or contradict 
ideologies of representation will determine their reactions to them and perhaps the form of 
participation. This therefore goes halfway to explaining the vast range of outcomes of 
participation and extractive conflicts.  
The second half of understanding why, when and how mining corporations implement 
participatory mechanisms and how people affected by mining react to them is analysis of the 
politics of scale. An explicit analysis of political scale allows us to move beyond the single 
scalar focus present in much of the literature. A modes of participation framework sensitive 
to scalar politics understands that multinational miners implement participatory mechanisms 
in response to localised conflict, ideological foundations, and standards set at the global scale, 




which, in turn, are also the result of international contestation between the mining industry 
and its critics.  
To explain why people affected by mining accept or resist invitations to participate, or force 
corporations to accept their participation, I analyse them as historically situated subjects with 
relationships to land and resources, forms of organisation based in histories of production 
and social reproduction, allies, and corresponding common-sense understandings of the 
world. The ways that their common-sense understandings contradict or are compatible with 
corporate ideologies of participation will largely determine their desire to participate and how 
they participate.  
The original contribution of this combination of approaches is to understand how histories 
and ideologies of people affected by mining explain diverse outcomes of participatory 
strategies in the mining sector. The next chapter demonstrates, clarifies and expands this 
framework by considering in detail the specific forms that participatory mechanisms take in 
the mining sector and how these are governed at a global scale. The following chapters 
change focus to analyse the conflicts involved in three case studies in Indonesia, each 
considers and demonstrates the ways that common sense understandings develop and 
condition contestations around participation and mining developments. 
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Chapter Four: National and Global 
Political Economies of Mining, Conflict 
and Participation 
Multinational mining corporations developed modes of participation in response to conflicts 
with people affected by mining and critics across a range of cases, jurisdictions and political 
scales. While the workings and outcomes of participatory mechanisms are affected by local 
social relations, risks and conflicts, their design and implementation are structured by the 
standards and regulations of international and national governance regimes. This chapter 
analyses the contestations and processes that have enshrined modes of participation in 
international and national institutional structures and ideologies. It demonstrates and 
expands on the modes of participation framework developed in the previous chapter to 
explain what accounts for their development since the 1990s. It thus conceptualises 
governance and regulation as changing political economic structures produced through 
ongoing contestation between opposing interests by analysing the macro ideologies, context, 
and relations within which participatory mechanisms are deployed.  
The first section of this chapter explains how historical conflicts which culminated in crises of 
legitimacy for the extractive industries in the 1990s prompted the development of global 
private-governance for the social dimensions of mining. International business associations, 
industry standards, and governance mechanisms combined ideological fragments from their 
critics with neo-institutionalist ideologies of development to reconstitute the legitimacy of 
mining corporations as responsible self-regulating actors. The International Council on Metals 
and Mining (ICMM) exemplifies this. The second section considers how international 
organisations and development agencies – and the World Bank Group in particular – also 
underwent a crisis of legitimacy in terms of their financial support for controversial extractive 
industries. This mirrored broader crises in development practice which prompted the ‘social-
turn’ in development and the rise of participatory development, which was copied into 
extractive industries.  
The third section argues that global and national trends towards corporate self-governance – 
private modes of participation – are expressed in increased responsibilities of corporations 
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for community development, participation and sustainability. CSR and especially participatory 
mechanisms are an expression and expansion of corporate power used to manage conflict 
and create social conditions favourable to extractive capitalism. The fourth section shifts to 
examine national level structures and regulation for the social dimensions of mining. While 
multinational mining corporations and dominant state actors are often in conflict over the 
spoils of mining, in regard to the social impacts of mining their interests largely coincide. This 
is certainly true in Indonesia where national and provincial governments provide minimal 
legislation and regulation in this area. The fifth section then analyses the political economy of 
mining in Indonesia, to both explain why state institutions provide minimal regulation and 
establish the domestic context within which conflict and participation over mining occur. I 
argue that powerful state institutions, including the Presidency and Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources, domestic oligarchs and foreign capital have remained dominant since the 
New Order Regime. However, responsibility to manage the social and environmental impacts 
of mining has shifted from state institutions onto mining corporations – especially since the 
withdrawal of the Indonesian Military from politics. At the same time, political opportunities 
for people affected by mining have opened to pursue their interests through democratic 
institutions, international alliances, media freedom, court cases and, of course, corporate 
participatory mechanisms. 
Together, these first five sections demonstrate and develop my argument that modes of 
participation and participatory mechanisms in mining involve a reassertion of corporate 
power in response to overlapping crises. Of course this is not a straight forward process of 
transformation and is contested at almost every step. Not least by the decisions and actions 
of mining-affected communities. Thus, the exercise of corporate power and reactions to it 
from affected communities, state actors, and civil society often produce unexpected 
outcomes. 
The sixth and final section considers how mining critics and affected communities have 
responded to participatory mechanisms. There are well documented examples of people 
affected by mining benefiting from deciding to embrace, co-opt, subvert or resist 
participation. Regardless of how they participate or not, groups will extract more benefits 





corporate and state sponsored sites of participation – including through demonstrations, 
NGO campaigns, political strategies and media strategies. 
Crisis and the Emergence of Global Governance  
In the second half of the 20th century, as exploration and resource extraction in remote areas 
increasingly became economically and technologically viable, the social and environmental 
dynamics of mining changed dramatically (Colley 2001; Dashwood 2013, 459; Dougherty 
2016). The extraction of minerals and coal from remote areas, especially in developing 
countries, meant that small agrarian communities and indigenous people became the 
principal groups affected by mining (Leifsen et al. 2017; Conde and Le Billon 2017; Filer and 
Le Meur 2017, 13). These changes led to new forms of conflict – forced relocations, land 
grabbing, collusion with corrupt regimes and militaries, environmental pollution and even civil 
war – which had become chronic by the 1990s (Evans, Goodman, and Lansbury 2001). In turn, 
significant controversies developed from local campaigns, jumping-scales to attract global 
media attention. NGOs rallied against the lack of regulation, transparency, and accountability 
of mining companies in their overseas operations, especially when operating in authoritarian 
contexts (Szablowski 2007, 75–77; Bünte 2018). Infamous cases with global media attention 
include: the 1996 execution of nine environmental activists in Nigeria, where Royal Dutch 
Shell was implicated (Hanlon 2008); the international campaign on blood diamonds 
(Fanthorpe and Gabelle 2013); civil-war in Bougainville (Allen 2018) and the international 
NGO and labour movement campaigns against Rio Tinto (McSorley and Fowler 2001). 
Discourses on sustainability, human rights, corruption, and environmental devastation 
framed global awareness of conflict, severely damaging the reputation of multinational 
miners and financiers, notably including the World Bank (Fox and Brown 2000; World Bank 
2003; Hatcher 2014).  
Beyond reputational damage, several cases saw multinational miners sued by affected 
communities in their home jurisdiction1 (Atkinson and Hudson 1998; Macdonald 2004; Bünte 
2018). This was famously demonstrated by OK Tedi traditional owners from Papua New 
Guinea taking BHP to court in the Victorian Supreme Court in Australia (Filer and Macintyre 
                                                     
1 As opposed to the operating jurisdiction. 
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2006), Bouganvillian landowners suing Rio Tinto in the Los Angeles District Court (ACFOA 1995; 
Leith 2003; Allen 2018), and Indigenous claimants from West Papua suing Freeport-McMoRan 
in the New Orleans District Court (Regan 1998; Filer, Burton, and Banks 2008; See Kirsch 2014, 
84–126 for an extended discussion of these international court cases). Building on their 
political advocacy with affected communities, international NGOs and coalitions launched 
campaigns to hold multinational miners operating abroad to the standards that apply in their 
home states (Bünte 2018; Chapter Five). Court cases and NGO campaigns together 
threatened to increase the regulatory burden on multinational miners. This 
internationalisation of resistance was especially game-changing for multinational miners in 
authoritarian contexts because they could no longer rely only on a close relationship with 
host governments, state-controlled media and militaries to control dissent. In 2002, the global 
mining sector was achieving a return on investment of only 4.67 per cent (Kellow 2007, 115), 
and desperately needed to control any further threats to profitability. 
Sustained negative publicity, NGO campaigns and political advocacy led to protracted crises 
of legitimacy for the global extractive industry (Danielson 2002, 7; Kirsch 2014, 159; Evans, 
Goodman, and Lansbury 2001). Multinational miners were apparently worried that 
recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro 1992, if adopted, could pose a “significant threat to [metals] markets” 
(Kellow 2007, 123). These crises of legitimacy threatened mining corporations’ authority to 
operate relatively free of regulation and threatened the viability of significant ventures 
(Szablowski 2007, 77–82). As introduced in Chapter One, I use the term ‘crisis of legitimacy’ 
in the Gramscian sense, analogous to ‘crisis of authority’ and ‘crisis of hegemony’ to signify 
that a ruling class had lost the consensus for their ideological leadership and risks being 
subjected to the regulation of other actors (Filippini 2017, 99). This can occur independently 
of, yet is related to, the dominant class’s structural power, which may be asserted through 
more coercive means to keep control. This is applicable to multinational mining corporations 
as a fraction of the global ruling class. Crises threatened their ability to self-regulate. They 
thus needed to reabsorb control, perhaps through making sacrifices, making demagogic 
promises or modifying their ideological position or face a wider crisis resulting in their 





Multinational miners responded with dual strategies: the first was to establish a new 
international network of self-governance standards, partnerships and organizations (Hatcher 
2014). The second was to re-localize and contain conflict through community development 
work, CSR and the participation of select local actors. Multinational miners pre-empted state 
intervention by establishing the institutional guidelines and ideological legitimacy to manage 
the social and environmental impacts of mining. Together these constituted a new mode of 
participation, institutionalised guidelines and ideologies of representation for corporations to 
manage the multi scalar threats to their profitability.  
An illustrative example is the International Cyanide Management Code for the Manufacture, 
Transport, and Use of Cyanide in the Production of Gold. The code was developed as a 
partnership between the then International Council of Metals and Environment (ICME) and 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in May 2000. Three months earlier, at the 
Romanian Baia Mare mine owned by the Australian company Esmeralda, a tailings dam 
breached causing massive cyanide pollution to rivers across Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, 
killing fish and poisoning drinking water. The BBC called it “the worst environmental disaster 
since the Chernobyl Nuclear Leak” (Batha 2000). Gold miners and cyanide manufacturers 
feared new stringent legislation would prove costly and so pre-empted this with the creation 
of a private voluntary code in partnership with the UNEP, to which Rio Tino seconded staff 
(Burton 2001, 119–22). Although it is voluntary, as an industry-wide code, it has benefits for 
medium and small gold mining companies which might not have the resources or experience 
to develop their own cyanide management procedures. The code relies on consultation with 
experts to establish its legitimacy rather than affected people.  
For almost any aspect of the environmental and social dimensions of mining, there is a 
relevant international standard. All are voluntary, although each confers opportunities, and 
each takes different forms in terms of the actors involved, the problem they respond to, the 
political power of actors involved, and the benefits conferred. Although there are too many 
to consider in detail, Table 4 lists the most prominent. All confer legitimacy on members and 
some facilitate access to resources, such as finance, markets, or technical guidance (On EITI 
see: Bünte 2018). By providing guidelines which each actor can implement according to their 
own interpretation and interests, rather than providing hard regulations, this network of 
standards functions to mitigate environmental and social risk to corporations and sometimes 
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state actors, investors and NGOs. This risk mitigation is about smoothing the process of 
extraction rather than preventing social and environmental harms (for example, on the 
Equator Principles see: Wright 2012).  
Table 4 - Selected International Standards and Organisations 
Standard Organisation Problem Actors 







World Bank Group Social and 
environmental 
conflict. 
Projects financed by 
IFC or insured by 
MIGA; IFC & MIGA, 
complainants. 
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Management Code  
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Nations Environment 
Program and International 
Council on Metals and the 
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Environmental 
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Principles on Security 
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The Equator Principles Independent, with IFC 
support 
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The UN Global 
Compact 











International Council on 
Metals and Mining 
Environmental and 




The Rio Declaration United Nations Conference 













OECD Guidelines on 
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The Equator Principles demonstrate how voluntary adherence to standards can facilitate both 
social legitimacy and access to resources. The Principles are a set of guidelines adopted by 
financial institutions that provide project finance with a total capital cost of US$10m or over 
(Watchman, Delfino, and Addison 2007). Some estimates claim the project finance nominally 
governed by the Principles accounts for up to 85% of global cross-border extractive project 
finance (Watchman, Delfino, and Addison 2007, 95). Financial institutions which adopt the 
principles place conditions on project developers that are often over and above the legislated 
requirements in host countries. These conditions include risk management plans for social 
and environmental risks, prior informed consultation in a culturally appropriate manner with 
affected communities, grievance processes, and public reporting of social and environmental 
impact assessments, in some cases there are also requirements to report greenhouse gas 
emissions (“The  Equator Principles III” 2013). Thus, participation based on consultative 
ideologies of representation is being built into international capital markets. 
The ICMM and its 10 Principles for Sustainable Development framework (ICMM 2015, 3) is an 
important example because most of the largest multinational miners and national mining 
associations are members, it is influential in creating other standards, covers most areas of 
environmental and social impacts of mining, and provides a primary reference for how its 
members design community relations programs.2 This section provides an account of how the 
development of international standards, and the ICMM specifically, was driven by crises of 
legitimacy. 
The GMI was formed in 1998 by CEOs of eight of the largest multinational miners who 
recognized the industry’s “trust deficit” (Kellow 2007, 124) that could result in being 
“legislated out of existence” (Dashwood 2013, 446). In 1999, Sir Robert Wilson, chairperson 
of Rio Tinto, framed the GMI as a response to crisis: 
Unless the major players in the global mining and minerals industry can present a convincing 
case that their activities are conducted in line with [sustainable development] principles ... 
their long term future is in jeopardy (quoted in Evans, Goodman, and Lansbury 2001, xvi–xvii). 
                                                     
2  As of 2018, ICMM had 27 members, 15 ranked in the top 40 mining companies by market 
capitalisation (ICMM 2018a; PWC 2018a). ICMM members have headquarters across most major 
origins of mining capital – North America, South America, Europe, South Africa, Australia and Japan, 
conspicuous in their absence are Chinese, Russian and Indian mining companies, which account for 
14 of the 40 largest mining companies (PWC 2018a). 
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The GMI’s two-year Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project 
investigated "disputes concerning land tenure, environmental management, and 
relationships to communities" (Kirsch 2014, 168). Discourses and practices of sustainability 
and community development were appropriated through NGO cooperation. By attempting 
to overcome collective action problems of any one MNC going it alone: 
The MNCs formed a collective citizenship aiming to operate across multiple nation-states, 
strategically building political influence and the corporate reputation of mining companies [and] 
engineered reforms from above, via multi-stakeholder networks around CSR (Phillips 2012, 172). 
The collective organization of the companies is important, as this allows them to claim that 
the industry is now self-regulated and hence that state regulation is unnecessary. The MMSD 
resulted in a four-step program for “Supporting Sustainable Development in the Minerals 
Sector” (Danielson 2002, XXV). The four steps are: understanding sustainable development; 
creating organizational policies and management systems; achieving cooperation among 
those with similar interests; and building capacity for effective actions at all levels (Danielson 
2002, xxv–xxxiv). Although the final report is devoid of any concrete recommendations for 
reform, it did establish a common language for sustainability and provided a base for 
proceeding initiatives. It created an ideological foundation of sustainable development to 
legitimise that private-led development is an inherent good. The MMSD also began to 
embody consultative ideologies of representation. However, because the focus was on 
restoring the industry’s international reputation it was international NGOs rather than 
affected communities that participated. 
The MMSD marked a shift in relationships, from confrontational towards more collaborative 
engagements between some NGOs and mining corporations. For NGOs which actively sought 
collaboration with MNCs, such as the World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the MMSD 
presented an opportunity to influence corporate practices. For other NGOs, including the 
Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and Minerals Policy Institute (MPI), voluntary, 
market-based CSR was viewed as a threat to legal reform and strict regulation  (Phillips 2012, 
184–87). The MMSD attracted much criticism from critical activists, NGOs and academics for 
failing to provide significant improvements in outcomes, for advocating voluntary standards 
and for co-opting discourses of sustainability, human rights and poverty reduction (Kirsch 
2014).  Nevertheless, the MMSD began the process of reframing and legitimising the mining 





Realizing the need to secure ongoing legitimacy and profitability, the GMI prompted the 
existing International Council on Metals and the Environment to broaden its scope and reform 
as the ICMM in 2001 (ICMM n.d.).  Adopted in 2003 and most recently refined in 2015, the 
ICMM requires that members commit to the Ten Principles which include requirements to 
“contribute to the social, economic and institutional development of host countries and 
communities” and “proactively engage key stakeholders on sustainable development 
challenges and opportunities in an open and transparent manner” (ICMM 2015, 6). The ICMM 
also harmonizes the principles with other standards applicable to MNCs:  
To ensure their robustness, the principles have been benchmarked against leading international 
standards. These include: the Rio Declaration, the Global Reporting Initiative, the Global 
Compact, OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, World Bank Operational Guidelines, 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, ILO Conventions 98, 169, 176, and the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights (2015, 3). 
The principles both borrow legitimacy from these other organisations and link them together 
as a network of self-governance arrangements. They commit members to develop and report 
on companywide and project specific policies and procedures for environmental 
management, community development and stakeholder participation. The ICMM thus builds 
on the MMSD and extends consultation and participation as a problem-solving technique to 
people affected by mining. 
However, the ICMM has attracted criticism for the same reasons as the MMSD. The ICMM 
principles are voluntary, unenforceable, vague, focused on process, neglect measurable 
outcomes, and have little independent reporting or monitoring requirements, allowing great 
flexibility for individual corporations in their implementation. The same criticism can be 
applied to almost all self-governance standards (Vogel 2007, 164; Singh 2011). The 
voluntarism and vagueness of the ICMM principles and other standards listed in Table 4 give 
individual mining corporations flexibility to create their own internal policy and guidelines. 
Each mining project will implement participatory mechanisms based on the participatory 
principles according to company policy and in response to local conditions. This may result in 
the creation of consultative committees, community development funding, complaints 
mechanisms, cultural programs, and/or participatory environmental monitoring.  
Together, this network of interconnected standards, company policy and practices constitute 
a new mode of participation with consultative ideologies of representation and societal 
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incorporation in corporate sites. As a collective, multinational mining corporations emerged 
more powerful having overcome threats to their legitimacy. However, mining corporation 
have not developed this mode of participation on their own, in fact they are directly 
influenced by the ideologies of representation and participatory development practices of 
international development organisations.  
Development Agencies and Participatory Development 
As outlined in Chapter Two, participatory development emerged following the rise in 
influence of neoinstitutionalism and the World Bank’s ‘social-development model’ (Hatcher 
2015, 323). In relation to extractive industries, the World Bank Group copied techniques of 
participatory development for use in extractive projects and influenced mining corporations 
to adopt them as a means of restoring legitimacy. In 2001, following the Group’s involvement 
in several controversial projects, the Bank declared a two-year moratorium on investment in 
extractive industries pending the completion of the independent Extractive Industries Review 
(World Bank 2003). When released, the review concluded that the World Bank Group still has 
a significant role to play in extractive industry development, albeit with a renewed focus on 
contributing to “poverty alleviation through sustainable development” by meeting the 
following conditions: 
• pro-poor public and corporate governance, including proactive planning and 
management to maximize poverty alleviation through sustainable development;  
• much more effective social and environmental policies; and  
• respect for human rights  
(World Bank 2003, vii).  
This provides a new foundation for people affected by mining to participate in the planning, 
monitoring and implementation of environmental and social dimensions of mining. The 
Extractive Industries Review argued that only under these conditions could the World Bank 
Group continue its controversial role in extractive industries. Hence, the review resulted in 
the World Bank Group adopting new standards for consultation and participation, the revision 
of policy and guidelines on the social and environmental impacts of extractive industries, 
renewed support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Voluntary 
Principles on Human Rights and Security and internal grievance mechanisms, and building 





recommended that indigenous people affected by mining be afforded the right of free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC), however, the Bank in fact adopted the lesser standard of free, 
prior and informed consultation (World Bank Group 2004). Support for extractive 
developments from the Group, including finance from the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and Insurance from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), were made 
conditional on extractive developments including certain kinds of participation by affected 
communities and NGOs (Szablowski 2007, 122–27; Hatcher 2014).  
Grievance mechanisms are a prominent participatory mechanism through which agencies 
directly engage with local populations and work around state structures. They are a last 
defence at resolving grievances within international organisations before conflict escalates 
through more threatening avenues – such as court cases or international NGO campaigning 
(see Park 2014 on grievance mechanisms in the ADB). That is, they can contain the risk of 
reputational and ultimately financial damage to corporations and their financiers. Grievance 
mechanisms also shape the issues and actors who are deemed legitimate.  
Fabiana Li discusses how the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), which handles 
grievances about projects financed by the IFC or insured by the MIGA both directly engage 
affected populations and ‘scientize’ issues (F. Li 2015, 92–98). She argues that while the 
process produced interesting scientific data, the technocratic framework meant that social, 
political and ethical dimensions of conflict were ignored. However, the data produced 
through investigations into grievances can be used by actors in other sites of political 
participation.  
This is not to say that the CAO cannot be harnessed by relatively powerless groups to extract 
concessions from mining corporations. This was the case when nomadic herders in Mongolia 
affected by Rio Tinto’s Oyu Tolgoi mine used CAO mediation to secure “commitments to 
improved environmental monitoring and management, compensation as well as number of 
initiatives to boost the economic sustainability of the herders’ traditional livelihood” 
(Brueckner and Sinclair 2020, 115). The CAO itself was established in 2009 in response to 
international NGO campaigns against the IFC’s involvement in controversial projects 
(Brueckner and Sinclair 2020, 115). The CAO then internalises contestation to contain threats 
to the legitimacy of the IFC  and its extractive industry partners (see also: MacDonald 2017a).  
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The World Bank and other agencies’3 work is not limited to the projects they fund but also 
involves ‘capacity-building’ and reforming developing countries’ legislation and regulation 
regarding extractive industries. This activity is consistent with and simultaneous to 
liberalisation and good governance reforms in other policy areas (Hatcher 2012; 2015, 328–
30). Here too, the ‘social development model’ forms a basis for legislative reform, which may 
require corporations to consult with affected communities on issues from environmental 
controls and monitoring, to compensation and endowment funds, to agreements about the 
provision of local jobs and so forth (Hatcher 2014). By placing the responsibility to consult on 
corporations: “the environmental, social and human rights dimensions embedded in this new 
generation of mining regimes appear to have been, in practice, removed from the state’s 
scrutiny” (Hatcher 2015, 437). 
The World Bank Group’s reform agenda facilitates corporate power while shielding mining 
corporations from social risk. The limited participation provided for in national mining codes 
leads Hatcher (2015, 323–24) to argue that:  
The involvement of local communities translates into a renewed emphasis on sociopolitical risk 
management for capital and multilateral institutions rather than an opening of political space, 
[…] for people impacted by mining activities and extant patterns of governance. 
Thus, the Group’s extractive-related reforms reflect “a pressing need to rally certain segments 
of civil society and manage local resistance” (2015, 340).  
In summary, the World Bank Group reformed its internal practices and used its influence to 
pressure corporations and states to adopt frameworks for stakeholder participation in private 
sector led development. This amounts to the World Bank Group and multinational 
corporations forging a new mode of participation based on technocratic problem-solving, 
consultative ideologies, societal incorporation, and corporate sites of participation. 
Ideological fragments from sustainability and participatory development practice were 
incorporated into neo-institutional ideologies of private sector led development to neutralise 
                                                     
3 In recent years, programs with similar focus on pro-poor development and participation in extractive 
developments have been developed by bilateral aid agencies. Of note are: the European 
Development Fund’s Program to Strengthen and Diversify the Mining Sector (Larsen and Mamosso 
2014); Norway’s Oil for Development program (Kolstad, Wiig, and Williams 2009; Solli 2011); DFAT’s 
Extractive Sector Development Assistance, AusAID’s Mining for Development Initiative (AMDI) 
(AusAID 2011; Parfitt, Bryant, and Barrett 2012; DFAT 2014) DFAT’s Leading Practice Sustainable 






or co-opt critics. With this foundation, the World Bank Group was able to partially restore 
legitimacy for its involvement in the industry and contain risks to its investments without 
needing to fundamentally challenge the rationale for mining or the power structures 
surrounding corporate-community engagement. To be sure, significant critiques have and 
continue to be made, as struggles over legitimacy are ongoing. The next section considers 
how similar contestations and processes have produced domestic regulatory frameworks that 
similarly provide for corporate self-governance and direct participation with stakeholders.  
Corporate Social Responsibility as Corporate Power 
Extractive companies developing mines and using participatory approaches to CSR do so for 
two reasons: they want to gain legitimacy from national and international audiences, 
investors and state actors and they want their project to succeed, unthreatened by potentially 
costly forms of conflict. Participation is a means to achieve established project goals. This 
section argues that CSR is not merely the expression of an ethical imperative, corporate 
‘greenwashing’ or a simple expression of corporate self-interest (O’Faircheallaigh 2008; 
Mzembe and Downs 2014) but is the result of changing social relationships and evolving 
contestation between corporate, state, and societal actors.  
In this view, CSR builds corporate power and influence over social and environmental issues 
(Elbra 2014; Welker 2014; Horowitz 2015). While CSR programs might aim to build trust and 
legitimacy with the public, civil society, affected communities and state actors, the 
asymmetric power relations between them are reinforced. Hanlon makes the point that:  
CSR represents a further embedding of capitalist social relations and a deeper opening up of 
social life to the dictates of the marketplace … it is the result of a shift from a fordist to a post-
fordist regime of accumulation at the heart of which is both an expansion and deepening of 
wage relations (2008, 57). 
This process amounts to a reorganization of relationships and roles played by corporations, 
states, and civil society driven by conflict over the extractive process. Through deploying 
fractions of their resources, mining corporations can influence key local actors and 
government decision makers.  
For example, Freeport and Newcrest both provide 1% of their operating profit from their 
Grasburg and Gosowong mines for community development funds to villages surrounding 
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their operations, providing health clinics, education and employment opportunities (Leith 
2003; Newcrest 2011; Chapter Six). Funds are distributed through local government councils, 
NGOs or community groups (Leith 2003). Such community development funds are often 
accompanied by agreements to guarantee local employment, provide education and training, 
relocation programs, or to protect biodiversity (Wanvik 2014). This helps to establish the 
legitimacy of large-scale mines and create local political, social and economic relations 
favourable to mining. The corresponding increase of community reliance on corporate 
generosity reinforces the role of the private sector in social life (Welker 2014; Elbra 2014).  
Yet an increase in corporate responsibility and power is not necessarily at the expense of state 
power, as corporations and state institutions often work in partnership as governance actors. 
For example, The Voluntary Principle of Security and Human Rights is a voluntary, consensus-
based initiative that sets out principles for transparent, accountable, and consultative 
corporate security policy in the oil, gas and minerals sectors. The Voluntary Principles 
reimagine corporate actors as active participants in the creation of human-rights norms, 
conflict resolution and democratisation, rather than as simply owing obligations to adhere to 
local legislation (Guáqueta 2013). The Voluntary Principles set out guidelines for corporations 
operating in regions with ‘weak-governance’. Signatories are expected to design security 
programs, using public and/or private security forces in consultation with local communities, 
governments and NGOs in ways that promote human-rights in line with international 
standards (“Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights” n.d.; Guáqueta 2013). 
Through the creation of the Voluntary Principles, corporate actors have become partners with 
states and NGOs in the process of designing security governance arrangements across local 
and global scales. 
With corporations becoming more involved in community development programs, 
environmental monitoring, human-rights governance, and stakeholder consultation, 
incentives are created for people affected by mining to engage with corporate actors. Leifsen 
et al. (2017, 1044) argue that “new types of conflict arise which are often related to what 
constitute legitimate forms of information, knowledge, impacts and levels of compensation.” 
For example, compensation may be introduced to diffuse conflict but can itself become a 
source of conflict. Indeed, the main effect of CSR programs is to change conflict, rather than 





processes of consultation and development and the form of conflict from confrontational to 
collaborative. This amounts to a realignment of interests of people affected by mining to be 
less oppositional to corporate mining.  
However, this process is not unidirectional. People affected by mining do not merely adopt 
corporate interests in response to patronage. Corporations must also make concessions and 
invest in community development in ways that are not directly reducible to the profit motive. 
Marina Welker (2014, 1), on the community relations practices of Newmont at their ex-Batu 
Hijau mine in Sumbawa, makes precisely this point: 
Without denying profit as a motivation, in this book I show that people enact corporations in 
multiple ways, and that these enactments involve struggles over the boundaries, interests and 
responsibilities of the corporation. 
Welker continues to argue that the community relations strategy of Newmont evolved 
through a series of contestations with people affected by mining and other opportunists who 
learned how to pressure Newmont to provide ‘development goods.’ Thus, CSR programs, like 
their governance, evolve as corporate political strategies in relation to contestation and 
threat.  
The major caveat I need to offer before continuing is that participatory mechanisms have not 
substantially replaced the kinds of violent, repressive strategies that have become infamous 
for their association with extractive industries. The security arsenal available to corporations 
and states today is only limited by their budgets and vulnerability to public scrutiny. Police, 
military, private security, thugs, gangsters (preman in Indonesia), criminal courts, and prisons 
all constitute violent means of containing conflict. Mechanisms of participation exist in the 
shadow of legitimate, illegitimate, legal and illegal deployable violence (Leith 2003; Arellano-
Yanguas 2011; Welker 2014). Indeed, they are both constituted against violence as the 
alternative and can provide cover for violent actions. To be sure, mining affected communities 
may decide to participate in corporate programs if they feel there is an implicit or explicit 
threat of violence awaiting non-participation or resistance to mining.  
Patterns of National Regulations for CSR 
The final major source of regulation of the social impacts of mining is domestic legislation and 
regulation. An increasing number of jurisdictions around the world require mining 
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corporations to practice CSR. Yet, legislation and regulations are most often too vague or fail 
to provide enforcement mechanisms, effectively leaving corporations to (continue to) self-
regulate (Rosser and Edwin 2010; Devi and Prayogo 2013; F. Li 2015). Indeed, state actors 
often promote the use of voluntary codes (J. Nem Singh and Grugel 2013, 68). For example, 
in Peru the 2006 legislation for CSR (called Mining Program in Solidarity with People or MPSP) 
mandated corporate spending on social development with a “loose set of rules” which 
effectively transferred the state’s responsibility “to improve local people’s lives” to the 
private sector (Arellano-Yanguas 2011, 95). Similar patterns have been documented across 
resource rich countries in Southeast Asia and the Global South (Hatcher 2020, 12). The result 
is that “mining enterprises are delegated significant degrees of … responsibility for the social 
mediation of mining development” (Szablowski 2007, 58). The predominant reason for this is 
that dominant interests within national and provincial legislatures and ministries usually align 
well with the interests of domestic and multinational mining corporations – they each want 
to extract as much resources and therefore revenue as possible. These interests often diverge 
and produce conflict over how revenue is distributed, for example over taxation rates and 
domestic ownership requirements, yet in terms of the social dimensions of mining, the 
priority is to smooth conflicts so that maximum extraction can proceed relatively unhindered.  
Breslin and Nesadurai (2018) argue that despite the common depiction of Southeast Asian 
states jealously guarding their sovereignty, forms of private governance operate across 
various issues, particularly where states have left ‘governance gaps’ in areas such as 
sustainable forestry, labour standards and maritime safety. Private and public-private forms 
of governance emerge at political scales where it suits intersections of interests of powerful 
state and non-state actors (Bünte 2018). The transfer of responsibility for governance of social 
and environmental dimensions of mining to corporations does not represent an increase in 
corporate power vis-à-vis states but is the result of an intersection of interests between 
dominant actors within powerful state institutions, multinational mining corporations and 
domestic capital. 
Indonesia is no exception to this dynamic. It is one thing to understand organised interests 
that advocate or block policies and regulations as an outcome of contestation and 
cooperation between groups. However, this is just one part of the political economy within 





economic relations that shape conflict, we must move past their institutional expressions to 
a broader understanding of extractivism in Indonesia.  
The Political Economy of Mining in Indonesia  
From 2013 until July 2019, mining contributed 15.66% to exports and 4.77% to GDP (Bank 
Indonesia 2019b; 2019a). 4 According to Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative reporting, 
mining contributed 3.35% of state revenue in 2016, down from 4.14% in 2015 (EITI Indonesia 
2018). Mining therefore retains a significant position in the ‘commanding heights’ of the 
economy, behind oil and gas in terms of its contribution to foreign exchange reserves and 
government revenues. Meanwhile, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) reported 1,769 
cases of land-conflict from 2014 to 2018, resulting in 41 fatalities, 51 non-fatal shootings, 940 
arrests, and 541 other instances of violence (KPA 2019).5 That is, despite the rise of CSR and 
participation, violent conflict remains chronic. To understand the current relationships that 
shape conflict and participation in Indonesia, a brief account of the historical constitution of 
the political economy of extractivism in Indonesia follows.  
Extractivism has played a key role in the development of Indonesia’s economy, foreign 
relations, and shaped conflict between large capital, labour, peasants and indigenous people 
since at least the colonial era. First the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and then the colonial 
state established and placed European capital at the helm “structural relations of extraction” 
that are still reflected today (Tilley 2020, 7). Two of the world’s major global extractive 
multinationals were established as royal trading companies during this period. Billiton (later 
to merge with Australian Broken Hill Proprietary Company to form BPH) and Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company (later merging with the Shell Transport and Trading Company to form 
                                                     
4 Mining products for export consist of copper ore, nickel ore, bauxite, nonmonetary gold and other 
mining products as classified by Bank Indonesia (2019a). If oil and gas is included, this figure rises to 
25.84%. For GDP mining related activities included here are “coal and lignite mining”; “iron ore 
mining” and “other mining and quarrying”. If “crude petroleum, natural gas and geothermal” are 
added, the contribution of mining to GDP increases to 8.32% (2019b). Refined and manufactured 
products are not included in these statistics.  
5 These figures are a decrease on previous years – in 2013 alone, the KPA reported 369 land conflicts, 
29 fatalities, 30 shootings, 130 other instances of violence and 239 arrests (Nugraha 2013). These 
reports include conflict around plantations, infrastructure, mining, forestry and other agrarian 
conflict. These figures surely underestimate the prevalence of violence as they rely on communities 
or NGOs reporting to the KPA. 
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Royal Dutch Shell) channelled profits from the extraction of tin and oil in Sumatra to the Dutch 
Royal Family and other European investors (Zanden and Marks 2012, 84–88). During the 
independence era, the fledgling Indonesian state nationalised many Dutch assets, replacing 
with “Indonesian military men” (Zanden and Marks 2012, 149). This created the foundation 
for a military-linked domestic oligarchy. The emergent military oligarchy formed alliances 
with international capital against domestic communists. For example, declassified memos 
show Shell managers were aware of and cooperated in the arrest of over 600 union organisers 
and workers linked to oil refineries in Palembang during just the first month of the 1965-66 
mass killings (Green 1965).  
During the New Order years (1965-1998), an easy symbiotic relationship existed between 
multinational mining companies and Soeharto's domestic oligarchical system.6 Indonesia’s 
oligarchical system evolved during the New Order regime as Soeharto maintained political 
power through vast patronage networks financed by oil, other centralised extractive 
industries, and export/import licencing. Domestic capital required foreign capital and 
corporate resources to drive development in the mining sector (Robison 2009, 115). Mining, 
along with oil and forestry provided “major sources of foreign exchange earnings and state 
revenues” (Robison 2009, 217). Mining also supplied domestic demand for aluminium and 
steel processing which were important resources, along with coal and oil, for the New Order’s 
industrial strategy (Robison 2009, 181). Minerals exports and domestic processing became a 
key source of wealth and power for the domestic oligarchy incubated by the New Order 
regime while the bureaucracy tightly controlled business through export and import licencing. 
The Indonesian Foreign Investment Law no. 1/1967 and Basic Provisions of Mining Law no. 
11/1967, with its Contract of Work (CoW) system created a stable legislative framework for 
foreign investment in mining. Foreign miners were required to accept local partners and in 
return foreign capital was shielded from, indeed was often protected by, the New Order’s 
centralised oligarchical economic system. Land acquisition and community relations were 
handled by domestic business partners, the central government or the military (Leith 2003).  
                                                     
6 According to Hadiz and Robison (2013, 38), oligarchy is a political economic system “defined by an 
increasing fusion of wealth and politico-bureaucratic power, articulated in the relationships and 
interminglings between the leading families of business and those of politics and the bureaucracy 





This relationship is best demonstrated by Freeport-McMoRan, majority owner of Grasberg, 
the world’s largest gold and copper mine in West Papua, notorious for financial and political 
links with the military, human rights violations, dispossession of indigenous people from land, 
clashes with organised labour and toxic waste (Bachriadi 1998; Leith 2003). Freeport was the 
first foreign company to sign a contract with Soeharto’s regime, within months of the dictator 
taking power, while the Indonesian genocide was still occurring, and quickly became the 
largest single source of tax revenue and significant foreign legitimacy for the Indonesian 
government (Leith 2003, 3). At the other end of the archipelago, in Aceh, another separatist 
conflict involved a huge resources project. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) formed in the 
1970s, at the same time as the world’s most productive gas fields were being developed by 
Mobil and Bechtel in Aceh (Aspinall 2007). While conflict was not caused by the gas-field 
development, it became a symbol of grievance and an opportunity to disrupt resource flows 
(G. Robinson 1998; Harker 2003). Some of the earliest actions by GAM were threats to and 
violent raids on gas work sites.  
The extractive industries in Indonesia suffered declining legitimacy in parallel with global 
crises in the sector. The secrecy surrounding the relationship between Freeport and the 
military was shattered by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid’s (ACFOA) report Trouble at 
Freeport (1995) which accused military officers and Freeport security of murder, torture and 
intimidation. This was followed by several other reports and international media coverage. 
Some of the traditional owners of the Freeport concession, with the support of WALHI, 
launched legal action against Freeport in the USA in 1996. While the court case failed, it did 
succeed in furthering publicity of the mine and creating negotiating power for the traditional 
owners with Freeport. As in West Papua, villagers in Aceh, supported by the International 
Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), took their case against ExxonMobil to US courts in 2001. Exxon was 
accused of complicity in, indeed direct financial support of, human rights violations 
perpetrated by a military unit that was contracted to protect their operations (Harker 2003). 
Again, the case was dismissed, but succeeded in raising the profile of accusations against 
Exxon and the military. This internationalisation, or jumping scales, of resistance through legal 
action was game changing because multi-national miners could no longer rely only on a close 
and secretive relationship with Soeharto and the military to control dissent. 
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These and other incidents threatened the balance in the relationship between Soeharto, 
domestic oligarchs and foreign mining capital as it became increasingly costly to violently 
supress opposition to resource extraction. Following international pressure in the late 1980s 
and 90s, the Indonesian Government began to construct a regulatory framework for the social 
and environmental effects of mining: from 1986 companies were required to submit 
environmental impact assessments and in 1990 the Environmental Impact Management 
Agency (BEPEAL) formed to regulate and enforce environmental laws, even though it was 
under-resourced and ineffective. Presidential Decree No. 55/1993 required MNCs to 
negotiate directly with landowners, instead of only with the central government (Leith 2003, 
43). Soeharto enacted this decree because negotiations with landowners had become too 
risky and “messy” and government wanted to transfer this risk to corporations (Leith 2003, 
43). Even before the fall of the New Order government, responsibility for the social and 
environmenal impacts of mining was being transferred from the central government and 
military to corporations.  
By the late 1990s, the New Order regime was facing multiple crises7 that would eventually 
bring it down and usher in reformasi. As more information surfaced about the role of foreign 
capital, development agencies and foreign governments in sustaining Soeharto’s regime 
while turning a blind eye to human rights abuses, their legitimacy as responsible actors was 
also brought into question (Leith 2003, 33–34; Guggenheim 2006, 121). This shows how crises 
spread and combine to produce far reaching consequences.  
After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, oligarchs and business conglomerates have retained their 
preeminent position within the Indonesian political economy, maintaining close ties between 
politicians, bureaucrats and business, even as centres of politics and administration have 
devolved to provincial and regency levels (Robison and Hadiz 2004; Hadiz 2010).8 Perhaps the 
                                                     
7 Student opposition, rebellious peasants and workers, the Asian Financial Crisis, and key oligarchical 
allies abandoning Soeharto family culminated in an organic crisis that saw Suharto resign in May 
1998. 
8 Hadiz and Robison (2013, 38) demonstrate how, following political decentralisation and 
democratisation, Indonesia’s oligarchs adopted new strategies for maintaining their dominant 
political and economic power: “For example, oligarchic power in Indonesia now more distinctly 
accommodates members of the growing apparatus of administration and politics at the local level. 
Many of these local members have successfully reinvented themselves as parliamentarians and 
political party leaders and forged new kinds of alliances with local business interests, leaders of mass 





most terrifying indicator of the continued dominance of oligarchy in extractives is the Lapindo 
disaster (Symon 2007; Tapsell 2012; Drake 2012). In May 2006 volcanic mud started flowing 
from a gas exploration drill site near Sidorajo, East Java. It is estimated that 90 million cubic 
meters of mud have erupted, displacing approximately 40,000 people (Tingay 2015). The 
operating company was jointly owned by the Bakrie family and Santos ltd. Aburizal Bakrie and 
his business empire is one of the most powerful beneficiaries of the New Order’s oligarchy. 
Bakrie was a government minister from 2004-2009 and chairperson of the Golkar Party 2009-
2014 (Tapsell 2012). Santos, an Australian Oil and Gas company, owned an 18% share until 
selling out in 2008 and denied responsibility. Although compensation has been promised, 
various government actors and corporations involved are deadlocked over the issue of who 
is responsible for the disaster and who should pay compensation (Symon 2007). Despite the 
absence of the military in this case, oligarchs, their political and bureaucratic allies, and 
multinational corporations retained the power to avoid legal sanction.  
While oligarchs and mutinational corporations remain dominant in the mining industry, 
decentralisation and reform of the mining regime opened up space for opponents and spread 
risk amongst a wider range of government institutions and corporations. Law 4/2009 on 
Mineral and Coal Mining designates responsibilities to issue licences and raise taxes to the 
regency, provincial and national governments, depending on the scale of the mine (Devi and 
Prayogo 2013). Law 32/2009 on Environment and Government Regulation 27/2012 requires 
mining companies to produce Environmental Impact Assessments and Environmental 
Management Plans before they receive environmental licenses from the appropriate level of 
government (PWC 2015). While regional autonomy allows conflict to be managed at local 
levels, it also opens up new opportunities for a wider range of actors to benefit from 
extraction (Erb 2016). With new opportunities for profit, comes new spaces for conflict, 
especially involving conflicts between and within district, regency, provincial government 
departments and with various stakeholders (Resosudarmo et al. 2009).  
Perhaps most significant for people affected by mining is that democratisation and 
decentralisation also resulted in demilitarisation9 and a proliferation of forums and methods 
                                                     
9 Although the military retreated from its explicit political role, in most places the domestic security 
role has been assumed by the Police. Without the independent financial base of the military, the 
Police may be even more susceptible to rent-seeking and hiring out their services to corporations 
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for communities and NGOs to express grievances (Erb 2016). Demilitarisation was a key 
turning point in the Kelian case (Chapter Five). In Buyat Bay, WALHI supported a local 
campaign against tailings dumping in the sea which resulted in a civil case against Newmont 
Mining and the arrest of the mine’s President Director (Symon 2007). This case indicates that 
space for NGO campaigning has increased. The criminal case was dismissed while the civil 
case was settled for US$30 million (“Newmont, Indonesia Settle Pollution Lawsuit” 2006). 
Media is also less restricted (Tapsell 2012). Indeed, Hadiz (2010, 144) argues that “the main 
benefit of democratisation for marginalised and formally repressed social groups is that they 
can now organise more freely.” On this point, there is substantial agreement with Aspinall 
(2013), who points to fragmented labour activism and new opportunities of electoral 
populism emerging in the post-authoritarian period. Despite the continued dominance of 
oligarchy in national politics, subaltern groups have been able to fight and often win battles - 
farm by farm, village by village or regency by regency - through flexible alliances, selective 
militancy and informal linkages with formal politics.  
Reflecting global trends as well as domestic processes of decentralisation and 
democratisation, the last two decades have seen notably more requirements in legislation for 
mining corporations relating to CSR and community development. Also reflecting global 
trends, these legislated requirements are vague and effectively voluntary. For example, 
Article 74 of Law 40/2007 on Limited Liability Corporations and Articles 95 and 108-9 of the 
Mineral and Coal Mining Law 4/2009 requires corporations operating in the field of natural 
resources to implement CSR programs from a dedicated budget, in consultation with local 
government and community. However, the budget, purpose and sanctions for non-
compliance are not specified (Waagstein 2011). More recently, in December 2016, the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources issued regulation (permen) 41/2016 on Community 
Development and Empowerment for Mineral and Coal Mining Business Activities with a 
compliance date of December 2018. This regulation provided implementation requirements 
for CSR programs. It specified which communities count as ‘local’, what kinds of development 
could be classified as sustainable community development, and that community 
development programs must be designed in consultation with representatives of affected 
                                                     
(Baker 2013). It is still common practice for mining corporations to employ Brimob (mobile brigade 





communities and provincial governments. However, permen 41/2016 was rescinded by 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources regulation (permen) 25/2018 on Mineral and Coal 
Mining Business, which simply specifies that community development activities must proceed 
in accordance with work plans approved by the provincial government. Together, these laws 
support the status quo of mining corporations self-regulating in relation to social dimensions 
of mining.  
In contrast, various state agencies exert considerable authority over licencing, taxation, 
down-stream development and export controls (Warburton 2016). For example, industry 
groups were apparently surprised when, in January 2014, the Indonesian government 
confirmed plans to implement several ‘resource nationalist’ measures contained in the 2009 
Mining Law relating to divestment and export tariffs (Engineering & Mining Journal 2014).  
Indeed, since 2014, the central government has implemented an increasingly resource 
nationalist regulatory agenda. The change from a contract-based system to a licencing based 
system gives governments more control and investors less certainty over mining areas. The 
measures are aimed at stimulating downstream processing of minerals (smelter construction) 
and capturing a greater share of extractive related revenue in Indonesia through increased 
government revenue, domestic linkages and local procurement (PWC 2018b). Although some 
point to this as a resurgence of the developmentalist state, it is at least an ‘altered 
developmentalism’, combining marketisation with nationalism (Gellert 2019). Some of the 
resource nationalist measures are developmentalist, aimed at industrialisation through 
downstream processing, while others simply strengthen domestic conglomerates over 
multinationals. The point is, ‘developmentalism’ notwithstanding, resource nationalism is a 
rebalancing of power between domestic and international forces, the provisions contain 
nothing to support or enforce the rights of people affected by mining or their allies.  
Rosser and Edwin (2010) argue that, although interest groups had managed to organise and 
pass CSR provisions in Law 40/2007, implementing regulations have been blocked by 
coalitions of MNCs and domestic capitalists with connections to the Indonesian presidency 
and cabinet. This is consistent with later research showing that domestic capitalists were 
instrumental in ensuring the non-implementation and watering-down of CSR laws 
(Warburton 2014; Aspinall 2015). The comparison of CSR with resource nationalism shows 
that the lack of CSR regulation and enforcement is not simply a matter of state capacity or 
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power as state actors clearly have the power to enforce regulation when it is in their interests. 
In relation to the social and environmental impacts of mining, the interests of multinational 
corporations, oligarchs, and state actors at most levels of government align to smooth conflict 
and capital accumulation through extraction, affecting what Szablowski  refers to as a 
“selective absence of the state” (Szablowski 2007, 27). 
Although together they remain dominant, the balance of power between domestic 
conglomerates, governments and MNCs continues to shift. Under Government Regulation 
1/2017 and Ministerial Regulation 9/2017, foreign mining companies are expected to divest 
51% of their ownership of resources projects to domestic partners (PWC 2018b). These 
divestment requirements have led the largest foreign owned mines to be sold to domestic 
conglomerates. The exception is Grasberg where Freeport-McMoRan retains just under 49% 
ownership (Jefriando 2020). Newmont sold its remaining US$1.3 billion stake in the Batu Hijau 
copper mine to PT Amman Mineral Internasional in 2016 (Schonhardt and Hufford 2016), 
while in March 2020 Newcrest sold its Gosowong mine (Chapter Six) for US$90 million rather 
than divesting 51% (Newcrest 2020b). These sales, from 2014 until this year, represent a 
fundamental restructuring of the ownership of massive mines in Indonesia. Domestic 
conglomerates have graduated from local partners or facilitators of foreign capital to 
controlling managers of the largest operating mines, while MNCs have sold out. 
In 2020, as this thesis was under examination, the National Government passed law 3/2020 
amending law 4/2009 on Mining Minerals and Coal. The amendments recentralises issuing 
mining permits under the national Energy Ministry, simplifies environmental approval 
processes and removes restrictions on the size of mining leases while offering no further 
implementing regulations on required community development programs (Harsono 2020). 
This again highlights the power of corporate miners and state actors over NGOs and affected 
communities in the regulatory and legislative process.  
The table below roughly summarises the information in this section by historical era, showing 
the broad shifts in dominant actors (roughly in order) within the political economy of 
extractivism, the resultant regulatory-ideological agenda, the most common sites of 
participation for affected communities and which eras the case studies in this thesis fit into. 
The point is not to erase the gradual shifts in alliances, regulation and dominant ideology, but 





to participate. For example, in Kelian (Chapter Five), activists’ fortunes changed dramatically 
following the fall of the New Order regime, the withdrawal of the military and 
democratisation. While this places each case into its historical political economy context, each 
case study chapter details the specific relevant laws, regulations and modes of participation. 
Table 5 - Mining Regulation History 
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In the political economy of extractivism in Indonesia, evidence suggests that the fundamental 
oligarchic structure has remained remarkably consistent since the New Order regime. The 
three-way alliance between domestic oligarchs, governments, and multinational corporations 
remains dominant in structuring formal and informal institutions, even as the balance of 
power and responsibilities between these groups has shifted. Responsibility for the social and 
environmental impacts of mining has gradually and increasingly shifted from governments to 
corporations. The central and provincial governments have increased their authority over 
licencing and revenue raising. Meanwhile, there are increased opportunities for people 
affected by mining to contest the social and environmental impacts of mining through the 
court system, representative democracy, international alliances, direct confrontations and, of 
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course, participation in corporate mechanisms. The key point here is that trends in Indonesia 
mirror global trends towards corporations directly managing the social and environmental 
dimensions of mining through participation based in consultative ideologies of representation.  
Contested Strategies and Reorganised Conflict: Embracing, Co-
opting, Resisting, Subverting and Building Alternatives 
Until now, this chapter has argued that modes of participation are the outcome of 
multinational corporations, international organisations and state institutions responding to 
threats to the profitability of mining. Yet participatory mechanisms rarely operate in the way 
they were designed. People affected by mining embrace, co-opt, resist, subvert, ignore or 
build alternatives to the participatory mechanisms designed by corporations, states and 
development agencies. The competing interests and power asymmetries between actors 
produce diverse and often unpredicted outcomes, even in ostensibly similar situations. The 
major contribution of this thesis is to move beyond assessing the efficacy of conflict 
management strategies to understand the ways in which the deployment of participatory 
mechanisms has reshaped social conflict.  
While there is a wealth of literature exploring the various reactions of people affected by 
mining to participatory mechanisms, there is very little that explains why and how people 
affected by mining choose to participate or not. One notable exception is Conde and Le Billon 
(2017, 681) who, through systematic literature review, find that “dependency towards mining 
companies, political marginalisation, and trust in institutions tend to reduce resistance 
likelihood. In contrast, large environmental impacts, lack of participation, extra-local alliances, 
and distrust towards state and extractive companies tend to increase resistance.” The findings 
here confirm their conclusions while focusing in more detail on factors shaping the capacity 
and desire of people affected by mining to participate or resist. 
By embracing participation, groups of people affected by mining can extract benefits from 
mining corporations. However, the extent of those benefits relies on the group’s relative 
power, which often must be established through autonomous sites of participation. In 
Fabiana Li's (2015, 92–98) discussion of the World Bank's Compliance Advisor Ombudsman 





processes can be used  by critics of projects in their public campaigning. O’Faircheallaigh 
(2008), as noted in Chapter Two, argues that groups of Traditional Owners negotiating mining 
agreements secure more favourable outcomes where they have built alliances with NGOs and 
other groups. Herders affected by Rio Tinto’s Oyu Tolgoi mine used CAO mediation to secure 
compensation, but after public campaigning with international NGOs established their 
bargaining power (Brueckner and Sinclair 2020, 115). Horowitz (2008) argues that indigenous 
groups in New Caledonia have reframed traditional cultural demands using the language of 
conservation to access development funding. 
Participatory mechanisms may also be co-opted to serve purposes or groups which are 
unintended by the corporation. Welker’s (2009, 144) research into Newmont Mining 
Corporation’s CSR program at the Batu Hijau copper mine in Sumbawa argues that particular 
community leaders were able to manipulate community development programs by 
alternately showing opposition and support for the mine to extract “patronage goods.” 
Arellano-Yanguas (2011) demonstrates how previously disinterested actors can subvert and 
capture rents from royalty redistribution intended as compensation when transparency 
initiatives alerted opportunists to the benefits of staging protests. Participatory mechanisms 
can thus create new demands by raising compensation as a prospect. 
Participatory mechanisms can be subverted and brought into service of interests opposed to 
mining. Shapiro (2010) documents how activists opposed to mountaintop removal in 
Appalachia subverted participatory consultative meetings. At one consultative meeting, local 
activists declined to address the corporate and state officials within their technical framework, 
literally turning their backs on the chair, instead addressing the public crowd with an 
impassioned speech (2010, 88–90). Secondly, activists insisted on more consultative forums 
not because they believed they would produce concrete outcomes, but because they knew 
consultative procedures are costly for corporations operating on low-profit margins (Shapiro 
2010, 135). Finally, participating in consultation allowed activists to meet with local 
supporters of mining and thus heal divisions amongst a community (Shapiro 2010, 137).  
Of course, it remains an option for groups, especially groups critical of mining developments 
to resist participation and continue to engage in more confrontational or autonomous forms 
of protest. This is the case in Kulon Progo (Chapter Seven) where the Association of Shoreline 
Farmers (PPLP - Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai) in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta, protested and 
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disrupted company and government attempts to consult and engage people affected by 
mining in community development programs (JATAM 2009). This kind of confrontational 
response is calculated to head off the potential for co-optation and cost the corporation 
financially and reputationally. Participatory mechanisms also open new opportunities for 
resistance: groups critical of mining can use CSR programs themselves as a point of criticism, 
for their inefficacy or as ‘green washing’ exercises. These strategies are not mutually 
exclusive, groups of people affected by mining may switch between legal channels and 
militant confrontation (or any other strategy) (J. Nem Singh and Camba 2016).  
Despite all the documented responses, the question of why and how groups of people 
affected by mining decide to participate or not is under examined. In the previous chapter I 
argued that disruptions to social relations of production and reproduction generate and shape 
conflicts while also becoming sites of resistance and the basis of power for groups of people 
affected by mining. The following chapters argue that control of land, forms of organisation, 
alliance structures and ideologies are crucial factors in how people affected by mining 
understand, use and create power to participate or resist.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have identified the major contestations, forces and governance mechanisms 
that constitute modes of participation and shape participation between multinational mining 
corporations and people affected by mining. The contestations over impacts of mining, CSR, 
global governance, and national regulation are mutually constitutive. Overlapping global, 
national, and company specific crises of legitimacy drive the creation of global self-
governance networks and the ideologies that constitute modes of participation for the social 
dimensions of mining. Language and practices of sustainability, participation, and 
empowerment have been adopted by multinational mining corporations and combined with 
consultative ideologies of representation of corporate societal incorporation. This underlines 
the continually dynamic nature of conflict management through new modes of participation. 
Participatory CSR also drew from and influenced development practice and the 
neoinstitutional ideological evolution of development agencies. The response of 
development agencies and multinational corporations also influenced reform of national 





arrangements and ideologies together lead to expanding corporate responsibilities and 
power in relation to the environmental and social dimensions of mining. In turn, as 
participatory mechanisms and strategies develop, this is changing the ways that people 
affected by mining engage and react to large scale mining developments. As local conflicts 
change form and actors adopt new political and economic strategies vis-a-vis each other, this 
will drive further refinements or changes in modes of participation and the global and national 
governance regimes that constitute them.  
The analysis of the political economy of Indonesian mining also suggests when and how the 
empirical results, the patterns of contestation in the following three chapters are 
generalisable outside the Indonesian context. Like most developing countries, the extractive 
sector in Indonesia is dominated by multinational corporations, domestic capital and 
bureaucratic institutions, each wanting to maximise their share of extractive revenue. This 
coincidence of interests results in little regulation and minimal enforcement on the social and 
environmental dimensions of mining. Indeed, trends of reducing the regulatory burden on 
mining capital also prevails in developed countries with significant domestic mining 
oligarchies such as Australia, the USA and Canada. Even when left-wing populist governments 
have been elected (e.g Ecuador, Venezuela) – the reliance of state revenue on extractives 
means only slight concessions are won. Only sustained widespread resistance can challenge 
the alliance between foreign capital, domestic oligarchs and entrenched bureaucracies at the 
national and international scale. I would expect significant differences in countries where the 
state is a major owner of mining capital, or a more closed political atmosphere prevails – such 
as before reformasi when the Indonesian military was more actively involved in mining. 
However, even given the dominant alliance of oligarchs, politicians and multinational 
corporations in Indonesian extractives, the outcomes of participation as a conflict 
management strategy vary widely. The next three chapters show this and turn towards the 
interplay of social relations of production and reproduction including common-sense 




Chapter Five: Violence to Participation at 
Rio Tinto’s Kelian Mine1 
The Kelian open-pit gold mine in West Kutai, East Kalimantan produced windfall profits2 for 
Rio Tinto and brought the multinational into conflict with 4,000 small-scale alluvial gold 
miners who were violently evicted from 1985. Conflict that began in the area immediately 
surrounding the mine site ‘jumped scales’ in 1998 when local organisers forged national and 
international alliances with NGOs and directly threatened Rio Tinto’s already besieged 
international reputation as a responsible miner. To regain its legitimacy and forestall potential 
government intervention, Rio Tinto turned to participatory mechanisms as an alternative to 
violent repression to contain and depoliticise conflict at both local and international scales. 
The lifespan of the mine (1985-2005) gives valuable insights into why one of the world’s two 
largest mining companies, Rio Tinto, helped craft new global standards – incorporating new 
modes of participation – at the turn of the millennium and how these were implemented as 
participatory mechanisms on the ground. Indeed, Rio Tinto holds up Kelian as a best-practice 
example of participatory mine closure and community engagement (Rio Tinto 2015). For 
these reasons, this chapter presents a ‘critical case’ in the development of participation as a 
conflict management strategy in the extractive industries (see Chapter One). 
Unlike the cases of Gosowong and Kulon Progo (Chapters Six and Seven), conflict between 
Rio Tinto’s Indonesian subsidiary, PT Kelian Equatorial Mining (KEM), 3  and affected 
communities began during the New Order regime in Indonesia and before the widespread 
uptake of participatory mechanisms in the extractive sector. It thus provides an example of 
participatory mechanisms being implemented directly in response to an activist campaign, 
                                                     
1 I would like to thank Pak Pius Nyompe and Jeff Atkinson for their helpful comments on draft versions 
of this chapter. Representatives from PT KEM were also provided with a draft however declined to 
comment further.  
2 Up to 400,000 ounces of gold a year were produced from 1991 to 2005 (Darling 1995; Kemp et al. 
2013; Everingham et al. 2016; Atkinson and Hudson 1998). 
3 The mine was operated by PT KEM, 90% owned by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) and 10% by 
Indonesian company PT Harita Jayaraya. In 1995, CRA merged with its parent company, UK based 
Rio Tinto – Zinc Corporation (RTZ) in 1995 to form dual listed Rio Tinto Group, known as Rio Tinto 
Limited in Australia and Rio Tinto Plc in the UK. For simplicity, I refer to all these related companies 





once Rio Tinto could no longer rely exclusively on violence to repress local opposition. KEM’s 
participatory mechanisms included a village support program, negotiations over 
compensation, negotiations about human rights abuses, participatory mine closure planning, 
and a community advice committee. Particular actors were included on specific issues 
according to KEM’s need to contain conflict, enhance their legitimacy and mobilise 
community resources. However, some aspects of this have produced ongoing conflicts over 
the nature of participation. Why conflict took specific manifestations and how they were 
contained and sustained is understood as a result of clashing modes of production and the 
ideologies that support them. 
This chapter proceeds in six parts. The first briefly describes the history, geography and 
economy of the Kelian River small-scale mining settlements from the 1940s. The social 
relations of production and reproduction that developed around small-scale gold mining and 
subsistence agriculture left a legacy of social solidarity and independent ideologies that would 
later support organised resistance to industrial mining. The second section describes the 
genesis of conflict from 1985 between Rio Tinto and small-scale miners: primitive 
accumulation (land-grabbing) took the form of violent evictions of small-scale mining 
communities, initial compensation payments, and human-rights abuses committed by 
military, police and KEM employees. Violence and human rights abuses were not only 
committed during evictions but also to repress ongoing opposition to the mine. Violence also 
took a distinct gendered dimension. This highlights the ongoing conflict produced by an initial 
act of primitive accumulation and disruption to local livelihoods. The third section bridges the 
themes of violence and participation. I argue that through geographically differentiated 
patterns of violence and CSR, KEM created a geography of participation that both secured 
broad legitimacy in the West Kutai Regency and contained conflict to a few remote villages. 
This strategy proved successful in creating social relations favourable to extraction until the 
end of the New Order regime in 1998.  
The next three sections analyse three waves of conflict and participation between people 
affected by mining, national and international NGOs, KEM and Rio Tinto. The first lasted from 
1997-1998, beginning when nascent local activism, through national and international 
networks, mobilised an international reputational threat to Rio Tinto and ending with Rio 
Tinto International ordering KEM to negotiate with representatives of people affected by 




mining. The second wave, from 1998-2003, concerns the re-localisation of conflict and 
negotiations between newly formed activist organisation Lembaga Kesejateraan Masyarakat 
Tambang dan Lingkungan (LKMTL; Council for Environment and Mining Communities 
Prosperity) and KEM. In addition to the international campaign, LKMTL capitalised on new 
political opportunities available following reformasi4 including increased space for human-
rights discourse and the decreased power of the Indonesian military. The second wave 
finished with the negotiation of a 60 billion IDR compensation payment for victims of human 
rights abuses in 2001. The final wave involved a more proactive approach by Rio Tinto, which 
collaborated with the World Bank to create a participatory mine closure plan in 2000. The 
participatory management of the ex-mine site continues until today through the community 
advisory forum.  
These three waves of conflict and participation show how Rio Tinto increasingly turned to 
participatory mechanisms to contain risky forms of conflict generated by the disruption to 
local social, economic and political relations following primitive accumulation. The motivation 
was to align the interests of people affected by mining with their own in maintaining the mine 
and change forms of engagement from confrontational to collaborative. In this, the 
participatory mechanisms were somewhat successful. Enough ideological common ground 
was found between KEM’s corporatized consultative ideologies of representation and the 
human-rights based left-nationalist ideologies of activists that negotiations could proceed, 
although not always smoothly. Potential opposition by indirectly affected villages was 
neutralised through community development programs and employment. Nevertheless, 
conflicts over the forms of participation – who could participate, when, on what issues – 
continues, both within the participatory mechanisms and outside.  
                                                     
4 The democratisation and decentralisation reforms that followed the resignation of authoritarian 





Map created by the author in QGIS using open source data 
Gold and Peoples’ Mining: Roots of Resistance 
Alluvial gold was first discovered by local people in the late 1930s in an upstream area of the 
Kelian River (Hopes 2004c, 23). This area was previously unsettled, the closest settlement 
being a Bahau Dayak village, Kelian Luar.5 In 1948, a few Kayan Dayak people discovered 
larger deposits and sold it to traders in Long Iram.6 News spread of the discovery and people 
from across Indonesia were attracted to Kelian by tales of gold (Bachriadi 1998, 166). In 1949, 
the growing, multi-ethnic community agreed to make a settlement together in Loa Tepu (now 
                                                     
5Located where the Kelian River flows into the Mahakam River, then called Long Kelian, the village was 
settled in 1818 by forest people who took up swidden agriculture alongside collecting forest 
products for subsistence and trade, this included small amounts of gold. Village secretary, West 
Kutai, interview with author, August 11, 2017. 
6Long Iram is a town located downriver on the Mahakam that was established by Banjarese traders in 
the late nineteenth century as a trading post for forest products destined for the Kutai Kingdom. In 
1902 the Dutch stationed a military company there, wresting control of the trade along the 
Mahakam from the Kutai Sultanate (Magenda 1991).  
 
Figure 2 - East Kalimantan and the Kelian area, showing selected towns and villages 




within the mine contract area) as a separate adat7 community. To officiate this, they held a 
festival for seven days and seven nights and invited adat and government figures from Kelian, 
Long Daliq, Long Iram, Bigung and other villages to formalise the settlement (Bachriadi 1998, 
167).  
Small-scale mining work was carried out by individuals, family groups or in small teams 
(Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000). In good times, the miners could make as 
much as 100,000 IDR (AU$68) per-person per-week from 2-3 ounces of gold (Bachriadi 2012, 
174). One ex-miner said they made: "Enough, plenty, our children could even become police 
officers, cemat [district head], civil servant, they were schooled while we mined there. Our 
children could go to school, we paid the fees from mining [income]."8 Community members 
opened land to farm,9 caught fish and collected rattan and resin from the forest (Bachriadi 
1998, 168). They built their own independent school, mosque, and meeting hall (Atkinson and 
Hudson 1998, 27).10 By the 1970s, it is estimated that 2,000 of the 4,000 people living in and 
around Loa Tepu were artisanal and small scale miners (ASM) or penambang rakyat (peoples’ 
miners). Ex-miners remember that Loa Tepu had a hopeful future, providing not only cash 
income but also most of their subsistence needs. Because of its remoteness11 the community 
was self-organising and self-managing.12  
Strong histories of organisation, especially if independent from government and big capital, 
along with control of land, ideology and alliance structures, are the factors that I argue enable 
a community to either engage effectively in or resist corporate participation. Although their 
control of land was later severed through violent evictions, in Loa Tepu, small-scale miners 
developed independent organisation and ideology based on the relations of production of 
gold and the reproduction of social life through subsistence agriculture legitimised through 
                                                     
7 Traditional or indigenous systems of law, culture, norms and institutions. 
8 Ex small-scale miner, interview with the author, Long Iram, May 8, 2017. 
9 Like their claims to gold deposits, forest gardens had no formal tenure. Tenure may have been 
recognised under traditional adat law, however formal certification by central government 
agencies was impossible, especially as the evolution of forestry laws in Indonesia progressively 
outlawed swidden cultivation (Peluso, Afiff, and Rachman 2008).  
10 Pius Nyompe, LKMTL, interview with the author, October 10, 2016. 
11 Loa Tepu is 40km upriver from the district capital, Long Iram, which is, in turn, approximately 330km 
upriver from the then regency capital Tenggarong. 






Dayak adat. Indeed, the organisation of their (heterogeneous) villages and work teams, with 
social solidarity and profit-sharing arrangements closely resembles what Lahiri-Dutt (2018) 
refers to as “extractive peasants.”13 That means their relations of production, subsistence and 
social reproduction more closely resemble smallholder farmers than larger scale mining. Their 
experiences of organisation, labour intensive work, social solidarity and a shared fate, meant 
that the evictees simply did not disperse when faced with a threat. Rather, experiences in 
organising productive activities and daily life translated into ability to organise collectively 
against a threat.  
Rio Tinto, Corporate Mining and the Genesis of Conflict 
This section explains the genesis of conflict between KEM and people affected by mining as 
an act of primitive accumulation. This is also understood within the political economy of East 
Kalimantan, which has been dominated by extractive industries since the colonial era. This 
was especially true of Kutai Regency, where income from extractives pushed government 
revenue to more than double other regencies in the province by 1998, before it was split into 
three smaller regencies in 1999 (Casson 2001, 9). Government finance, campaign funding and 
patronage systems were dependent on revenue from extraction, producing collusive 
relationships between politicians, bureaucrats and corporations (Anugrah 2019). The 
extractive political economy of East Kalimantan combined with the authoritarian regime in 
Indonesia left little room for oppositional politics. 
Corporate engineers first arrived in 1975 to conduct surveys for Rio Tinto14 (Bachriadi 1998, 
168). At first, residents were happy, because the engineers needed assistance in transporting 
equipment up the Kelian River, collecting ore samples, and operating equipment, and they 
paid cash. There was no significant conflict during the exploration and research phase. Yet, 
looking back, one ex-small-scale miner told me that was the moment when they lost their 
freedom: "Before Rio Tinto arrived, the community was still free."15 
                                                     
13 In Indonesian, miners used the term ‘tambang rakyat’ (peoples’ mining) which connotes social 
solidarity, self-organisation and the absence of big capital.    
14 The then Indonesian subsidiary of Rio Tinto was PT Rio Tinto Bethlehem Indonesia.  
15 Ex small-scale miners, group interview with author, Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017. 
 




KEM began acquiring permits in 1982 and in 1985 KEM signed a contract of work (CoW)16 with 
the Indonesian Government to exploit the primary gold deposit (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and 
Nainggolan 2000). In addition to the mining area, KEM also needed to construct a new 69km 
road and port facilities at Jelemuq on the Mahakam where 24 families lost their land 
(Bachriadi 1998, 176; Atkinson and Hudson 1998, 28). From this point on, relations with the 
small-scale miners changed dramatically, as KEM needed to secure exclusive access to the 
mine site. 
There are vastly different and conflicting accounts of the land acquisition, the compensation 
process and human rights violations that occurred from 1982 until 1992. My purpose here is 
not to determine the truth of these historical matters but to explain the genesis of conflict 
between small scale miners and KEM. Grievances over evictions morphed into conflict over 
compensation which manifest as demonstrations throughout the 1990s and international 
campaigning from 1997. 
To assist KEM, the Long Iram District Government formed a land acquisition team (Tim 
Pembebasan Lahan), which would distribute some compensation or ‘moving money’ (uang 
pindah) and convince residents to move. In January 1982 the Cemat (district head) of Long 
Iram ordered the small-scale miners to close their operations (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and 
Nainggolan 2000, 23). KEM sent security guards to deliver eviction notices. Ex-miners 
recounted: “They said if you like it or not, you have to move from here, they also said the 
government has ordered it.”17 The Government did not recognise their adat rights.  
Indeed, the land acquisition process was not conducted with the consent of, or even in 
consultation with, land holders but was negotiated between the district government and KEM 
and presented to residents as a final offer. Conflicts with land holders over land acquisition 
were resolved in KEM’s favour as a result of then president director of KEM, Alan Hawke’s 
“extensive local contacts and, in particular with the Bupati [regent] and Panglima [five star 
general] in Balikpapan” (B. W. J. N. Davis 2004, 39). From the beginning KEM developed close 
relations and mutual interests with local government officials. Such lack of consultation, let 
                                                     
16 CoW No. B-06/Pres/1/1985 to exploit 286,233 hectares (Bachriadi 1998, 161). 
17 Ex small-scale miners, group interview with the author, Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017; also, Ex 





alone negotiation or consent, resulted in disagreements about compensation, residents 
refusing to move and then violent evictions. 
Community Aid Abroad (Australia) (CAA, now Oxfam Australia) investigations from 1998 to 
2003 report that compensation for land of AU$130 to AU$650 (200,000-1 million IDR) per 
household was promised to evictees but was never received (Atkinson and Hudson 1998, 26–
28; Kennedy 2001; Nyompe 2003). By contrast, researcher Bachriadi (1998, 177) reports that 
the Long Iram District Head set compensation at 200,000 IDR (AU$136) per hectare but that 
many land owners expected between five and ten million IDR (AU$3,410-6,821). 18 
Furthermore, while a number of residents reportedly received compensation between 
400,000 and 2.5 million IDR (AU$273-$1705) per family, many others did not accept this offer 
and held out for fairer compensation (Bachriadi 1998, 180). One group of ex-small-scale 
miners told me that each family received 100,000 IDR (AU$68.21) per person in 1990.19 
According to Bachriadi (1998, 177), many of the residents did not perceive such amounts of 
money as compensation but as moving money (uang pindah) – money to cover costs 
associated with moving, and therefore far short of being able to replace lost land, buildings, 
and crops, let alone livelihoods.  
KEM community relations staff could not tell me how much compensation was paid but stated 
that everything was clear and settled according to the laws and regulations of Indonesia and 
that they had recognised 444 families as landholders: 
They received compensation depending on the size of their land and building. We offered them 
two hectares of land [in Tutung], but they rejected that, they preferred to take cash. We built 
them houses, some just took money if they wanted to go back to their original village. It was 
already clear. [Only] after 1998, they started to demand more.20 
KEM management considered the issue of compensation to have been fairly settled, while 
affected people felt cheated.  
Bachriadi (1998, 171) reported that residents of Loa Tepu were promised replacement 
facilities in Tutung, a new settlement being built by the company outside the mining area. 
According to Tutung residents, KEM promised to build houses, two hectares of land each, 
                                                     
18 Approximate, at 1990 average exchange rate.  
19 Ex small-scale miners, group interview with the author, Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017. 
20 Ex-Community relations manager PT KEM, interview with the author, August 8, 2017. 
 




clean water facilities, sanitation facilities and electricity. However, all that was provided was 
a cleared plot of land 15 by 25 meters and a clean water supply.21 Another ex-resident recalled 
that when it came time to move, construction of houses in Tutung was not finished and that 
in some cases KEM only provided tents.22   
By 1990, the mining area was under corporate control. 23  Residents who refused 
compensation or refused to move until compensation was paid or replacement houses built 
were subjected to intimidation and violence from the land acquisition team, KEM security, 
military and police24 (Bachriadi 1998, 181). These events are catalogued in many sources, 
most reliably in the report of the independent Fact Finding Team (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, 
and Nainggolan 2000) convened by Komnas HAM (the National Commission on Human-
Rights).25 
Residents resisting eviction were arrested, their houses and gardens were burnt and their 
possessions destroyed, or they were shot26 (Kennedy 2001). Between 1982 and 1990, over 
five hundred houses and cottages were burnt (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000, 
24–25).27  
Two ex-small-scale miners described how hopeless they felt the situation was as they were 
being forced to move to Tutung: 
Although the community is right, they are always made wrong. If we insisted [on our rights], the 
iron hand will come. That is the problem and that is why all kinds of violence short of bombings 
                                                     
21 Village Head, West Kutai, interview with the author, December 8, 2018. 
22 Ex small-scale miner, interview with the author, Long Iram, May 8, 2017. 
23 Ex small-scale miners, group interview with the author, Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017. 
24 PT KEM also directly employed both active and retired police and military officers, blurring the 
distinction between KEM and state security forces (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000, 
26). 
25 The Komnas HAM report is the result of a one-year investigation by a fact-finding team, consisting 
of representatives from Komnas HAM, LIPI and TRUK assisted by LKMTL and PT KEM. The 
investigation was the result of an agreement between LKMTL, KEM and other NGOs on 11-12 
January 1999 to invite an independent team to investigate claims of human rights violations (2000, 
7). The investigation was designed as a first step in getting closer to the truth (“lebih mendekati 
kebenaran”) (2000, 6) and provide a basis for further investigation within the formal justice system. 
Given that further investigation never occurred, this report is the most reliable and rigorously 
verified source available. 
26 Ex small-scale miners, group interview with the author, Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017. 
27 Some of these were abandoned, some were temporary shelters (pondok), and some were the 






were used […] we were just like a herd of cows that was pushed into a barn together.28 
And: 
I was arrested and twice was sent to Tenggarong. Before PT KEM enclosed [the land] I strongly 
defended it, I did not want to move, I did not want to receive compensation. They were offering 
20 million rupiah. For us that is small, in three days we would make that much from mining. So, 
to receive compensation, we were forced, it must be received through the violence of Brimob, 
police. If I wanted to or not, we couldn't stand it any longer. Because that was a previous age, 
rather violent.29 
One of the last remaining families in the mining area was Pak Daniel Paras’. On 20 December 
1991, KEM security and Brimob30 officers ordered them out. He refused because he had not 
yet received compensation or a replacement home in Tutung, as had been agreed to 
(Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000, 29–30). He and his four children were eating 
breakfast when Brimob officers opened fire on their house. Officers then entered, ransacked 
their house and forced them out. According to Bachriadi’s research (1998, 184), when seven 
houses on Gunung Runcing (an agricultural area within the mining contract area) were 
destroyed, their occupants only received taxi money of 40,000 IDR each for river taxis to 
transport their possessions. 
Of course, these events were traumatic, one ex-resident of Loa Tepu told me that he 
witnessed beatings and “too much violence.”31 He believes the violence meted out by police 
was ordered by KEM: 
Well, it is like this, for example there’s an order to use violence from the people at the top … 
that is the reason they [the police] feel legitimized in using forceful violence … PT KEM was 
protected by the state which abandoned its people unprotected.32 
The small-scale miners were cleared out of the mining area and production began in 1992.33 
The violent evictions, reframed as violations of human rights, would haunt KEM through the 
1990s and find international audiences in 1997. Miners moved to either Kelian Dalam,34 
Tutung, or returned to their family’s origin.35  
                                                     
28 Ex small-scale miner, interview with the author, Tutung, August 9, 2017. 
29 Ex small-scale miner, interview with the author, Long Iram, May 8, 2017. 
30 Mobile Brigade, paramilitary and anti-riot police. 
31 Ex small-scale miner, interview with the author, Tutung, August 9, 2017. 
32 Ex small-scale miner, interview with the author, Tutung, August 9, 2017. 
33 Ex-Community relations manager, PT KEM, interview with the author, August 8, 2017. 
34 Kelian Dalam is a village downstream from KEM’s contract area on the Kelian River. 
35 Ex small-scale miners, group interview with the author, Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017. 




Each location developed different patterns of participation and manifestations of conflict. The 
initial act of primitive accumulation, the land grab and evictions, totally disrupted the 
livelihoods of evictees who needed to find and construct new sources of subsistence, 
production and social reproduction. The different strategies adopted by evictees resulted in 
differentiated dynamics between KEM and local communities in each location. I will describe 
these patterns now, before showing how KEM attempted to contain manifestations of conflict 
and create more stable social relations.   
Manifestations of conflict post-eviction 
In Tutung, where most evictees were moved, most opened land for gardening or rubber 
plantations. The few lucky or well-connected Tutung residents secured contracts or 
employment with KEM to provide transport, construction or security services. The company 
contracted builders for the school, mosque, police station, and government offices in Tutung 
but not housing or farming land.36 Others engaged in informal and precarious work. 
Many of the 444 evicted families stayed in Tutung and bode time farming while they struggled 
to obtain the compensation they believed they were entitled to. In the words of one ex-
resident of Tutung: 
There has not been justice. For the community, we wanted just livelihoods. Try to open land, 
two hectares to farm. That was the promise – to make two hectares of land, we could live like 
that. Houses were also promised but that didn’t happen. Whoever was working … just built their 
own houses in Tutung, there wasn't any built by the company. We had to pay for it all ourselves.37 
Up to 200 protests, demonstrations and blockades over evictions and compensation had been 
carried out by the end of 1992, most were met with strong repression by police, military and 
company security (Nyompe 2003). The demonstrations built in intensity until 24 December 
1992 when over 400 people marched from Tutung to the gates of KEM and blocked the road 
for seven days. Local police and military forces, acting in close cooperation with and 
supported by KEM security, responded by arresting 15 people. None of the arrests followed 
legal process (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000, 14–19). One of the arrested 
                                                     
36 Ex small-scale miner, interview with the author, Long Iram, May 8, 2017. 






leaders, Edward Tarung, died in custody38 (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000, 
19–21).  
KEM banned the ex-miners from panning for gold within the contract area. Nevertheless, 
many evictees who had moved to Kelian Dalam continued to pan for gold further downstream 
in the Kelian River, however: "[We made] Only enough to eat every day, just enough to eat, 
we could die too, it was difficult. There is only a tiny amount of gold."39 Down river, they could 
only make 87,000 IDR (AU$59) per person per week in good times, which became increasingly 
less frequent.  
Some small-scale miners saw it could be more profitable to reprocess the waste rock and 
tailings of KEM (ngerebok). They had to enter the mining location at night. KEM considered 
this theft and if people were caught, they were sent to the police station in Tenggarong or 
shot at by KEM security and Brimob officers hired by KEM (Bachriadi 1998, 186).40 In 1995, 
one person died after being caught and falling into the Namuk dam, full of cyanide 
(Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000, 34). At least two other people were shot 
when they were caught (Bachriadi 1998, 187). 
Before KEM began operating, residents used the river water to wash, catch fish, bathe and 
for drinking.41 After KEM began operating, the residents reported the river water would cause 
itching and rashes on their bodies (Bachriadi 1998, 189). In 1991, five residents died days after 
bathing in the river. After this, the community used the river water with limitations; they 
stopped drinking the water and washing at certain times of the day. 
KEM was aware of these risks. Their 1990 environmental assessment (AMDAL) stated that: 
High concentrations of sulphide and sulphur dioxide originating from waste rock will produce 
changes in the soil and through erosion and washing will increase the content of sulphur 
compounds in Bayak River and Nakan River [subsidiaries of the Kelian River] … Liquid waste, 
especially which overflows from the dam if still containing cyanide can react with the heavy 
metals and has synergistic characteristics, that is to result in compounds becoming more 
poisonous. These compounds do not just affect the water quality, but also water vegetation and 
if absorbed by aquatic animals can enter the food chain, this can create sub-lethal and 
dangerous conditions (cited in: Bachriadi 1998, 191). 
                                                     
38 LKMTL activist, interview with the author, December 7, 2018. 
39 Ex small-scale miner, interview with the author, Long Iram, May 8, 2017. 
40 Ex small-scale miners, group interview with the author, Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017. 
41 Ex small-scale miners, group interview with the author, Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017. 
 




Yet this was before the mining industry adopted standards of consultation with people 
affected by mining,42 so Kelian Dalam residents were not even consulted, let alone given any 
opportunity to participate in decision making or environmental monitoring.  
Until 1998, the relationship between evictees and KEM remained confrontational. Between 
1986 and 1998, KEM had progressively paid compensation to 4,509 people for lost land and 
possessions, totalling 7,750,409,929 IDR (approx. AU$4.5 million at average exchange rates) 
(KEM 2007). Beyond this, there was little incentive for Rio Tinto to address the concerns of 
people affected by their practices until the formation LKMTL and the struggle jumped to 
national and international scales (Nyompe 2003).  
Forms of production, subsistence and reproduction adopted by evictees continued to bring 
them into conflict with KEM, either through protest activity or trespassing. KEM’s strategy of 
repression through violence with limited compensation further exacerbated these tensions 
until they found expression after 1998. Another major factor determining both the impacts 
of violence and later participation was gender.43 
Violence against women and girls 
In much of the literature and popular discourse about the impacts of mining, women are 
depicted as being disproportionately victimised.44 A more recent angle of feminist enquiry 
seeks to “step beyond … current discourses of victimhood” (Lahiri-Dutt 2012, 203) by 
emphasising the agency and roles of women in mining and mining communities. In Gosowong 
and Kulon Progo (Chapters Six & Seven), there are examples of how gendered divisions of 
labour and relations of social reproduction both determine and are changed by forms of 
participation and activism. This can be empowering for women, creating previously 
unavailable opportunities. However, in the case of Kelian, women evictees were 
disproportionately disempowered by the economic and social changes brought about by 
                                                     
42 See Chapter Four. 
43 While all violence has a gendered dimension and is not limited to sexual assault or harassment, in 
this case, sexual violence became a major problem for KEM and a major component of human-rights 
based campaigning after 1998.  
44  For example, an AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara; Archipelagic Indigenous Peoples’ 
Alliance) leader gave the example of how environmental pollution can have gendered dimensions if 
women are collecting water, washing and cooking with it but also with that kind of awareness, 
women can fight harder for their land. Interview with the author, Jakarta, August 25, 2016. See also 





industrial mining. There was little opportunity to reverse this through participation or 
resistance. 
Company security, police and the military all used gendered violence and sexual harassment 
as part of the evictions of the mining communities up to 1992. This culture persisted during 
the operations of the mine, as many women complained of sexual harassment and violence 
by KEM employees. The Komnas HAM report finds that out of 21 reported cases, there were 
17 cases of “sexual harassment, rape, and sexual relations under psychological pressure [that] 
deserve further investigation” (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000, 35). In 16 of 
these cases the perpetrator was an employee of KEM, the general manager of KEM was 
responsible for six of these, and at least four of the victims were girls under 16 years old.45 
Only one of the perpetrators ever faced sanctions from his employer and there was a culture 
of ignoring, denying and supporting perpetrators at KEM (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and 
Nainggolan 2000, 35). 
Although during my research I met a few women survivors, one of whom shared her story at 
length, none wanted to me to share them directly and most did not want to talk about the 
human-rights violations they had suffered. Therefore, the voices of the women themselves in 
this section is lacking and stands in stark contrast to male activists and evictees, who readily 
retold stories of violence against women as examples of the most grievous human-rights 
violations, to show how their communities had been wronged. This reluctance of women to 
share their stories is due to past trauma, yet this has not prevented women or men in other 
locations from wanting to tell their stories. Silence should not be equated with powerlessness 
– silence is often an effective survival strategy, especially when participation is calculated to 
produce little benefit (Parpart 2010). What this demonstrates is that women survivors – 
compared with their male counterparts – expected little benefit from having their stories told 
by researchers or organisations. Nevertheless, the gendered patterns of violence established 
during the original act of primitive accumulation continued during the mine’s operation, 
serving to further silence women. Modes of resistance and participation, including the 
ideologies of KEM and LKMTL did little to overcome this.  
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Although KEM set up a Harassment Team to accommodate complaints in 1995 (Rachmayana 
2004, 182), ex-KEM managers remain dismissive of claims of sexual harassment or sexual 
assault. One explained that: 
KEM employees were mostly Indonesian [not local] and ex-pats. There was successful 
relationships and marriages. There were [cases of pregnancy] but [the woman] already had a 
family. Forced, not possible, different religions, not possible. Mixed. There were successes and 
failures. Sexual harassment? Most of the cases are failed relationships, not sexual harassment. 
It was solved in the adat way. Maybe before construction, I don't know about that. There were 
many contractors for construction.46 
Even more so than victims of other kinds of human rights abuses, victims of sexual violence 
were silenced not only through the repressive measures of KEM and security forces, but also 
through shame in their own communities (Rachmayana 2004, 182) – where patriarchal 
common-sense prevailed. It would not be until after reformasi that these issues began to be 
taken seriously and, even then, the women survivors would not negotiate directly with KEM, 
but would have their voice represented through layers of NGOs. The cases of sexual violence 
were also sensationalised by activists as the most obviously unjust cases of human rights 
violations by KEM and used as a weapon in the international campaign against Rio Tinto.  
CAA investigations linked changes in gender relations – and other social transformations – to 
the economic impacts of the mine. Inequality grew between households and between men 
and women as “the cost of basic necessities led to more traditional subsistence and 
cooperative economic activities being regarded as inferior to having a job at the mine” 
(Atkinson and Hudson 1998, 35). While the influx of male workers from across Indonesia and 
abroad led to large-scale prostitution near Jelemuq (Atkinson and Hudson 1998, 36). As 
employment, both in mining and downstream services (with some exceptions such as sex-
work, truck driving, and cleaning services) is skewed towards men, 47  women and their 
economic contributions are devalued because of the decreasing status of communal 
production, their lower status within new systems of production, and the gendered division 
between production and social reproduction. 
Economic development and employment patterns dramatically exacerbated gendered 
inequality. As corporate mining and wage-labour replaced more communal village-based 
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profit-sharing production and subsistence, forms of social reproduction required to sustain 
production also rapidly changed. These changes stemming from the act of primitive 
accumulation led to a separation of productive from reproductive activities and a 
commodification of labour power (Federici 2004, 74; Chapter Three). In this case, the 
commodification of labour included the commodification of sexual labour and women’s 
bodies and associated violence against women and girls. This disempowerment is also 
reflected later in the lack of women participating in negotiations and consultations, despite 
being disproportionately affected. 
The geography of conflict and participation 
KEM’s engagement with people affected by mining was not limited to evictees. They also 
established several CSR programs for the 27 villages in the area to the south of the mine. 
These programs included a village support program, the Rio Tinto Foundation and agricultural 
college, employment opportunities and a ranger program. This section argues that there were 
four distinct geo-economic areas with different patterns of conflict and participation which 
affected who could participate on which issues. Each of KEM’s CSR programs were also 
interventions into local political and economic relations – which became more dependent on 
the company and more integrated into market capitalism. This differentiation enabled KEM 
to secure broad legitimacy in West Kutai while containing serious challenges to remote areas.  
The first geo-economic area is the two villages closest to the mine site – Tutung and Kelian 
Dalam. As discussed above, they make up the bulk of evictees and victims of human rights 
abuses. Residents of these villages were consequently the most enthusiastic supporters of 
LKMTL with obvious interests in compensation.  
The second geographical area is the five Dayak agricultural villages slightly further away. Being 
swidden farmers only occasionally engaging in alluvial gold mining, they were less directly 
affected by industrial mining. Because of their proximity to the mine site and claims to 
traditional custodianship of the forests, these villages, in addition to Tutung and Kelian Dalam, 
had direct interests in how the forest is managed. These five villages – Kelian Luar, Lakan 
Bilem, 48  Batu Apui, Sembuan and Intu Lingau plus Kelian Dalam (Mine Closure Steering 
                                                     
48 Lakan Bilem became a village in 2005, before it was a hamlet within Sembuang Village. 




Committee 2002, 2) – would be wiped out if either of the dams at the mine site failed. 
Therefore, their interests are mostly in the good management of the mining infrastructure 
and forests while obtaining some benefits from Rio Tinto, including compensation for 
pollution.  
These five villages did receive some benefits from KEM’s village support program, Rio Tinto 
Foundation, employment and ranger program (detailed below). These villagers seem to have 
rarely engaged with any kind of activism or politics outside of their villages and were more or 
less passive recipients of CSR. Village heads and adat figures from these villages also 
participated in KEM’s community advisory committee (Komite Penasehat Masyarakat, KPM), 
detailed below.  
The third area consists of villagers further downstream on the Mahakam river, Long Iram and 
Tering in particular, which was the multicultural trading post for gold and other forest 
products. This group was politically astute and managed to secure some compensation from 
Rio Tinto through protest action loosely connected with LKMTL. Their participation was 
conducted through negotiations with government officials during protests.  
The final geographical area is the largest and least directly affected by the mine, consisting of 
the 27 villages which KEM defined as ‘local’, including all the villages mentioned above. 
Residents of these villages were prioritised for employment, were eligible to attend the 
agricultural school and could apply for assistance from KEM’s village support program.  
Taking this geographical view helps to show how KEM maintained a good or neutral 
reputation in West Kutai by giving small benefits to those who suffered negligible impacts. 
The isolation of more severely affected victims within West Kutai led LKMTL to seek support 
outside the regency. KEM used different modes of participation for LKMTL and others who 
were able to mobilise political power. KEM’s community relations employees also speak 
differently about their village support and other CSR programs which they are proud of, and 





KEM’s village support program, established in 1992, invited representatives, usually village 
officials,49  from 27 villages to bring proposals for funding to KEM’s community relations 
department. Villages received money and equipment to cement village roads, renovate 
schools, build village government offices, mosques, churches and musholla (prayer rooms), 
water sanitation, health clinics, hold celebrations on public holidays and provide rice during 
drought.50 The program both mitigated negative effects of mining – for example by providing 
water sanitation where rivers were no longer clean – and provided additional benefits. From 
2000, the village support program changed focus to sustainable development. KEM 
established a self-help consultative group which focused on sustainable economic 
development such as support for agriculture, fisheries and livestock.51 For example, in Lakan 
Bilem, in 2005, KEM helped establish a cacao plantation by purchasing enough seed to plant 
70 hectares.52 As it was village officials – supposedly in consultation with other villagers – who 
presented proposals and negotiated projects, the village support program utilised and 
cemented existing village hierarchies and patronage networks. That is, KEM’s emerging 
consultative ideology of participation fitted well with and piggybacked on the existing mode 
of village governance. 
The Rio Tinto Foundation was established in 1995 to build public infrastructure in Tutung and 
an agricultural college in Liggang Bigung. With funding from AusAID, the foundation provided 
rice to drought stricken farmers in 1997-1998 and established public health programs (Bua 
2004, 127). Local people were hired to construct the buildings, also providing a needed source 
of employment for evictees. School officials explained that children from the 27 villages can 
attend the agricultural college for free, and graduates with good grades receive scholarships 
to continue their education at university in Samarinda while the majority of graduates find 
employment in the palm oil plantation industry.53 The agricultural school aims to change 
                                                     
49 Under the New Order Regime, Village Heads were elected, but candidates were vetted by the state 
Golkar Party. After 1998, the restriction to Golkar approved candidates was removed. Other village 
officials, including Village Secretary were appointed by the Village Head in consultation with the 
District Head (Aspinall and Rohman 2017). 
50 Village head, West Kutai, interview with the author, August 11, 2017; Village head, West Kutai, 
interview with the author, August 12, 2017; Ex small-scale miners, group interview with the author, 
Kelian Dalam, August 10, 2017. 
51 Ex-Community relations manager, KEM, interview with the author, August 8, 2017. 
52 Village head, West Kutai, interview with the author, August 12, 2017. 
53 Rio Tinto Foundation officer, interview with the author, December 4, 2018. 




patterns of agriculture by teaching the younger generations about fertiliser, sedentary 
farming, plantation work and cash cropping – as opposed to traditional methods of swidden 
agriculture. 
KEM also prioritised residents of the 27 villages for employment opportunities, mostly as 
cooks, cleaners, waiters, or other unskilled labour. However, a few were lucky to obtain ‘good 
jobs’ such as secretarial positions or truck drivers that came with the opportunity to increase 
their skills and careers, learn English, travel internationally and rise through the corporate 
hierarchy.54 
KEM’s village support program and the Rio Tinto foundation involved limited participation 
compared with the negotiations and mine closure planning that were developed later in 
response to activist campaigning. However, education, infrastructure development and 
employment facilitated modest changes in the local political economy. Through community 
development programs and the agricultural college, villages were encouraged to shift from 
subsistence to production for market and relations of production to become more integrated 
with capital, state actors and the company. Sedentary, marketized production is less 
threatening to mining than shifting subsistence agriculture as it is predictable and creates 
more compliant subjects. Through these early CSR programs, KEM was able to distribute a 
relatively small amount of resources to a large amount of people and thereby secure their 
broad legitimacy in West Kutai. The patron-client relationship also ensured little opposition 
from village elites who reinforced their political and social positions through participation and 
community development programs. Meanwhile, confrontational conflict over justice, human 
rights, and compensation was contained to a small group of people mostly in Kelian Dalam 
and Tutung – until the conflict took on national and international dimensions.  
Jumping-scales – the Internationalisation of Conflict  
This section is concerned with the formation of local organisation LKMTL, their ideological 
foundation and how they formed networks with national and international NGOs. The power 
to force KEM to negotiate came from LKMTL’s success in rescaling conflicts over 
compensation. The human-rights influenced left-nationalist ideology of LKMTL activists made 
                                                     





a strong foundation for collaboration with international NGOs. Indeed, these two factors – 
ideology and alliance structures – are two of the factors that determine the ability of people 
affected by mining to participate in corporate mechanisms or to reject them. 
As described above, before 1998, demonstrations and efforts to obtain compensation and 
justice by the ex-small-scale miners met severe repression. The activists needed a new 
strategy to pursue their claims. Pak Pius Nyompe, whose mother’s land at Jelemuq was 
acquired without compensation by KEM, had previous experience advocating for land rights 
in cases along the Mahakam River.55 Pak Pius became involved in the Kelian case in 1997, 
advocating with residents of Tutung and Tering (Hopes 2004b, 178). LKMTL was established 
by Pak Pius and 13 other representatives of the evictees in July 1998, before that it was 
informally known as ‘the group of 14’.56  
While LKMTL had no official political program other than obtaining compensation for evictees 
and victims of human-rights abuses, they had an ideological foundation based squarely in 
human-rights, citizenship and human dignity. One of the fourteen representatives explained 
that he was a member of PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian Nationalist Party) before 
1965, while another was a member of PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokrasi; Democratic Peoples’ 
Party) before 1998.57 This indicates that LKMTL leaders were influenced by ideas of left-
nationalism, if not socialism, that emphasise the rights of Indonesian citizens to share in the 
benefits of national development. This political tradition is grounded in the dignity of the 
common people (rakyat) struggling for land and justice. While the adherents to left-
nationalist ideology were limited to a few activists with previous experience of political 
struggle, it resonated with many of the small-scale miners struggling for land, livelihoods and 
dignity, helping to translate their experience into ideas and action. The elements of this 
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going house to house to find local organisers. Pius Nyompe, LKMTL, interview with author, October 
10, 2016. 
57 PNI, led by President Soekarno, was the dominant political party before 1965, PDI-P is the post-
reformasi reformation of PNI led by Soekarno’s daughter Megawati Soekarnoputri. PRD was an anti-
authoritarian socialist party active in the campaign to overthrow Soeharto in the 1990s. LKMTL 
activist, interview with the author, 7 December, 2018. 
 




ideology that focus on human rights, justice and human dignity also provided common ground 
for later networking with NGOs.  
In 1995, PLASMA from Samarinda, was the first NGO to become involved in the case. Their 
first action was to write a media release about reports of drums of cyanide floating down the 
Kelian River.58 This attracted national and international attention.59 Issues of human-rights 
abuses and environmental destruction were then taken up by several regional and national 
NGOs including Pelangi, Putih Jaji, JATAM (Jaringan Advokasi Tambang; Mining Advocacy 
Network) and WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia; Friends of the Earth Indonesia).60 
Through working relationships between JATAM and CAA activists, field trips were arranged 
for Australian activists to visit the Kelian area in September 1997, make a short documentary 
film and begin reporting on the issues, reaching international English speaking audiences 
(Macdonald and Ross 2002, 37). 
These visits to Kelian coincided with the beginning of CAA’s campaign to create a Mining 
Ombudsman which would hold Australian-based mining companies operating abroad to the 
same standards that apply in Australia. 61  In January 1998, CAA funded a month-long 
Australian tour for five activists representing JATAM, Putih Jadi and communities affected by 
the Kelian Mine and the Aurora Gold mine, located in Central Kalimantan. Amongst these five 
activists was Pak Pius Nyompe. Pak Pius spoke at events organised by CAA, unions and other 
activist organisations and organised a protest at the Melbourne home of “one of the 
prominent board members of Rio Tinto.”62  
Meanwhile, Rio Tinto had become the target of a multinational campaign when the 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) in Australia, created a loose 
coalition with other labour, environmental and human rights organisations under the banner 
of the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions 
impacted by or struggling against Rio Tinto (McSorley and Fowler 2001; International 
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Kelian River during a heavy storm” (Atkinson and Hudson 1998, 32). 
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60 Pius Nyompe, LKMTL, interview with the author, October 10, 2016. 
61 This followed the successful action in the Victorian Supreme Court against BHP over its OK Tedi mine 
in 1996 (Slater and Gordon 2018) – see Chapter Four. 





Longshore and Warehouse Union 2010; Manheim 2001, 127). The network produced the 
Tainted Titan report (ICEM 1997), along with a short film documenting Rio Tinto’s past 
controversies and then current industrial relations battle with the CFMEU (CFMEU Mining and 
Energy Division 1998). Rio Tinto refused to address the report or the network as a whole and 
instead singled out particular groups to engage in negotiations (McSorley and Fowler 2001).  
The tour culminated in Rio Tinto executives in Melbourne meeting with Pak Pius and receiving 
a list of grievances.63 At that meeting, Rio Tinto executive Garry Cueson reportedly stated that 
"We are working totally within Indonesian Laws and Procedures".64 In the eyes of Pak Pius 
and CCA, such a statement only underscored that the law in Indonesia was inadequate in 
protecting human rights, rhetorically strengthening CAA’s campaign to hold companies to 
Australian standards when operating overseas. Nevertheless, Rio Tinto executives ordered 
KEM to negotiate. 
Soon after Pak Pius returned to Indonesia, he was approached by the head of Rio Tinto 
Indonesia and PT KEM:  
They asked about all the problems that we were campaigning about in Australia, so that we can 
sit down together and solve them … I asked for three months … because I have to go village to 
village in order to collect [information from] people and victims. So at the beginning of May, 
with Reformasi approaching, we arranged the demands of the people to present it in Jakarta. 
18 people went to Jakarta.65 
Yet, they felt that KEM was not serious about negotiations: 
We felt that the meeting in Jakarta was fruitless and then our friends delegated me, myself, to 
go to London at that time. It was five days before the peak of Reformasi.66 
Then, through CAA and UK based NGO Down to Earth, in May 1998, Pius attended Rio Tinto’s 
AGM in London where they expanded their international activist network (Atkinson, Brown, 
and Ensor 2001, 15). Following the AGM, Pak Pius was invited to meet with Rio Tinto 
executives.67 The sustained international pressure led Rio Tinto London executives to order 
KEM to negotiate again. Through informal alliances with NGOs, the local group was able to 
‘jump-scales’, turning a local conflict into an international one, where more resources and 
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66 Pius Nyompe, LKMTL, interview with the author, April 14, 2017. 
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allies were available and Rio Tinto’s legitimacy was vulnerable. The temporary alliance was 
easy ideologically as the liberal human-rights focus of the NGOs fitted well with the grievance 
and justice focus of LKMTL. 
As described in the previous chapter, Rio Tinto was adopting new strategies towards 
international criticism, courting critics instead of ignoring or attempting to silence them, and 
dealing with criticism on an issue-by-issue and location-by-location basis. To prevent 
damaging multi-issue networks, Rio Tinto worked to re-localise conflict. Ordering KEM to 
negotiate and solve grievances with LKMTL mitigated further damage that could be done by 
the network with JATAM, CAA, the CFMEU or Down to Earth. This was part of the then 
emerging mode of participation being formalised through global standards, legitimised 
through consultative ideologies as a problem-solving strategy.  
Contesting power within and around negotiations for 
compensation 
Following Pak Pius’s return from London, a series of meetings between KEM, community 
representatives and JATAM were arranged. In June 1998, KEM agreed to pay ten million 
rupiah ($AU1,632) 68  compensation to each of the 444 evicted families and continue 
negotiations about other grievances (Phillips 2001, 189; Atkinson, Brown, and Ensor 2001, 15). 
According to KEM community relations staff at that time, this amount was considered trivial, 
but encouraged further opportunism: “if we gave them each two hectares, it would cost ten 
million, so 4.44 billion rupiah. For KEM it was a small amount, so we just paid.”69 Each of the 
families donated one tenth of their compensation to formalise a new local organisation, 
LKMTL, and continue campaigning (Atkinson, Brown, and Ensor 2001, 15).  
While the issue of compensation for evictees was relatively simple, negotiations over 
addressing human rights violations, ongoing environmental pollution and other effects of 
mining were more complicated. Who would be paid how much compensation when was the 
outcome of each side (KEM and LKMTL) employing various strategies to contest each other’s 
power, within and outside negotiations.  
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To be sure, the 444 evicted families were not the only people affected by loss of land, 
livelihoods, resources, and human-rights abuses. Before KEM began operations, many of the 
original miners, especially Dayak people, would move back and forth between the mining area 
and other villages or were living in Kelian Dalam (outside the contract area) and were not 
captured within the 444 families, even though gold contributed to their livelihoods.70 LKMTL 
recruited these people along with anyone claiming to have suffered negative impacts. Around 
ten thousand people, many disingenuously, registered with LKMTL as claimants for 
compensation.71 Initial screening reduced this group to 5,026 legitimate claimants.  
Negotiations over compensation through 1998 and 1999 continued to be fraught, both LKTML 
and WALHI at times boycotted meetings (Lynch and Harwell 2002; Nyompe 2003, 4). CAA 
activists recall this as a time of chaos and frustration.  
In mid-1999 the company’s approach changed. In violation of the previous agreement with the 
community, a government official was introduced into the negotiating process. The company 
also began a separate negotiation process with another group (called Team Murni), which 
supposedly represented the community, but which did not have the formal mandate of LKMTL. 
This caused considerable anger and frustration, leading to a breakdown in the negotiations, to 
communities blocking the mine road and to subsequent arrests by the police (Atkinson, Brown, 
and Ensor 2001, 15; see also: Lynch and Harwell 2002; Nyompe 2003, 4).  
The negotiation process had been a way of working out who had the power to force 
compromises. Pak Pius appreciated this: “[When negotiations were breaking down] I begun 
to mobilise the masses to create pressure. Always demonstrating until they agreed to sit and 
negotiate.”72 This dynamic contestation would continue until one side was exhausted and 
accepted the compromises on offer. From the beginning, negotiations were both the 
outcome of social conflict and a forum to further contest each other’s power. 
An agreement between KEM and LKMTL was reached on 11-12 January 1999 to invite an 
independent investigation into human rights violations lead by Komnas HAM (Mangkoedilaga, 
Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000, 7; Atkinson, Brown, and Ensor 2001, 14–15). Bringing in 
independent experts was a way to break the deadlock and facilitate compromise.  
Although international pressure had forced KEM to begin negotiations, LKMTL had to bring 
more pressure to bear on KEM to resolve outstanding grievances. LKMTL mobilised power 
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outside official negotiations – through demonstrations, reports on human rights violations, 
and continued international campaigning. The fall of the New Order regime was vital to the 
success of LKMTL. From May 1998, there was a feeling of “euphoria because of reformasi, so 
that the community dared to demonstrate.”73 Meanwhile, the military became hesitant to 
crack down. This new political situation meant there was more space both for LKMTL to 
demonstrate locally and national NGOs and activists to speak out, as with the Komnas HAM 
report.  
KEM managers viewed LKMTL and their NGO allies as opportunists: 
In 1998 an NGO appeared, with Pak Pius. At that time, it was changing from New Order to 
reformasi. So, NGOs brought up old cases, asking for payments, it was an opportunity for them. 
KEM fulfilled responsibilities consistent with the laws. If not, we would face court. They already 
received their compensation. They worked with JATAM, with WALHI.74 
From 1998-2000 LKMTL and community demonstrations blocked the access road to the mine 
more than ten times.75 In April and May 2000, LTMTL supporters set up road blocks between 
the Jelemuq port and the mine site frustrated with the slow process of negotiations. The 
blockade lasted for over 40 days in total. The prolonged blockade and lack of supplies forced 
KEM to halt production, evacuate workers, and declare force majeure on contracts for the 
delivery of gold.76  KEM estimated that the blockade cost at least US$12.5 million in lost 
revenue (Casson 2001, 13). Police and military reinforcements were dispatched to repress the 
demonstration. Desperately wanting to avoid violence and international publicity, KEM 
agreed to LKMTL’s framework for continued negotiations, ending the blockade and the need 
for armed intervention.77  
The results of the investigation into human-rights violations, released in early 2000, lent 
legitimacy to LKMTL’s position. The report found evidence supporting claims that the human-
rights of people had been violated. The report recommended further investigation to verify 
each accusation followed by negotiation of compensation and prosecution by Indonesian 
courts (Mangkoedilaga, Widjojo, and Nainggolan 2000). Results of the investigation spread 
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quickly amongst national and international NGOs and media, threatening again Rio Tinto’s 
international reputation (Muhammad et al. 2005, 153). 
Rio has since acknowledged human-rights violations occurred including: 
The ill-treatment of persons during the relocation of settlers in the mine area by Kelian 
Equatorial Mining security personnel and police officers, including the eviction of artisanal 
miners and the destruction of their living places and working equipment, causing loss of 
livelihoods. Some claims involved allegations of serious physical abuse by security forces 
carrying out the relocation.  
The ill-treatment of protesters by company security personnel and police, including cruel and 
degrading treatment during arrest and detention following demonstrations against Kelian 
Equatorial Mining. 
Sexual harassment and sexual abuse of women by Kelian Equatorial Mining employees (Kemp 
et al. 2013, 82). 
Despite a “public expression of regret” (Kemp et al. 2013, 81), no party involved ever faced 
court. JATAM was critical of this as a bad precedent in Indonesia:  
Although Komnas HAM found evidence of a number of human rights violations in 1999-2000, in 
fact this case has never been investigated, just evaporated. If the government was serious about 
this problem, they must drag the groups violating human rights to court. In fact, cases of 
evictions, burning cottages and sexual violence against women in that area was only solved 
through adat ceremonies. A step backwards for human rights enforcement in Indonesia 
(Muhammad et al. 2005, ix). 
Instead, negotiations provided compensation without admitting guilt, legitimised by notions 
of justice drawn from adat.  
Negotiations throughout 2000 were beset by conflicts over who had the rights to participate, 
the appropriate ‘solutions’ to human rights violations and power struggles within the 
negotiation process. CAA criticised the process: 
The company attempted to resolve the human rights issue by organising a traditional 
reconciliation ceremony instead of more formal legal action. In October 2000, WALHI – the 
organisation which had been facilitating the negotiations – withdrew in frustration at the 
company’s attitude. In an attempt to restart negotiations, Rio Tinto employed the services of 
Justice Marcus Einfeld of the Australian Federal Court as an intermediary. In March 2001, 
negotiations recommenced between the company and LKMTL, with the involvement of WALHI 
(Atkinson, Brown, and Ensor 2001, 15). 
With both local demonstrations threatening production and the human rights report 
attracting international attention, Rio Tinto needed damage control. In March 2001, following 




further negotiations, KEM announced a 60 billion Rupiah compensation package (AU$11.1 
million) for victims without admitting guilt or liability (Nurcahyana et al. 2008; Macdonald and 
Ross 2003, 51).  
To assess the validity of the 5,026 outstanding claims for compensation, a team was 
established comprising of LKMTL, KEM and government representatives. 
[KEM] started to evaluate the new data based on the age of the claimant, witnesses about land 
ownership, [interviews with] community figures, village heads, village adat leaders. KEM made 
a selection team to investigate who was entitled to their demands. From those 5,026, 1,000 
were truthful, that we accepted after the interviews.78 
LKMTL received 25 million rupiah per month to assist with the validation of claims and 
distribution of payments to claimants over three years. This involved recontacting each of the 
5,026 claimants, inviting them to be interviewed by a validation team. Then, if their claim was 
validated, contacting them again with an offer for their calculated compensation.79 
The decision to avoid formal legal proceedings was in the interests of both KEM and LKMTL. 
The activists had no faith in the justice system and pointed to close links between government 
and PT KEM – for example then Bupati (Regent) Thomas Ismael (2006-2016) was 
transportation manager for KEM 1990-2000. Given KEM was the largest single tax payer in 
West Kutai this structural and personal relationship was interpreted as evidence they would 
not get a fair hearing, or a hearing at all.80 Although Komnas HAM and JATAM favoured legal 
processes to achieve justice, other parties favoured direct negotiation with the company. 
KEM employees stated that this is because it was more in keeping with Dayak adat practices, 
but of course this also limited their exposure to negative publicity. For Komnas Perempuan 
(National Commission on Violence Against Women), this limited further potentially traumatic 
and unsuccessful legal proceedings for women. 
Gendered participation 
While NGOs highlighted gendered violence as the most shocking of human rights violations 
to escalate their campaign, LKMTL leaders were all men. LKMTL approached some women, 
                                                     
78 Ex-Community relations manager, KEM, interview with the author, August 8, 2017. 
79 Ex-Community relations manager, KEM, interview with the author, August 8, 2017. 
80 After Kutai Regency was split into three regencies in 1999, PT KEM was the single largest tax payer 






including victims of violence, to help identify and collect the stories of other victims of sexual 
harassment and violence, but none took leadership roles.81  
After the investigation into human rights abuses, Komnas Perempuan (The National 
Commission on Violence Against Women) acted as an intermediary between LKMTL, KEM and 
(alleged) victims of sexual violence to negotiate compensation. Activists from Asosiasi 
Perempuan Untuk Keadilan (Association of Women for Justice; APIK) accompanied women 
during the validation process. 82  Negotiation for compensation supposedly followed adat 
custom: “meetings were held, attended by the complainants, KOMNAS HAM as mediator, 
complainants’ lawyers, LKMTL and several Heads of Traditional Law” (Rachmayana 2004, 182). 
This was strictly about paying compensation for allegations, not establishing the validity of 
claims.  
This shows how not only the impacts of mining, but also participation is structured along 
gendered lines. Although gendered violence was a critical part of the narrative of human 
rights abuses, women consistently had less access to resources and opportunities than their 
male counterparts. Their participation in corporate processes was mediated through an extra 
layer of NGO representation. 
This section demonstrates that after a mechanism for negotiations was established, following 
the initial international pressure the alliances brought on Rio Tinto, they became a site for 
continued contestation over the interests of multiple parties. This case supports my 
theoretical argument that like political institutions in general, participatory mechanisms do 
not resolve conflicts, rather they become terrain for new kinds of contestation. In this case, 
to break deadlocks within the negotiations, LKMTL mobilised several forms of power outside 
corporate sites of participation – demonstrations, international networking, the independent 
report on human rights and the assistance of women’s NGOs. These non-institutional modes 
of participation allowed LKMTL to develop and demonstrate its power, which allowed them 
to increase their bargaining power within the negotiations. While there was tension between 
the corporate consultative ideology of Rio Tinto and the human-rights, left-nationalist 
ideologies of LKMTL, there was eventually enough receptivity to make agreements.  
                                                     
81 Pius Nyompe, LKMTL, interview with the author, April 14, 2017. 
82 Pius Nyompe, LKMTL, interview with the author, April 14, 2017. 




Mine Closure and Forest Protection  
In 1998, KEM began planning for mine closure, set for 2003. At that time, Indonesia did not 
have significant regulations for mine closure. However, wanting to avoid further conflict 
resulting in negative press internationally, Rio Tinto collaborated with the World Bank which 
provided technical assistance. The World Bank, also in the process of developing social policy 
for its investments in the extractive sector, advised that a “trilateral process of consultation 
and problem solving, involving mining companies, governments, and communities, is 
required for a mine to be closed successfully” (World Bank and International Finance 
Corporation 2002, v). This shift in modes of participation completes the case of KEM moving 
from charitable forms of CSR, to conceding the participation of actors in reaction to pressure, 
to proactively inviting participation on a consultative basis. 
The World Bank advised KEM on how to establish a participatory committee, which 
stakeholders to invite and how decisions should be made.83 The committee operated from 
2001-2003 with a mandate to address five matters:  
1. Rehabilitation of the tailings dam, waste rock dam and mine pit;  
2. The creation of a protected forest;  
3. Transformation of the buildings, plant and infrastructure into a wetlands ‘biofilter’;  
4. Transferring some assets to local government and communities.  
5. Finalising the 60 billion IDR compensation payout.  
Stakeholders included local activists, regency and provincial government, adat 
representatives, academics from the Institute of Technology Bandung, and representatives 
from KEM and Rio Tinto.84 
In public documents, Rio Tinto (2016, 136–37) described the mine closure planning process 
as representative of “Kelian Equatorial Mining, Rio Tinto, the surrounding community, and 
the district, provincial and central governments” and that “key decisions on all aspects of mine 
closure were to be made by consensus … or if a decision could not be reached by consensus, 
the working groups were tasked with reconsidering the options and presenting them at the 
                                                     
83 Manager of community relations, KEM, interview with author the author, May 17, 2017. 
84 Manager of community relations, KEM, interview with the author, May 17, 2017; also Kelian Mine 





next meeting”. Rio’s corporate documents present a picture of harmonious participation and 
do not mention conflict. Indeed, in 2015 Rio Tinto (2015, 10) boasts that it “received the 
Indonesian Government’s ‘Caring Company Forest Reclamation Award’ for rehabilitation at 
the Kelian mine site”. 
In contrast, Nyompe (2003), describes how LKMTL and WALHI withdrew from participation in 
the Mine Closure Steering Committee and working groups because of serious disagreements 
about both mine closure plans and outstanding compensation for past abuses: 
Our opinion was always cut, they would never listen to our problems […] [The] MCSC is 
formulistic, there were no opportunities to ask questions or submit input. WALHI attended the 
first meeting, their question was cut off and they had no opportunity to ask questions, so they 
withdrew and did not participate again.85 
It is clear that there were serious unresolved conflicts between the parties involved. Even 
according to KEM staff who participated in the committee, negotiations were not 
straightforward: 
I have to say that the process was not easy … political, we cannot avoid that. … the local NGO 
has other interests – they had a hidden agenda, sometimes they are a bit political. They walked 
out and then come back again. So complicated at that time.86 
Interviews with ex-KEM employees contradict the notion that ‘consensus’ was the basis of 
decision making – stating that controversial issues were tightly controlled by the chair, 
oppositional views were not admitted for discussion and votes were taken when there was 
disagreement.87 
Indeed, the MCSC was a site where multiple interests clashed and usually were resolved in 
the company’s favour. For example, LKMTL and WALHI wanted to use the forum to ensure 
issues of compensation were resolved before the company closed, some other members were 
interested in opportunities to mine again, which KEM tried to neutralise by giving one final 
opportunity to small-scale miners and prove there was insignificant amounts of gold left:   
We also had a problem with many illegal miners coming to the dam. So, we also gave an 
opportunity to the community, in turns, to work in Namuk [tailings dam]. They don’t use 
machines, just panning, they had a trial … We provided transport, brought them in, they worked, 
                                                     
85 Pius Nyompe, LKMTL, interview October 10, 2016. 
86 Manager of community relations, KEM and HLKL, interview, May 17, 2017. 
87 Ex-Community relations manager, KEM and HLKHL site manager, interview, August 8, 2017. 
 




and we took them back. We provided facilities to prove there is not enough gold there. This is 
to stop the perception.88 
Thus, participation was used by KEM as a mechanism to avoid future conflict. After KEM 
concluded mining related activities, the contract area was turned into a 6,670-hectare 
protected forest. A new corporation, PT Hutan Lindung Kelian Lestari (Sustainable Kelian 
Protected Forest Limited; HLKL) was set up to rehabilitate and manage the forest in 2006.89 
Its status as a protected forest precludes mining, fishing or families returning to the area. 
As part of the effort to protect the forest, HLKL set up a ranger program and participatory 
community advisory committee (Komite Penasehat Masyarakat; KPM). The KPM was 
comprised of village officials or Adat Heads from each village. The ostensible aim of this group 
was to: 
Provide advice on cultural issues and advise on how to operate. So how the forest can be 
watched for long, not against the cultural values. … It is such a good thing, we can get input on 
community and cultural issues and also get information if there is any intruder from the village 
to our area. They can help us with that.90  
The above and below quotes demonstrate how the KPM was designed from the beginning to 
serve two functions: officially to provide cultural advice about forest management and 
secondly to police villagers who might illegally enter the protected forest area. According to 
various village officials: 
KEM also gives advice, socialisation, that [our villagers] cannot enter the protected area. That is 
all. Dam Namuk will flood Sembuang (Lakan Bilem) Dam Nakan will flood Kelian Dalam and Luar. 
It would wipe out this village. At the beginning they asked about how to manage the forest 
following … how to respect the land and traditions. Our advice was to restore the forest to its 
original condition and preserve the streams and small rivers.91 
KPM is mostly just about hearing about the impacts of people disturbing the KEM area. They 
just want to talk about the problems of people entering the KEM area, not about the school. 
They just tell us after there is a violation, just to give us advice not to let our community enter 
the restricted area.92 
Clearly, the KPM, enabled by consultative ideologies of representation, was a way for KEM to 
utilise the participation of village heads to solve the ‘problem’ of trespassing. Participants 
                                                     
88 Manager of community relations, KEM, interview with the author, May 17, 2017. 
89 Pius Nyompe, LKMTL, interview with the author, October 10, 2016. 
90 Manager of community relations, KEM, interview with the author, May 17, 2017. 
91 Village Head, West Kutai, interview with the author, August 11, 2017. 





agreed to participation because they thought they would be consulted on a wider range of 
issues yet when the limitations of this became clear, the consultative mechanism fell apart.  
Meanwhile, KEM hired rangers from local villages to assist with rehabilitation, forest 
management and guard work. Rangers were both employees of HLKL and representatives of 
their villages.  
[Rangers] have to get a recommendation from the village head to work as rangers. […] we 
wanted them to represent the village, so if there is any issue they can talk to their community. 
There are many illegal miners still coming to Kelian. The rangers help us a lot communicating 
with their people, because the rumours in the villages get spicy.93 
Of course, the forest is not only guarded by rangers, who may have conflicting interests, but 
also by police and military personnel hired by HLKL. 
Until now, PT HLKL (protected forest area) is guarded by the police and also the Indonesian army. 
To prevent people from local mining activities and also maybe they are afraid of people to cut 
the forest for the rice field or whatever.94 
And excessive force continues to be used: 
I was in the forest with a friend, we were cooking rice. And all of a sudden someone came and 
screamed “Don’t run!” He was shooting. He was shooting upward and then he shot me, it hit 
me but the third and the fourth bullet didn’t hit me. They wear uniform, Brimob. I don’t know 
exactly but I know his commandant’s name was [redacted]. I was cleaning my gold mining tools. 
We were far deep in the forest, so we took some time to cook. It was after the closure of PT KEM 
operation.95  
However, the KPM was disbanded after a few years because the HLKL managers thought that 
members of the advisory committee were “pushing their own agendas.”96 It appears that 
some members of the committee were using knowledge gleaned from the process to 
continue organising illegal mining: 
It worked for a few years until there was a small disturbance. Some of the members of the 
community advisory group were involved in illegal mining. From Sungai Babi [Kelian Dalam]. So, 
we want to restructure the KPM, they were too... naughty.97 
The KPM produced opportunities for each actor to pursue their own interests even as 
interests diverged – this participatory mechanism was co-opted to various ends and 
                                                     
93 Manager of community relations, KEM, interview with author, May 17, 2017. 
94 Putih Jaji Activist, interview with author, October 10, 2016. 
95 Ex-small scale gold miner, interview with author, August 9, 2017. 
96 Manager of community relations, KEM, interview with author, May 17, 2017. 
97 Ex-Community relations manager, KEM and HLKHL site manager, interview, August 8, 2017. 




consequentially disbanded when it failed to serve the function intended by HLKL, when 
participants refused to accept the boundaries imposed by HLKL. This final attempt at 
participation in the Kelian area neatly demonstrates how the original land grab is still – 35 
years later – disrupting the lives of people affected by the mine and still requires constant 
rebalancing of violence and participation to manage the conflicting interests generated 
through changing modes of production and social relations of reproduction – when these are 
threatening to extractivism – even well after extraction of gold has ceased. 
Conclusion 
The life of the Kelian mine (1985-2004) corresponds to the critical time when the global 
mining industry was responding to crises of legitimacy, developing new standards of global 
governance and experimenting with participatory mechanisms. Indeed, the MCSC at Kelian 
was a testing ground for the new social approach of the World Bank and Rio Tinto. This case 
offers critical windows into three different phases of participation around mining – or how 
Rio Tinto has attempted to control risks of conflict with people affected by mining. First, the 
absence of participatory mechanisms that prevailed until 1998, when Rio Tinto relied on 
violence and repression to counter opposition and charity to secure legitimacy. Second, 
participation as a direct response to pressure from critics was beset by conflict both within 
and outside corporate controlled processes. Finally, in the MCSC and KPM, more proactive 
and systematic participatory mechanisms that we expect from contemporary multi-national 
mining corporations. 
It is clear here how risks to international reputation (the CAA campaign), disruption of local 
operations (LKMTL blockades), and domestic liability (KomnasHAM), combine with 
international governance (World Bank guidance and international standards) to determine 
when, why, how, and the degree to which Rio Tinto implemented participatory mechanisms. 
Although influenced by nascent global standards, participation, particularly negotiations over 
compensation, was a direct response to challenges and threats resulting from the original act 
of primitive accumulation. In this case, participatory mechanisms were both an attempt on 
the company’s part to change patterns of local conflict from confrontational to collaborative 





within the mode of participation which was taking form at the global scale in organisation like 
the GMI and ICMM (Chapter Four).  
Rio Tinto employed two distinct scalar strategies: first to globalise the issues through the 
formation of new global governance standards and secondly to re-localise the issue by 
engaging LKMTL directly and cutting out their international allies. A methodological focus on 
only global governance mechanisms, only localised conflicts or only conflicts within state 
institutions would fail to appreciate how conflicts at one scale are affected by, and can 
become entangled with, conflicts across other scales.  
In this way, through consultative participation, Rio Tinto has managed to limit compensation 
payments, avoid legal proceedings and maintain territorial control over their site. This shows 
how multi-scalar conflicts entangle to produce changes in corporate strategies and a limited 
exchange of interests between people affected by mining and Rio Tinto. 
There is also a clear distinction between the negotiations initiated as a direct response to 
LKMTL’s campaigning and the later, more proactive, forms of participation. In this case, 
participation was desired by LKMTL and Rio Tinto was forced to establish negotiations. 
Participation was desired by LKMTL because it was their only option for advancing their 
interests – institutions such as the police and courts offered no hope, the community no 
longer controlled their land and local demonstrations had produced no results. There was 
enough congruence between Rio’s emerging consultative ideologies of representation and 
the human-rights agenda of LKMTL that participation could proceed.  
LKMTL’s main source of power before 1998 was its international and national allies. Activists 
in LKMTL were highly reliant on alliances with NGOs, but these alliances were built on 
foundations of organisation and ideology. Experiences of organisation and solidarity 
remembered from the time of small scale-mining carried over into resistance through the 
1990s and provided a base from which LKMTL could build alliances following reformasi. 
Secondly, this was a campaign focused on obtaining compensation (in lieu of justice) for past 
abuses and therefore was easily incorporated into a human-rights framework. Negotiations 
for compensation for human rights violations, although a compromise on their preference for 
justice, fit well with both LKMTL’s ‘common-sense’ understanding of themselves as victims 
entitled to redress and the liberal human rights ideologies of NGO allies and therefore 
smoothed collaboration across cultural and language barriers. Multinational mining 




corporations have also been forced to incorporate some elements of human-rights discourse 
into their ideological framework. The greatest weakness of LKMTL and the communities in 
Tutung and Kelian Dalam is their lack of resources and land, which of course had been 
destroyed by the evictions. Those community members who did gain control of land or other 
resources were embedded within corporate or state hierarchies and evictees developed 
divergent interests.  
Given the lack of resources and divergent interests, the organisational ability and ideological 
coherence of LKMTL members was remarkably resilient. The legacy of small-scale mining was 
a sense of solidarity through shared-fate, organisational experience and the belief they had 
been wronged and were entitled to justice. This legacy was not overcome by the new modes 
of large-scale corporate gold production, despite the attempts of KEM to provide 
development goods, education and employment. While KEM espoused trickle-down 
economics and believed in their civilising mission, LKMTL believed in human rights and justice. 
Conflict between KEM and the people affected by mining then, while primarily a conflict over 
land and resulting from changing modes of production, was also a conflict between competing 
ideologies sustained by relationships of social reproduction.
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Chapter Six: Gold and Governance in 
Gosowong 
The Gosowong gold mine in North Halmahera was the most significant mine managed and 
owned by an Australian corporation in Indonesia. 1  Until March 2020, Newcrest Mining 
Limited owned 75% of the operating company PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals (NHM), while 25% 
was owned by the Indonesian state’s consolidated mining company PT Aneka Tambang 
(Newcrest Mining Ltd. 2016). 2  Gold production began in 1999, around the time that 
international governance mechanisms for the social and environmental dimensions of mining 
were first being developed. The participatory mechanisms implemented by NHM have 
evolved in response to international standards and to conflict with people affected by mining.  
Newcrest is a member of or signatory to many of the international organisations and 
standards governing the environmental and social dimensions of mining. These include the 
Minerals Council of Australia’s (MCA) Enduring Value Framework, the International Council 
on Mining and Metals’ (ICMM) 10 Principles of Sustainable Development; 3 the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights; The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI); the International Cyanide Management Code; (Newcrest 2015, 12); and in November 
2017 Newcrest was admitted as the 25th member of the ICMM (Eames 2017). These 
standards commit Newcrest to implementing participatory consultative mechanisms with 
affected people, forming the foundation for Newcrest’s more detailed internal sustainability 
and community relations policies (Newcrest 2017). Of the three cases in my research, it most 
strongly embodies international standards, presenting a typical case of contemporary 
participatory community relations implemented by a multinational miner.   
                                                     
1 Gosowong produced 331,555 ounces of gold in the year to June 2015 and currently comprises of two 
underground mines, Toguraci and Kencana, established in 2003 and 2006, a processing plant and a 
now rehabilitated open-pit mine (Newcrest Mining Ltd. 2015). 
2 In March 2020, as this thesis was under examination, Newcrest announced the sale of its share of 
NHM to Indotan Halmahera Bangkit  (Newcrest 2020a). Newcrest stated they sold 100% of their 
share rather than divest 51% as required under Indonesian law (Newcrest 2020b). 
3  See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion on the ICMM, Voluntary Principles and Cyanide 
Management Code. 
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In previous chapters, I have argued that participatory mechanisms are enacted by mining 
companies for two primary purposes: first, to contain multi-scalar conflict; second, to 
facilitate changes in the social relations of production and reproduction in the area 
surrounding the mine. Indeed, from 1999 until today, NHM has implemented different 
programs to achieve both objectives. The puzzling aspect in this case is the prevalence of 
violent conflict and public demonstrations which surrounded the mine from 1999 until around 
2005, after which reports of violence, grievances, and conflict all but ceased.  Contestation 
persists; however conflict takes less visible manifestations. Conflict now occurs through 
negotiation rather than confrontation, and less national NGOs are reporting on or advocating 
about the case. Although the standards and forms of participation are rather typical, the case 
could be seen as a rare successful implementation of participation to reduce violent and 
threatening manifestations of conflict, and therefore deserves detailed investigation.   
this chapter examines the roots of contestation, understood as generated by extractive 
accumulation disrupting historically constituted social, political and economic relations. 
Analysis of how these contestations have been reshaped through participation over 20 years 
of mining is divided into six sections. The first gives some historical background on the political 
economy of North Halmahera up until the establishment of the mine, arguing that through 
centuries of colonialism and capitalist development, local political economic relations have 
developed in a far more hierarchical pattern compared to the other two case studies. Second, 
mere months after gold was first produced, violent conflict broke out between Kao people 
(indigenous, majority Christian) and Makian (transmigrants, Muslim). Indeed, the new mine 
was an indirect trigger for this conflict which engulfed North Maluku province in 1999 and 
2000. Likewise, the community development programs of NHM helped to restore peace in 
the post-conflict period. The third section details how in the post-conflict period, contestation 
around the mine turned from one supposedly centred on religion and ethnicity to 
environmental and cultural concerns. A broad multi-ethnic alliance formed to confront NHM 
about various grievances. Activism turned national in 2003 when local NGO WALHI (Wahana 
Lungkungan Hidup Indonesia; Friends of the Earth Indonesia) North Maluku, together with 
national allies, took action in the constitutional court attempting to block NHM from opening 
a new underground mine – Toguraci – within a protected forest (d’Hondt 2010). Local 





The fourth section turns to look at NHM’s response to these conflicts. The company increased 
the size of community development contributions almost tenfold from 2004 to 2007, when 
NHM began contributing 1% of revenues to its community development and empowerment 
program, climbing to US$4 million in 2010 (d’Hondt and Syahril 2010, 10; Newcrest 2010). In 
addition to the village support program, the 1% fund also financed larger economic 
development projects in partnership with business, and district and regency governments 
which worked to facilitate changes in relations of production in North Halmahera. In 2007, 
the United Nations Development Programme established the Legal Empowerment and 
Assistance for the Disadvantaged (UNDP-LEAD) program in North Maluku (UNDP 2008). 
Together, these participatory mechanisms helped depoliticise conflict. Villagers affected by 
mining still organised protests, however these now focused on process and forms of 
participation, rather than direct opposition and the effects of mining. The fifth section 
examines the rise of adat (indigenous custom, law or tradition) as an ideological and 
organising framework. A new bupati (Regent) ran a successful campaign to extract a greater 
share of revenue from NHM between 2005 and 2010, drawing on indigenous identity and 
alliances through national NGO AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, Alliance of 
Indigenous Communities of the Archipelago). AMAN activist Ibu Afrida’s story demonstrates 
how adat, or indigeneity, continues to be a robust ideological framework and has recently 
incorporated gender equity as a key organising tool. The sixth section finishes the chapter by 
juxtaposing a participatory mechanism that NHM did not implement – participatory 
environmental monitoring – to highlight the power of NHM to define the agenda of who can 
participate on what issues when.  
Through the evolution of conflict, various people affected by mining, along with opportunists 
not affected by mining, have formed various alliances to place demands on and extract 
resources from NHM. These alliances are more cross-class than in my other two cases. They 
are also more fluid, as they are based on multiple interests which may only coincide for short 
periods. The outcome of this is that people living closest to the mine, the most affected by 
pollution and the loss of customary forests, have relied on shifting alliances with more 
powerful actors. Together, these events reveal a model example of how a mining company 
has been able to both manage conflict and facilitate changes in economic relations through 
participation. Through economic development programs, NHM has positioned itself within 
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existing and new relations of production aligned with the interests of provincial and regency 
elites. Through the 1% fund, the range of grievances expressed has changed from 
environmental pollution and rights violations to transparency.  
Map created by the author in QGIS using open source data 
Political Economies, Cloves to Gold 
The history of North Halmahera, from at least the 15th century, has been characterised by 
waves of outsiders imposing political power and economic interests on the indigenous people. 
Sultans, colonialists and corporations were attracted by North Halmahera’s natural resources: 
cloves, nutmeg, exotic birds, copra, fish, timber and gold. To extract these resources, the 
exploiters established forms of political rule: sultanates, colonial administrations, and the 
republic. These forms of rule developed corresponding relations of production and 
reproduction. Patron-client relations, trading networks, settlements, missionaries, 
plantations, wage labour, transmigration and mining enclaves have all enabled the extraction 






of natural resources from North Halmahera and dramatically changed the lives of its 
indigenous peoples (Duncan 2003; Topatimasang 2016).  
Roem Topatismasang (2016, 48–61) and his team of anthropologists argue that there have 
been three significant waves of penetration affecting the economy and political structures of 
indigenous people4 in North Halmahera. First was “co-optation” by the Ternate Sultanate5 
and Dutch East India Company (VOC) driven by attempts to monopolise the spice trade, which 
peaked in the 18th century (C. Brown 2003, 33). The second was the entrance of Protestant 
missionaries, who helped ‘settle’ semi-nomadic indigenous people both through conversion 
and establishing coconut plantations and cattle farms. The third wave was the resettlement 
programs of the Republic of Indonesia in the 1960s, which aimed to “civilise and advance” 
people still living semi-nomadically in forested areas. This resettlement coincided with the 
opening of forests and natural resources for exploitation. Little or no compensation was given 
to resettled forest people for the enclosure of their communal forests (Duncan 2013, 41). A 
new monopoly in clove trading was established in 1989 by the Clove Market Control Board 
(BPPC, Badan Pengendalian Pemasaran Cengkeh) run by Tommy Soeharto (Topatimasang 
2016, 24–25). Transmigration programs resettled mostly Javanese peasants in the interior of 
North Halmahera, while other land was ‘freed’ for timber concessions and plantation 
agriculture, creating resentment from those disadvantaged (Duncan 2013, 41). Not far behind 
logging and plantations was a wave of systematic exploration for minerals beginning in the 
mid-1980s. These waves of penetration always met resistance, in some places more than 
others, resulting in an unevenly developed geography.  
The result of this has been the development a two-speed economy. On one side there are 
tightly controlled hierarchical patron-client systems of production, finance and distribution 
for national and international markets. Local people bear the brunt of disadvantage in the 
                                                     
4 The ethnic classification of people is a fraught endeavour. The Topatimasang (2016) team use the 
Tobelo language as an ethnic marker that consists of almost all people in North Halmahera excluding 
Galea and Makian people and extending into East Halmahera and Moroutai. By this classification it 
includes all people living in the five districts surrounding the Gosowong mine except for 
transmigrants, who are Makian people living on the coast and Javanese living in interior villages. The 
indigenous people living adjacent to the mining area, who speak a language related to Tobelo and 
identify as Kao, Pagu or Isam (Adat leaders, interviews with author, September 7 & 8, 2017). 
5 Although the Sultan’s claims to be the patron of Pagu people date back to the 16th century (Ibu Afrida, 
adat elder, interview with author, September 7, 2017). 
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form of environmental deterioration and loss of traditional land (Duncan 2013, 42). Some 
cash from these activities (unevenly) trickles down to local managerial, working, and peasant 
classes which finance the import of rice, consumer goods and construction material. On the 
other side, just as persistent, is the subsistence economy that provides the basic needs of 
local people and which is still embedded in complex relationships of reciprocity and adat.6 
Therefore, village elites and those who aspire to ‘middle-class’ lifestyles are dependent on 
and deeply integrated into relations of production controlled and managed by corporations 
and governments in Tobelo, Ternate, Amsterdam, Jakarta, Melbourne, and elsewhere. 
Ideologically, this pattern of development has left a patchwork – a “syncretic historical 
residue” (Rupert 2006, 93) of adat, feudalism, protestant and Islamic religious beliefs, 
nationalism, and modernisation. The differentiated common-sense of groups structures the 
way that people affected by Newcrest’s gold mine have made claims to community 
development, employment and damages. 
The most recent wave of changing capital formations and systems of rule began when 
Newcrest and NHM commenced operations in 1997, and with 350 employees, was the largest 
employer in North Halmahera (C. Wilson 2008, 36, 56). The land acquired by NHM was a 
forested area and although some indigenous people had still been foraging in the forest until 
it was enclosed by NHM,7 it contained no agricultural8 or residential areas. Therefore, unlike 
the other two case studies in this thesis, this act of primitive accumulation had negligible 
impact on pre-existing local modes of production. The impacts on relations of production and 
reproduction would come later, when pollution disrupted river-based livelihoods. The major 
impact of primitive accumulation was environmental and cultural. This is reflected in the 
manifest forms of conflict, which were mostly about confronting NHM over pollution, 
disrespect of traditional and sacred sites, and receiving a fair share of the benefits of resource 
extraction. Only months after production began, mass violence erupted in the area 
immediately surrounding the mine and spread across North Maluku to Tobelo, Ternate and 
Tidore. 
                                                     
6 Ibu Afrida, adat elder, interview with the author, September 7, 2017. 
7 NMH manager of social performance, interview with the author, April 24, 2018; Ibu Afrida, adat elder, 
interview with the author, September 12, 2017. 





Elite Directed Mass Violence 
In 1999 and 2000, North Maluku was engulfed in mass violence. This is popularly thought of 
as an ethnoreligious conflict that began between transmigrant Makian Muslims and 
Indigenous, majority-Christian Kao that turned into generalised violence between Muslims 
and Christians in Kao, Tobelo, Ternate and across North Maluku. However, most rigorous 
scholarship points to intra-elite conflict over state revenue, political office and natural 
resources during the decentralisation of Indonesian politics as the immediate cause of conflict 
(C. Wilson 2008; C. Q. Smith 2009; d’Hondt and Syahril 2010; Barron, Azca, and Susdinarjanti 
2012; cf Duncan 2013). Likewise, everyone I interviewed in North Halmahera emphasised that 
while religion was a major fault line, the conflict was about land, decentralisation, and elite 
contestation.9  
Back in 1975, the Maluku provincial government had forcibly relocated the entire population 
of Makian Island to the southern part of what was then Kecematan (district) Kao because of 
the risk to Makian Island of volcanic eruptions. The Makian and Kao ethnic communities (and 
other transmigrant communities) lived as neighbours without any serious incidents but with 
very low levels of integration, little clarity about the status of land ownership and growing 
tension along religious and ethnic lines (C. Wilson 2008; C. Q. Smith 2009). That lack of clarity 
about land ownership proved to be a problem during the decentralisation process.  
North Maluku Province split from Maluku in October 1999. However, it was the creation of 
new Kecematan Malifut in the southern half of the old Kecematan Kao10 that sparked raids 
and reprisals between villages. Depending on how the borders were drawn, one of these 
districts would include the Gosowong mine within its administrative boundaries (see map). 
Local political figures assumed the local government would have more opportunities to 
extract rent, including by insisting on local employment. Political elites motivated by 
perceived windfall benefits of decentralisation including, but not limited to potential 
                                                     
9 The decentralisation and democratisation of the reformasi period triggered diverse kinds of conflict 
across Indonesia. In the words of Vedi Hadiz: 
The new rent-seeking opportunities provided by decentralisation clearly make up the fuel for 
the often intense levels of conflict that surround contests for control of key institutions of 
governance at the local level. (2010, 95–96). 
10 Malifut would have a majority of Makian citizens while Kao would remain a Kao majoritarian district.  
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revenues from mining, used the imminent tensions between Kao and Makian people to their 
advantage. Fear was used to mobilise ordinary people in service of elite positioning. 
Throughout 1999 several people died, and 10,000 people fled their homes. 
The violence quickly spread west to Ternate and north through Tobelo, as politicians there 
fanned the flames of Christian and Muslim rivalry as part of campaigns to be elected as North 
Maluku’s first governor. It is estimated that during 1999 and 2000, around 3,500 people lost 
their lives (d’Hondt and Syahril 2010). The violent conflict ended when local military units 
were reinforced by troops sent from Jakarta in July 2000 (C. Wilson 2008). 
Barron et al. (2012) argue that the peace established in North Maluku was more durable than 
that in Central Maluku (Ambon) because elites did not find violence profitable and other 
revenue streams became available that removed incentives for continued ‘ethnic conflict’. 
While they do not mention the mine in their book, one crucial revenue stream was community 
development funding and employment by NHM. Indeed, until today, NHM provides 
development funding to 83 villages across five districts – a much broader area than is directly 
affected by mining – in order to avoid further conflict based on ethnic favouritism.11 Thus 
NHM indirectly and unintentionally played a role in both triggering conflict and restoring 
peace.   
Alliances and Grievances 
Following the end of mass violence in North Maluku, new grievances from people affected by 
the mine surfaced. Complaints such as pollution levels, disrespect of adat, exploitation of 
resources, and lack of compensation combined with opportunities for development funding 
which saw local farmers, fishers, villagers, ex-employees, small-scale miners, officials from all 
levels of government, and NGO activists join forces in protest. Importantly, this alliance was 
multi-ethnic and cross-religious (d’Hondt and Syahril 2010, 19–25). Not surprisingly, over time, 
different sections of this fluid alliance have broken off as they have benefited from their 
demands being met.  
Talking about their involvement with the NHM case from 2003, an AMAN activist told me that: 
                                                     





Aside from having problems with the community, land problems, land that is used by NHM has 
not been paid for; there is also problems with pollution, polluted land, chemicals spill into the 
river, polluting the river that is used by local people for their daily needs. In the wet season, 
the rivers overflow into gardens; you can see the plants dying, tomatoes and chillies dying 
from those chemicals, cyanide and mercury12 ... In 2011 a waste disposal pipe burst … Before 
NHM came, they could eat, drink and earn income from fishing.13  
Motivated by these grievances, protestors occupied the mine site, blocked roads and held 
demonstrations. Of course, these grievances are directly related to the mine – either to 
resentment over the initial land grab or the environmental impacts of mining and processing 
gold with cyanide. People affected by mining sought redress for the initial and ongoing 
impacts of primitive accumulation. Conflict and confrontation developed in several different 
directions, influenced by organisational and ideological alliances, especially the 
environmentalism of WALHI and pan-adat of AMAN.  
Mining in protected forests 
Protest and opposition to Newcrest’s mining peaked when they announced plans to establish 
a new underground mine – Toguraci – a few kilometres away from the existing open-pit and 
within the boundaries of a protected forest. Locals objected because Toguraci is a customary 
sacred place and a protected forest. Semi-nomadic ‘Forest Tobelo’ and villagers living close 
to the forest had still been foraging and hunting there until it was enclosed by NHM. 14 
Demonstrations escalated until “operations were suspended from October to December 2003 
while the mine was occupied by illegal miners” (Newcrest 2012, 25). When Newcrest says 
illegal miners, they are actually referring to heterogenous groups of people, consisting of 
small-scale miners, other locals, village officials and NGO supporters. The characterisation 
was used to delegitimise opposition and justify payments to Indonesian police, including 
Brimob,15 to provide security (d’Hondt 2010; Newcrest 2012; 2015).  
In January 2004, one group of protestors, trying to access a traditional forest area near 
Toguraci was caught and beaten by Brimob officers with rifle butts and sticks, with one 
                                                     
12 Mercury is used by small scale miners to extract gold, while NHM’s Industrial process uses cyanide. 
13 AMAN activist, interview with the author, March 14, 2017. 
14 NMH manager of social performance, interview with the author, April 24, 2018; Ibu Frida, adat elder, 
interview with the author, September 12, 2017. 
15 Brimob (Mobile Brigade) is Indonesia’s paramilitary and riot police force.  
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protestor executed on the spot. Others allege they were interrogated in Newcrest offices and 
transported by a Newcrest helicopter to jail (Hamby 2016). Newcrest (2012, 144) denies that, 
but does not deny that it paid Brimob to provide security. 
Forestry Law no. 41/1999 had made mining illegal in protected forests. This law was an 
obstacle to NHM’s development of Toguraci. An explosive investigation by Chris Hamby 
provides evidence that executives from Newcrest mining threatened to take the Indonesian 
Government to arbitration under Investor State Dispute Settlement provisions in trade 
agreements: 
[A former NHM executive] had delivered the company’s “message to the government” during 
a meeting with mining ministry officials, he recalled. “If we cannot mine in this area,” he 
remembered telling them, “we will wash our hands [of] Indonesia and go to international 
arbitration.” The message was clear: Indonesia would be sued, perhaps for hundreds of 
millions of dollars (Syahrir AB, quoted in Hamby 2016). 
Together with similar threats from other multi-national mining companies, Hamby argues, 
this resulted in exemptions to the ban on mining in protected forests. In March 2004, 
President Megawati issued a decree allowing 13 exemptions to the Forestry Law (including 
Toguraci) and the national parliament passed Law No 19/2004 amending the 1999 Forestry 
Law to allow companies to continue mining in protected forests where contracts of work were 
signed before 1999, thus limiting potential liability under investor-state dispute settlement 
clauses (Down to Earth 2004; 2005; d’Hondt 2010).   
Local activists lead by WALHI North Maluku joined forces with groups from other locations 
facing similar proposals to form the National Coalition Against Mining in Protected Areas. The 
coalition launched action in the Constitutional Court to challenge the presidential declaration 
and law no. 19/2004. The court eventually found that six of the mines should not have been 
given exemptions and upheld the other seven, including Toguraci. D’Hondt (2010) further 
reports that NGOs decided against appealing the decision as further legal action would have 
been too costly and uncertain.  
With further legal avenues ruled out and protesters being beaten and killed by Brimob, 
options for directly confronting Newcrest were running out. There was a dramatic decrease 
in protest activity and especially in media and NGO reporting. The demoralisation of 





was killed] there hasn’t been any struggle, only NGOs that struggle in the name of the people, 
but it is limited.”16 What is less obvious is how conflict has changed as new alliances formed 
around different sets of interests, particularly community development and adat. People 
affected by mining were ready to turn to participation and engagement just as NHM was 
prepared to expand its participatory programs.  
NHM’s Participatory Mechanisms  
Newcrest and NHM had to respond to mounting tensions surrounding the mine. Although 
media attention was confined to the provincial and limited national coverage the risk of 
international media attention on human rights abuses and environmental pollution posed a 
risk to its reputation, even if it avoided legal sanction. The demonstrations themselves posed 
a clear risk for the profitability of its operations. To be sure, Newcrest had a choice in how to 
respond. Continuing to rely on Brimob’s violence and existing community development 
programs was not a good option. Instead, NHM developed new participatory mechanisms in 
response to conflict to determine the bounds of conflict and set the agenda, defining 
legitimate actors and issues.  
The option that Newcrest and NHM chose was to dramatically increase community 
development funding, with a tenfold increase from 2004 to 2007 through a new 1% fund. This 
fund takes one percent of profit before tax, depreciation and amelioration and distributes it 
through village teams for community development programs. By 2011, Newcrest was 
contributing AU$22.5 million through its community development and empowerment (CDE) 
programs (Newcrest Mining Ltd 2011). The 1% fund is divided further into a village support 
program and a sustainable economic development program. The village support program is 
further divided into educational support, including scholarships; support for health programs; 
and infrastructure and social activities. Aside from the 1% fund, NHM also agreed to a new 
regional development contribution to provincial and regency governments and reached 
agreements with other community groups. 
                                                     
16 WALHI North Maluku activist, interview with the author, September 15, 2017. 
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Participatory Village Support Program 
From 1997 until 2006 CSR was administered directly by NHM, villagers could make proposals 
and NHM’s CSR staff would allocate funding on a case by case basis. The 1% fund began in 
2006; its first full year was 2007. Not only did the amount of funding increase but the 1% fund 
provided more certainty and an ability to plan longer-term community development projects. 
To administer and allocate the funding, a three-person team was established in each village.17 
According to NHM’s village team guidelines, the village teams should be appointed by village 
consultative assemblies (musyawarah desa) and NHM recommends that the village team 
should be made up of people outside of the village government structure, however NHM does 
not attempt to enforce these guidelines.18 In all of the six villages across four districts where 
I met members of the village team, the village head (kepala desa) was the chairperson of the 
village team and other members were appointed by either the village head, the village 
consultative body (BPD Badan Permusyawaratan Desa) or the musyawarah desa. 19  The 
village teams were responsible for creating proposals in consultation with residents, village 
officials, adat and religious figures, and district officials20 before presenting them to NHM's 
CDE manager for approval. Village teams have mostly used the funding to supplement existing 
village government expenditure. The money has been used to build roads, fences, churches, 
mosques, teacher accommodation; purchase seed, equipment for farming, and livestock; pay 
building and land tax; and subsidise rice.21 
Under Indonesia’s Village Law No.6/2014, village heads are elected by residents every six 
years while other village officials are appointed by the kepala desa in consultation with the 
cemat (Salim et al. 2017, 10). The law remains vague on how members of the BPD are 
appointed, and variation exists across villages, in some they are elected, in others they are 
appointed by the kepala desa and in others appointed by the musyawarah desa. The 
                                                     
17 There are 81 villages in the five districts with approximately 50,000 residents.  
18 NMH manager of social performance, interview with the author, April 24, 2018 
19 Cemat Halmahera Utara, interview with the author, September 9, 2017; Kepala Desa, Kao Barat, 
interview with the author, September 13, 2017  
20  The district (kecematan) governments were responsible for supporting the village teams and 
distributing the funding. Until 2015 the five kecematan governments received 1/6 of the 1% fund 
for development and administration, after 2015, all funding was channelled directly to villages. 
Kecematan officials, including the cemat are appointed by the bupati.  
21 Village head, Kao Barat, interview with the author, September 13, 2017; Chair of Village Government 






musyawarah desa is an annual citizens assembly where villagers are consulted on village 
administration and development priorities. In practice, this means that political power in the 
village is centred around the kepala desa who retains final decision-making authority over the 
village government’s budget. Indeed, Aspinal and Rohman (2017) show that elections for 
kepala desa are characterised by money politics and victors gain access to patronage 
networks and state resources, including the dana desa (village fund). 22 Village governance 
then, mixes democratic and consultative ideologies of representation to legitimise the 
allocation of development funding.  
This mode of participation in village governance fits neatly with NHM’s consultative ideologies 
of representation and provides a readymade institutional and ideological structure through 
which NHM’s Village Support Program is distributed. By default, the program is managed by 
existing power holders within the village government and reinforces the status quo of political 
relationships and patronage within villages. In villages with good democratic practices and 
relatively equal distribution of funding, the 1% fund is also likely to be distributed fairly. 
Where villages suffer from higher levels of corruption, gendered, religious or ethnic inequality, 
and projects favour elite interests, this money will also reinforce these patterns. For example, 
during a visit to one village, two coconut farmers, who were not government officials, said 
that they made suggestions at the musyawarah desa to assist with farming but decisions 
about what to propose to NHM were made by the village team. The farmers were hesitant to 
offer opinions beyond simply describing the process – they seemed to accept the situation as 
default, or part of the received common-sense understanding of village politics.23  
The implementation of the 1% fund changed how conflict was expressed, which actors were 
involved, and the issues they raised. The privileging of village officials within the fund makes 
them less likely to be supportive of NGOs who seek to organise and advocate for their villagers 
if that could potentially jeopardise funding and therefore patronage resources. Thus, a vital 
link between people affected by mining and potential allies was removed. NHM had 
effectively taken control of the agenda. Indeed, D’Honts’ (2010) research reports that this 
new structure of community development has directed grievances away from NHM and 
                                                     
22 Dana Desa is the main allocation of funding from the national government to village governments. 
The laws governing Villages, funding and village structures have recently been reformed with law no 
6/2014 (See: Antlöv, Wetterberg, and Dharmawan 2016; B. White 2017). 
23 Coconut farmers, Kao Barat, interview with the author, September 13, 2017 
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towards villagers who influence the distribution of funding. That is, the structure of conflict 
changed from disparate groups of people collectively voicing protests against NHM into inter-
community disputes between the administrators and beneficiaries of CDE funding and those 
who miss out. 
All the participants I interviewed who were involved in administering the 1% fund reported 
two major grievances, the transparency and efficiency of the funding process. By a lack of 
transparency, village officials mean that the village teams merely receive a sum of money but 
have no way to check if it is actually 1% of revenue from mining. By efficiency, respondents 
meant that the approval process can be too slow to respond to evolving development needs 
or proposals are not assessed holistically.24 One example given to me was that, when a village 
team proposed to establish an aquafarm, NHM agreed. However the equipment sourced by 
NHM was incomplete and not accompanied by training, so the project did not go ahead and 
the whole amount was wasted.25 That is, grievances are technical and process orientated. 
There are other grievances, such as low numbers of locals employed in the mine, continued 
concern about pollution and resentment that the 1% fund is framed as community 
development rather than compensation for lost resources and violations of adat. However, 
these have moved into the background and are used more as justifications for demanding 
greater community contributions rather than issues to advocate about. 
Demonstrations continued after 2007, although were less frequent, and organised at the local 
level by villagers, and district or village governments, as opposed to NGOs. These 
demonstrations also changed their objectives, focusing on the efficiency and transparency of 
the 1% fund.26 Tensions over the administration of the 1% fund culminated in April 2015 when 
demonstrators blocked the road and all deliveries from the port every day between 6 am and 
6 pm for a month.27 These demonstrations pressured NHM into making a series of changes to 
the way the 1% fund is delivered.  
                                                     
24 Cemat (sub-district head), Halmahera Utara, interview with the author, September 12, 2017; Village 
Head, Kao Barat, interview with the author, September 13, 2017. 
25 Village head, Halmahera Utara, interview with the author, March 21, 2017. 
26 Kecematan official, Halmahera Utara, interview with the author, March 23, 2017; Village head, 
interview with the author, March 21, 2017. 





By 2015, NHM management had also recognised problems with the transparency and 
accountability of the program. From their point of view, because NHM’s funding was filtered 
through sub-district government and village teams, they were not receiving 
acknowledgement for their contribution and their reputation was suffering. Reporting on 
projects funded through the 1% fund was minimal and management could not evaluate the 
effectiveness of the various projects. The lack of accountability also presented a risk under 
Newcrest’s new anti-bribery and corruption policy.28 Thus both sides recognised transparency, 
accountability and efficiency as problems, yet had different ideas about what these terms 
meant and how to solve them.  
In 2015 NHM replaced their CSR team and hired consultants to redesign how the 1% was to 
be delivered and evaluated.29 The 1% is now given as a dedicated budget to the village teams, 
case by case proposals no longer need to be presented to NHM’s CSR team for assessment 
and the district governments no longer distribute funds to villages or receive a cut. Instead, 
village teams propose yearly budgets for approval by NHM and produce annual accountability 
reports.30  
Following those changes, there is now more scope for village teams to plan long-term 
projects. It has also increased the significance of annual village consultative assemblies 
(musyawarah desa) in determining the strategies for CDE funding. This is the same village 
assembly that discusses the village fund (Dana Desa) from the central government. The teams 
and village governments attempt to align the 1% fund and Dana Desa as much as possible. 
Their view is that this supports existing projects and consolidates community development 
efforts.31 The new system addressed NHM’s concerns about transparency and accountability 
and addressed some village concerns about efficiency but did not address village concerns 
about transparency. NHM, in implementing its participatory community development 
funding piggybacked on the existing mode of participation in village governance. Producing a 
de facto hybrid state-corporate site of participation. This simplified NHM’s task by fitting into 
existing political relationships but also cemented pre-existing hierarchies within villages.  
                                                     
28 Manager of social performance, NHM, interview with the author, April 24, 2018. 
29 North Maluku Mining Inspector, interview with the author, September 14, 2017. 
30 Manager of social performance, NHM, interview with the author, April 24, 2018. 
31 Village head, interview with the author, March 21, 2007 
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In December 2016, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources issued regulation (Permen) 
41/2016 on Community Development and Empowerment for Mineral and Coal Mining 
Business Activities. This regulation provides for the implementation of provisions in law no. 
40/2007 on Limited Liability Corporations and law no. 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining 
requiring all corporations involved in the resources sector to develop and implement 
community development programs with a dedicated budget (see Chapter Four). The new 
regulation specified which communities count as ‘local’ and what kinds of development could 
be classified as sustainable community development. It also specified that community 
development programs must be designed in consultation with affected community 
representatives and the provincial government. For NHM, this meant that they began to 
divert a portion of the 1% fund from village teams into new sustainable development 
programs which were designed in consultation with the provincial government officials not 
villages.32 It also meant that village teams had to only use their community development 
funding for sustainable development programs. This excluded the use of the 1% fund from 
paying tax, subsidising rice and many cultural and religious activities. These changes triggered 
demonstrations against NHM in December 2017. 33  However, regulation 41/2016 was 
withdrawn by Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources regulation 25/2018 on Mineral and 
Coal Mining Business, which simply specifies that community development activities must 
proceed in accordance with work plans approved by the provincial government. 
While it is evident that the dramatic decrease in reports of conflict coincided with a tenfold 
increase in community development funding from NHM, the question becomes how this 
community development funding reshaped and managed conflict. My fieldwork revealed that 
conflicts persist, however they have changed from conflicts over the effects of mining to 
conflicts over the distribution of benefits. Conflicts over funding are further contained within 
the established politics of village governance. I have also shown how the participatory village 
support program – part of NHM’s 1% fund – has controlled the definition of legitimate 
grievances, who can advocate for them and on what terms they will be settled. The 1% was 
the dominant mechanism bringing about a depoliticisation of conflict. However, there were 
                                                     
32 The implementation date for regulation 41/2016 is December 2018, by which time, NHM will have 
had to design or redesign the sustainability program with local community representatives.  





also other significant mechanisms from the UNDP, Regency Government and NHM’s 
sustainable economic development program.  
Sustainable Economic Development and Social Relations 
NHM also coordinates sustainable economic development projects with the 1% fund, but 
separate from the village support program, through three streams: education, health and 
economic development. The education and health streams work with the provincial 
government departments to build and refurbish schools, community health centres and a 
hospital in Kao. The economic development stream includes two cassava factories, a tapioca 
flour factory and corn, cassava and sago plantations managed in partnership with the 
agricultural department of North Halmahera, kecematan governments, local business 
partners and NGOs (PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals 2015). It is focused on creating long-term 
ventures that can survive after the mine eventually closes and is further divided into training 
programs and increased support for factories and plantations.34 While the village support 
program was successful in containing conflict within village structures, the economic 
development stream was directed at changing local modes of production under the frame of 
‘sustainable development.’  
In addition to the plantations established under the program, NHM has a local purchasing 
scheme to buy produce for processing in the factories and for use at the mine.35 In two villages 
I visited in West Kao, both had experience with selling NHM agricultural produce. The first is 
a Kao village where a majority are coconut farmers. In attempts to establish wider cassava 
gardens, NHM provided fertiliser and bought the cassava. However they only paid 200 IDR 
per kilo. The farmers interviewed found this a laughable proposition, as they could get higher 
prices for cassava selling it to traders; while coconut production is more profitable again. They 
did not continue in the program.36 The second village was a transmigrant village of Javanese 
people who have opened rice fields, NHM also has a program for buying rice and although 
the village official thought the price they offered was fair, the conditions were prohibitive. 
NHM wanted to sign a contract to take delivery of two tons of rice each and every fortnight. 
                                                     
34 Manager of social performance, NHM, interview with the author, April 24, 2018 
35 Manager of social performance, NHM, interview with the author, April 24, 2018 
36 Coconut farmers, interview with the author, September 13, 2017. 
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The farmers were scared to commit because production is not stable year-round and NHM 
was not flexible. They were also reluctant to continue selling rice to NHM because payments 
for deliveries took between one and two months to process.37 NHM’s purchasing program did 
not fit with relations of production centring on small-holder agriculture, they required more 
hierarchically organised and centrally managed relations of production.  
Through these sustainable economic development programs, NHM is creating (or reviving) 
systems of production based on medium to large-scale production, wage-labour, and 
capitalist managerialism. They are investing in plantations and factories while treating small-
holders with contempt. The managers of the plantations and factories are regency 
government departments, local businesses and NGOs who NHM wants to keep close. The 
workers are then also kept dependent on local elites and NHM’s patronage. These hierarchical, 
capitalist relations of production are much more favourable to mining than, for example, 
smallholder or collective farming as they provide more predictable local produce and a more 
compliant population.  
What is immediately striking about this sustainable economic development is the similarity 
with the Dutch East India Company and the New Order’s economic policy for Halmahera. Both 
encouraged cash cropping plantations owned and managed by local elites while labourers 
were at the bottom of a strict hierarchy from Jakarta (or Amsterdam) at the top, through 
sultanates and provincial governments, plantation managers and village governments. Thus, 
NHM’s program utilises and built upon established economic hierarchies and capitalist 
ideologies of modernisation, reinforcing existing systems of economic power and patronage. 
These changes helped break up anti-mining cross-class alliances and left people affected by 
mining more likely to engage with the corporation. 
UNDP-LEAD  
The United Nations Development Program’s Legal Empowerment and Assistance for the 
Disadvantaged Project (UNDP-LEAD) is a human-rights based approach to legal 
empowerment and access to formal and informal justice. It operated from 2007 to 2009 in 
three provinces, with North Halmahera as the pilot. A primary focus of the program is 
supporting informal legal processes such as mediation and arbitration. The project operated 
                                                     





through making grants to NGOs and university-based institutions which would, in turn, 
provide education, advocacy and otherwise assist disadvantaged people to improve their 
access to justice. One of the priority areas was ‘justice, land and natural resources’ 
(Government of Indonesia and The United Nations Development Program 2007). 
The liberal institutionalist framework that informs such interventions privileges civil society 
and NGO actors as supporters of a broader ‘good-governance’ reform agenda. It 
conceptualises the conflict between citizens or ‘claim-holders’ and other parties as a failure 
of proper institutional function. The solution to which is disadvantaged people becoming 
aware of their rights and therefore empowered to demand justice via institutions that can act 
as neutral interventions into conflict. Indeed, the project document explicitly states the 
assumption that: “Governance and democracy are hollow institutional shells unless the 
populace has the knowledge of relevant rights and the capacity to realise them” (Government 
of Indonesia and The United Nations Development Program 2007, 20). 
This ideological understanding and interventions based on it are dangerous and often 
disempowering for the people identified as intended beneficiaries. It contains the assumption 
that disadvantaged people are partly to blame for their situation because of their ignorance. 
A second dangerous assumption is that existing legal institutions are neutral arbiters that will 
provide a fair hearing to poor people once they demand recognition of their formal rights. 
Just as institutionalist theory dismisses conflicts outside formal institutions, institutionalist 
interventions delegitimise it (see the critique of institutionalism in Chapter Two). Through the 
system of grants to NGOs, the UNDP-LEAD program provided incentives to NGOs – and the 
communities that they support – to engage in legalistic approaches to justice instead of more 
confrontational methods.  
To illustrate my critique, we can consider the example of WALHI. After 2007, UNDP-LEAD 
became the sole funder of WALHI North Maluku, which was then the leading NGO working 
on issues surrounding Gosowong. d’Hondt and Syahril (2010, 28–29) argue that UNDP-LEAD 
was central in convincing WALHI to change tactics from holding demonstrations, blocking and 
occupying mine sites to seeking legal redress through formal and informal legal avenues. A 
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local activist confirmed this “[WALHI and AMAN] changed their strategy, working with the 
legal system, KomnasHAM, go to Jakarta, not direct action.”38  
WALHI activists were not blind to the risks of depoliticisation and they did not accept the 
ideological foundation of the LEAD program. We must remember that WALHI and the 
community surrounding the mine were, by 2007, demoralised by the loss of the Constitutional 
Court challenge to mining in protected forests and the killing of one protestor. One activist 
told me some NGOs participated in the UNDP-LEAD program because they thought it could 
be an opportunity to uncover new information (such as water quality and effects of pollution) 
and to help their grievances reach an international audience. However, instead of being a 
vehicle for activists to jump-scales, like CAA (Community Aid Abroad, now Oxfam Australia) 
was in the Kelian case, conduct research, or otherwise empower people affected by mining, 
the UNDP helped depoliticise opposition to mining through individualised participation in 
grievance processes.39 
Cross-class Alliances and Adat 
North Halmahera became a new regency (kabupaten) in May 2003. Still recovering from the 
destructive conflict a few years earlier, the regency held its first elections in 2006. Ir. Hein 
Namotemo40 was elected bupati (regent) of Halmahera Utara on a platform including a more 
significant role for adat and indigenous friendly development. One of his promises was to 
open negotiations with NHM about their contribution to regional development.  
Part of the problem was the way provincial government elites took advantage of power over 
newly established and then barely functional kabupaten governments to appropriate their 
resources. Law 33/2004 on Revenue Sharing from Natural Resources provides for the 
distribution of land rent and royalties between national, provincial and regency governments. 
20% of royalties and land rent should be distributed to the national government, 16% to the 
province (North Maluku), 64% of land rent to the producing regency (North Halmahera), 32% 
of royalties to the producing regency, and the remaining 32% of royalties to be divided 
                                                     
38 WALHI North Maluku activist, interview with the author, September 15, 2017. 
39 WALHI North Maluku activist, interview with the author, September 15, 2017. 
40 Ir. Hein Namotemo was a career bureaucrat and junior politician before the conflict. He has been 
credited with playing an important role in the post conflict peace process by reviving the role of adat 





between all other regencies in the province (Duncan 2007, 729; Agustina et al. 2012, 19). 
However, Smith’s (2009, 174) research shows that, from its establishment in 2004 until at 
least 2008, there were intergovernmental conflicts: 
The new North Halmahera district government (where the mine was located) regularly issued 
complaints to the NHM mining company over the reduced revenue share they actually 
received when compared with what they were promised in the legislation - it was routinely cut 
by the provincial government. The district government demanded the goldmine send their 
revenue share directly, but the company was unable to do this as it contravened legal 
agreements with the central government. 
Namotemo and his administration further argued that NHM, as a hugely profitable foreign-
owned gold miner, should make additional contributions to regional development. After one 
term as bupati, little progress had been made; Namotemo had not managed to convince NHM 
to make additional payments to the North Halmahera Government.  
The recognition of indigenous peoples and protections for adat in Indonesian law is 
ambiguous, fragmented and fraught by overlapping conflicts and interests (T. Li 2014; 
Wardana 2018; van der Muur et al. 2019) .It is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer a full 
discussion of these issues. For now, it is enough to say that instead of appealing to national 
or international legal protections, adat supporters organised a political campaign.  
This then became an election issue and the Bupati’s team began recruiting more of the people 
living around the mine to their campaign. Simultaneous to his term as bupati, Namotemo was 
the chairperson of AMAN’s national representative body and in 2009, facilitated ten 
communities to form an AMAN branch in North Maluku.41 Six years after first becoming 
bupati – supported by local groups motivated by interest and identity as indigenous people, 
provincial-level politicians, and national allies through AMAN – he managed to secure 1.5% of 
operating profit for the regency government and 1.1% for the provincial government. This 
became a new Contribution to Regional Development used by these two levels of government 
to supplement their development budgets.  
Securing this funding was a tremendous success for the Bupati’s campaigning in North 
Halmahera based on broad cross-class support for adat and development. However, after 
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securing this funding, although continuing to promote the role of adat as a unifying identity 
– even ideology – in North Halmahera, regency level support for the more specific concerns 
of people directly affected by the mine about pollution and respect for sacred sites 
evaporated. 
Nonga Wola and Ibu Afrida 
Namotemo’s campaign saw a revival of adat and indigeneity as an ideology and legitimising 
force in conflicts over the use of natural resources in North Halmahera. This can be opposed 
to the common-sense acceptance or resignation to village governance as a mode of 
participation. The next generation has continued this revival, both as a way of surviving 
modernity and to claim some of the benefits of it. Gosowong was a traditional forest for 
hunting and gathering forest products such as wild cloves, fragrant woods, and food until 
1997. In the 1940s, apparently small amounts of gold were recovered.42 Since NHM had been 
operating, there had always been feelings of resentment from some Pagu Isam people that 
they had not been acknowledged or compensated as the traditional landowners. Even with 
the expanded CDE program, and development funding, some resented that they were treated 
the same as all other people across five kecematan when it was their traditional forest that 
was occupied by NHM. Thus, around 2010, a new movement emerged, led by a charismatic 
activist.  
Ibu Afrida is school teacher from Sosol village in Malifut who has become an adat activist. Her 
story is both remarkable and illustrative of several dynamics within adat as a political 
framework. Firstly, she describes the importance of adat as a system regulating social 
relations: 
We have adat law [about] marriage, laws about etiquette, character. We must be polite. We 
have laws about land, property, like that, we have many traditional regulations. How to look 
after nature, take care of one another. We also have knowledge, inherited knowledge for 
example about medicine, about this life, many kinds of cases.43 
As a conception of the world which “‘organise’ human masses, and create the terrain on 
which men [sic] move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (Gramsci 1971, 
                                                     
42 Ibu Afrida, adat elder, interview with the author, September 12, 2017. 





377; Q7§21), adat can be considered an ideology. It also becomes a basis of education and 
alliance building:   
I had already made education in every place, meeting with whoever, about recognising our 
identity as indigenous people. Starting from our mother language, I gave understanding about 
the land. It isn't sultan land, it isn't state land. Out of the state and us, we were here earlier. 
They [community members] understand, after they understand we can begin making maps. 
After I started education we started territorial mapping. I asked the elders to tell stories. Then 
we mapped coordinates using GPS.44 
This land mapping and documenting of stories helped to establish claims of Pagu people as 
traditional landowners dispossessed by NHM, and other non-indigenous landowners. Ibu 
Frida and her allies could then make a claim on NHM: 
So, after that, we went to NHM. We weren't welcomed there so we blockaded. I brought a 
mass of people who were aware, and we blockaded for 48 hours at the gate ... Seven trucks of 
people adults and children. 2012. Then it is also important that there was a network like 
AMAN, Komnas [HAM], journalists … it was all covered by media. Then I was arrested by police 
... I was taken to Polres ... It was only one day in Polres because the Bupati is an adat person 
and the head of AMAN's national board.45 
Ibu Frida’s ideology, organising, networking and confrontational activism combined to 
convince NHM that they needed to negotiate. When a manager of community relations came 
to meet them after her release from the police station, Ibu Frida said: 
"Mr Terry, I want to ask you: This land we call... your base camp we call Toguraci, Toguraci and 
Gosowong. I want to ask you Mr Terry, the Toguraci and Gosowong [names]; [did] you bring 
[them] from Australia or from Jakarta? I think [they were] named by our... ancestors. So, it 
means this [is] our land." If Mr Terry were to say, there is no acknowledgement by the state 
[about indigenous land rights] then don't use this name because that means it is owned by us. 
And here is the map of our traditional area. Indeed, this map is not yet recognised by the 
Government in Jakarta. But all these sites, sites that are being explored, they are using our 
names. I asked them not to ... He couldn't answer, he replied "What do you want?" […] I said "I 
want to reconstruct our original culture, I want to document all of it. So that when I am gone, 
                                                     
44 Ibu Afrida, adat elder, interview with the author, September 7, 2017. 
45 Ibu Afrida, adat elder, interview with the author, September 7, 2017. 
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let's say one hundred years from now, I don't remember anymore, it isn't in my brain, but it is 
written." Then Mr Terry said "Good idea."46  
With the help of a linguist from LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, the Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences) in Jakarta, Ibu Frida negotiated with NHM to design a cultural 
documentation program. They signed an MOU to provide two billion rupiah (AU$194,700) in 
funding from 2013 to 2018 to support the construction, provisioning and activities of a Pagu 
documentation centre called ‘Nanga Wolla’ (our house) in Sosol village, Malifut. Ibu Frida 
made her claim, based in a shared ideology (adat) and organised through national networks 
and local demonstrations. Through this struggle, she has been recognised as the first female 
leader amongst Pagu people.  
The resources that she negotiated with NHM was a source of conflict with some other adat 
figures who are not happy about her growing influence and power and have begun 
attempting to negotiate alternative agreements with NHM. The Pagu indigenous group are 
historically patriarchal, patrilineal, and ruled (or guided) by a hereditary aristocracy. Ibu Frida 
comes from one of these aristocratic families but through her grandmother. She is both aware 
of the tensions and proud of transcending them: 
I have been leading for seven years. It should not be me because women are not allowed. 
Patrilineal, patriarchal. However, it is me who has never stopped struggling for the existence of 
Pagu people, for human rights, for indigenous rights. I don't stop. So, I also struggle for the 
reconstruction of culture, like with the documentation centre. Because of that the old people 
respect me. Although until now it is a dynastic system.47  
So even while claiming to represent an authentic tradition passed down from generation to 
generation, aspects of this tradition can be challenged and change. The role of AMAN in this 
is quite significant, as they advocate explicitly for the role of women within adat communities 
across Indonesia. Adat is clearly a powerful ideology which can mobilise people through 
appeals to tradition yet is not as static as most of the literature assumes (for example 
Kristiansen and Sulistiawati 2016).  
What is most important for the questions posed in this thesis is that a relatively small group 
of people, led by a charismatic woman, was able to force a multinational mining company to 
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negotiate with it. The success of this campaign contains the same elements of other successful 
campaigns considered in this thesis: a legitimising ideology, local activism supported by 
national alliances, legitimising claims to landowning and confrontational tactics which pose a 
threat to the profitability of mining. And like all other cases, it is also a precarious situation; 
their power, alliances and networks must be maintained if they are to avoid being forgotten 
or replaced by another group.  
Jalan Tikus 
AMAN activists did not focus on adat to the exclusion of other issues. Indeed, in some ways, 
they intensified activism around environmental pollution. Ibu Joyce was a member of the 
North Halmahera parliament at the same time her husband, Hein Namotemo, was bupati. 
She was also the women’s organisational coordinator for AMAN North Maluku. In 2011, a 
group of activists, including Ibu Joyce, followed a windy backroad (jalan tikus) into NHM’s 
grounds in an attempt to find a rumoured leaking waste pipe. They snuck in at night, collected 
evidence and were arrested. They suspected and confirmed that NHM was dishonest about 
pollution. She said they knew about pollution because of dead banana and coconut trees in 
the area and they wanted to know what levels of contamination existed, even though NHM 
said there was no contamination at all. NHM did not provide further information or negotiate 
about pollution levels.48  Motivated by these stories, along with consistent complaints by 
fisherfolk about the disappearance of anchovies from rivers, and complaints of locals falling 
sick with lumps and itches, AMAN organised some demonstrations in Ternate and received 
media coverage in 2013 and 2014 (Karim 2013; AMAN Maluku Utara 2014). Yet, to this day, 
there has not been any significant reaction from NHM. 
Juxtaposing AMAN’s struggle based in adat and advocacy about pollution demonstrates how 
NHM can control the agenda by permitting some issues to be subject to negotiation – adat – 
while keeping others off the table – pollution. The existence of the mine, its operating area, 
systems of production and waste disposal are non-negotiable. How NHM contributes to local 
development is, but only once the threat of disrupting activities through demonstrations and 
blockades has been proven. This had the effect of breaking apart the previous coalition that 
existed around environmental issues, adat, lack of development, and small-scale mining, as 
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Activist, interview with the author, September 15, 2017. 
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leaders have incentives to change their demands towards those with more chance of success 
and generating material benefit.  
Participatory Environmental Monitoring 
Before concluding, I want to consider a participatory mechanism that NHM has not 
implemented. Throughout this chapter, I have highlighted how NHM’s participatory 
mechanisms have shaped the agenda of permissible grievances. Grievances about pollution 
and effects on fisheries close to the mine area have also been persistent since 1999.  
There are only a few publicly available studies on the environmental impacts of NHM’s mining 
activities and grievance holders do not have the resources to conduct their own research.49 A 
study led by Bogor Agricultural University in 2010 found dangerous levels of cyanide and 
mercury50 in fish caught in Kao Bay, where any pollution from the Gosowong mine enters the 
sea (Simbolon, Simange, and Wulandari 2010). 
Newcrest is a signatory to the International Cyanide Management Code for the Manufacture, 
Transport, and Use of Cyanide in the Production of Gold (the code),51  a voluntary set of 
standards against which signatories are audited. Compliance involves self-monitoring and 
auditing by independent consultants. From 2011 to 2015, monitoring results from the Kobok 
river, where NHM discharges its wastewater, found cyanide levels:  
consistently recorded as being <0.05 mg/L which is greater than the compliance level of <0.022 
mg/L … any releases of solution resulting in a free cyanide concentration of more than 
0.022mg/L measured below the mixing zone will be regarded as an environmental emergency 
event that requires NHM to follow a set process, including raising the alarm, notifying the ERT 
captain, taking samples and mitigating the release event. […] NHM could not produce evidence 
that it complied with these requirements, including incident investigation and reporting for 
each event. As the operation could not show that free cyanide levels at S12KR are less than the 
compliance level of <0.022mg/L, NHM is now considered to be Non-compliant with this 
standard of practice. (Golder Associates 2015, 17). 
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50 Cyanide pollution is a result of NHM’s industrial gold mining activities while mercury is used by small-
scale miners. 






These levels could be enough to harm and kill fish in the river:  
Concentrations of free cyanide in the aquatic environment ranging from 5.052 to 7.2 
micrograms per litre reduce swimming performance and inhibit reproduction in many species 
of fish. […] Concentrations of 20 to 76 micrograms per litre free cyanide cause the death of 
many species, and concentrations in excess of 200 micrograms per litre are rapidly toxic to 
most species of fish (International Cyanide Management Institute n.d.). 
NHM disputes that they have polluted the river, despite these findings, and refuses to release 
more detailed information. NHM’s position is that they release monitoring results to the 
government and it is the government who chooses not to publicise the reports.53 Meanwhile 
the regency government is under-resourced and under prepared to independently investigate 
and act upon the data they are presented.  
Although there has been periodic agitation by people affected by pollution, WALHI, and 
AMAN, there has not (yet) been enough pressure or publicity about pollution to force NHM 
to negotiate, investigate, consult or implement a participatory monitoring program. Key allies 
who agitated for and now receive CDE funding do not have the same interest in confronting 
accusations of pollution. Because both Indonesian legislation and international standards that 
apply to NHM are either voluntary, not public, or unenforceable, NHM can choose what issues 
they engage stakeholders about. Yet this choice is not just a moral or commercial judgement 
about public good or ethical responsibility. This choice becomes more about how they can 
best respond to different interests affected by the impacts of mining and the political, social 
and economic conditions they face. They have effectively shut down debate through 
avoidance.  
Conclusion 
The Gosowong gold mine presents an exemplary case in the study of contemporary trends in 
multinational mining corporations enacting participatory mechanisms. Newcrest’s own 
experience—being mired in violent conflict, experimenting with repression, and eventually 
turning towards participatory CSR guided by international agreements—mirrors the account 
I have provided about the extractive sector globally. Newcrest and NHM have employed 
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tactics to control conflict, from hiring paramilitary police as security, to attempting 
sustainable economic development initiatives, and to increasing contributions to regional 
development. My research shows that NHM is sensitive to demonstrations and is quick to 
make concessions but very rarely gives in to the specific demands of protestors. Its 
participatory mechanisms serve two purposes: containing conflict generated by the ongoing 
disruption rooted in acts of primitive accumulation; and facilitating changes in local relations 
of production and reproduction more favourable to extractive industries.  
Participatory mechanisms implemented by NHM have changed the form of demonstrations, 
from large, confrontational and well-publicised blockades, expressing a collection of 
grievances, to smaller, single issue, and less widely reported demonstrations. The aims of 
most demonstrations have also changed – from opposing the expansion or practices of mining 
to seeking more transparent and efficient forms of participation. Each participatory 
mechanism implemented by NHM embodied a slightly different consultative ideology of 
representation as they mixed with local conditions. The village support program fit with the 
pre-existing mode of participation – the ideologies of representation and institutionalised 
patronage networks – embodied in village governance and so was rather successful at 
redirecting and containing conflict. The sustainable economic development programs, 
legitimised by sustainability, and fitting into regency level political economic hierarchies more 
actively intervened in relations of production. While in the case of Ibu Frida, it was Newcrest 
that was receptive to her particularistic ideology rather than the other way around. This 
diversity of ideologies and institutional structures within this single case underlines the forms 
that participation takes is shaped by the receptivity of affected people.  
The demoralisation of the failed Constitutional Court case, the killing of a protestor, the 
UNDP-LEAD program, the regional contribution to development, and NHM’s sustainable 
economic development program have all helped to change how particular actors have 
engaged in conflict. However, it is the village support program that has aligned the interests 
of village governments with those of NHM and facilitated a depoliticisation of conflict.  
In stark contrast to the assumptions of institutionalists, best exemplified by the UNDP’s LEAD 
program, people affected by mining, their NGO allies, and politicians representing them have 
been able to extract many concessions from NHM through direct negotiation and 





solutions and ‘good-governance’ played no role in securing the rights of people affected by 
mining. 
It will be instructive to see if, after its sale from multinational Newcrest mining to the domestic 
Indotan Halmahera Bangkit in March 2020 (Newcrest 2020b), NHM maintains similar 
participatory strategies and alignment with international standards. Any change in strategy 
as NHM continues to plan for mine closure may provide further evidence of the influence of 
international self-governance standards and the ideologies embedded within them.  
Kulon Progo (next chapter) provides an instructive contrast in how and why participatory 
mechanisms are contested, co-opted, embraced or ignored by people affected by mining. In 
Kulon Progo most people affected by mining militantly rejected participation, whereas around 
Gosowong they accepted participation as a way to receive some benefit from the mine. The 
main reason for this is that the land that NHM is mining was forest, not farmland, and so few 
people have had their livelihoods directly threatened and they were more receptive to NHM’s 
consultative ideologies. The contestation around Gosowong is not about the existence of the 
mine but about what is considered a fair contribution to the surrounding communities and 
who should benefit. Where there was enough ideological common ground between the 
ideologies of representation adopted by NHM and people affected by mining, on issues such 
as sustainable community development and support for indigenous culture, participation 
produced results for both sides, even as these results represented a process of contestation 
and compromise. Where there was little ideological receptivity, on environmental pollution, 
participatory mechanisms were not established, and no compromises were achieved.  
In addition to the difference in land conflict, alliances are more vertically organised (cross-
class) in Halmahera than in Kulon Progo. This is because of differences in their organisation of 
agricultural production, histories of organisation and ideologies. It is a product of historically 
produced social relations of production and reproduction, which left people in North 
Halmahera less experienced in organising autonomously from rulers.  
The ideological basis for contestation is similarly different. In Halmahera indigeneity and adat 
lends itself to conceptualising struggle as between ‘local’ people, no matter their class 
position, and ‘outsiders’. The main organisation supporting local people in Halmahera was 
AMAN, a natural fit as it promotes indigenous rights across Indonesia, the engagement with 
AMAN was facilitated by and reinforced adat and indigeneity as an identity and ideology, 
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which did not explicitly challenge class-relations. Whereas in Java, peasant struggles have a 
much longer history of ‘the people’ (rakyat) struggling against landlords and capital. Together, 
these comparisons support my argument that the most crucial factors in structuring both 




Chapter Seven: Iron Resistance in Coastal 
Kulon Progo 
This final case study is an example of an exceedingly rare occurrence: a group of people whose 
land and livelihoods were threatened by a proposal to establish a mine successfully resisted 
the attempt. They did not merely extract concessions or greater compensation. My other two 
case studies have demonstrated that participatory mechanisms are enacted by mining 
companies for two main purposes: first to contain conflict; secondly to facilitate changes in 
the means and relationships of production in the area surrounding the mine. In this case study, 
the mining company, PT Jogja Magasa Iron (JMI), attempted but failed at both. People 
affected by the mining project organised militant resistance to the mine and consequentially 
it never developed beyond a pilot stage. This demonstrates the significance of decisions taken 
by people affected by mining about if and how to engage in participatory mechanisms. More 
interestingly, this case provides an example of how local people can find sources of power 
apart from corporate invitations to participate, assistance from NGOs or other institutions. 
This chapter then focuses more on the question of why, how and when people affected by 
mining decide to reject participation and take other courses of action.  
The most significant factors explaining the choices of people to resist, and their capacity to 
do so are: control of land, but not necessarily legal ownership; cooperative, non-hierarchical 
relationships of production and social reproduction; histories and experiences of organisation; 
ideologies; and alliance structures. 
This chapter proceeds in six parts. The first is a history of the area, the mining proposal and 
the development of mining, including the partially successful land acquisition. The second is 
a description of the participatory mechanisms that JMI has implemented – sosialisasi,1 village 
teams, micro-credit korporasi,2 and negotiations for compensation. In presenting empirical 
data, it will become clear that the mechanisms were all ineffectively implemented because 
                                                     
1Sosialisasi could be translated as socialisation or consultation. I use the Indonesian word because 
‘consultation’ connotes a two-way dialogue whereas sosialisasi is more of an attempt convince the 
audience without necessarily asking for their feedback.   
2 The Indonesian word ‘korporasi’ could be translated as cooperative or corporation. I use the 
Indonesian word because these korporasi function similar to both cooperatives and corporations. 
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they relied too heavily on alliances with government and elite actors and failed to include 
local peasants.3 In the public relations of JMI, the peasants and conflict are entirely ignored, 
reflecting arrogant attitudes towards rural people. Local peasants were at first not invited and 
later refused invitations to attend any company organised events.  
The next section turns to focus on the local activist organisation, the PPLP-KP (Paguyuban 
Petani Lahan Pantai Kulon Progo, the association of shoreline farmers Kulon Progo), who have 
organised local militant resistance and formed alliances with other groups in Indonesia and 
internationally. Their power results from their independent organisation, militant tactics, and 
productive management of their land. To explain this it is necessary to examine the 
development of their farming methods, organisation and relationships since 1985. This has 
led to independent organisation of their social relations of production and reproduction and 
an anarchistic ideology developing amongst the peasants which translated quickly into a well-
organised resistance. The fourth section describes the various alliances the PPLP engaged in 
and particularly how the most successful alliances were those that fit best with the peasants’ 
evolving common-sense understanding of the world and those that addressed gaps of 
knowledge and skills in the villages. In the fifth section, an analysis of gender relations and 
the gendered division of labour lends further weight to the argument that relationships of 
production and social reproduction help determine the organisation of political groups. Yet 
this relationship can also be reversed, an analysis of gender roles shows that participation in 
resistance opened opportunities to create more equitable gendered divisions of labour.   
The sixth and final section turns to one of the six villages affected by the mine, Karang Wuni, 
where the outcome of participatory mechanisms has been the reverse of the other five 
villages – Banaran, Karang Sewu, Bugel, Pleret and Garongan (see map below). Slight 
variations in land ownership patterns, ideology and alliances led to first a few, then most 
peasants participating in negotiations with JMI and finally relinquishing their land. However, 
the korporasi in Karang Wuni is organised democratically and transparently, animated by very 
similar forms of organisation and ideology as the other villages.  
                                                     
3Thorough this chapter I translate the Indonesian word petani as peasant and refer to the small-scale 
farmers who work their own land and/or land supposedly owned by the Paku Alam royal family as 
peasants. For further discussion on the politics of peasants and farmers in feudal and capitalist 






Map created by the author in QGIS using open source data 
The Iron in the sand 
Iron was discovered in the dunes on the south coast of Kulon Progo Regency in 1964. Attempts 
were made to identify exploitable iron sand resources in 1973 and 1975; however, interest 
evaporated until the mid-2000s (Naidoo, Pertel, and Ghavalas 2017, 10). In 2005 PT Jogja 
Magasa Mining (JMM) began to develop a proposal to exploit the iron in the sand. JMM is 
described as “a consortium of individuals, including the Sultan of Yogyakarta” (Indo Mines ltd 
2015, 7). The following year, Indo Mines Limited, a small exploration company listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange, made investments in the project, acquiring a 70% stake and began 
test drilling (Indo Mines ltd 2006). In 2008, a Pilot Plant was constructed on site (Indo Mines 
ltd 2008). 2008 also saw PT Jogja Megasa Iron (JMI), the operating company jointly owned by 
Figure 4 - Coastal Kulon Progo showing the mining area and affected villages 
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Indo Mines and JMM, sign a Contract of Work (CoW)4 with the Indonesian government (Indo 
Mines ltd 2009, 6). In 2009, Indo Mines secured project finance from the London mining 
finance company Anglo Pacific plc (Indo Mines ltd 2016, 39). The mining plan is to extract iron 
from the 6m deep coastal sand dunes and produce 2.0Mt/year of pig iron concentrate for 
18.5 years from a beneficiation plant which could then be exported or refined further at a 
smelter in Indonesia (Naidoo, Pertel, and Ghavalas 2017, 27).  
Indo Mines’ two main partners in this project are the Sultan’s family, who own 30% of JMI 
through JMM and the Pakualaman5 royal family who claim ownership of a majority of land in 
the contract area. Through these initial partners, JMI found allies in the regency and village 
governments. Between 2012 and 2014, Rajiwali Group, a major domestic conglomerate 
owned by Peter Sondakh, bought 57.12% of Indo Mines shares (Indo Mines ltd 2012; 2014). 
This alliance between international capital, one of the largest domestic corporate 
conglomerates, provincial royal families, regency and village governments represents a 
formidable elite alliance wielding considerable power within Indonesian political and 
economic structures. This alliance is especially formidable given the extensive patrimonial 
relationships and deep cultural reverence for the royal families of Yogyakarta (Jati 2013). 
The same geological process that made the coastal strip rich in iron also gave it a kind of 
fertility which local peasants have learnt to harness, growing chillies, vegetables and fruit to 
provide for their livelihoods. Therefore, the area subject to the proposed mine almost 
precisely overlaps with farmland supporting a community of approximately 2,000 peasants in 
400 families spanning the southern edges of six villages (Widodo 2013, 125). The proposal to 
mine involved borrowing sections of the land for years at a time, progressively mining the 
22km long, 1.8km wide contract area (Jati 2013). While each section was being mined the 
farmers would not have access but would potentially be compensated during that time with 
                                                     
4 For 3,000 ha for 25 years (Yanuardy 2012, 11). The initial CoW spanned eight villages along the south 
coast of Kulon Progo Regency in the Special Province of Yogyakarta. The two westernmost villages 
were later excluded because of plans for a state-built airport in that area. Therefore, I only consider 
events in the six villages that lie west of the Progo River and East of the Bogowonto/Serang river.  
5Yogyakarta has been ruled by the heads of two royal families, the Sultan and Paku Alam. Since 
Indonesian independence, Yogyakarta has maintained a special (istemiwa) status. It is the only 
province in Indonesia where the governorship is hereditary, the Sultan is the governor and Paku 






other areas of land currently abandoned. However, as detailed below, the actions of peasants 
prevented further development of the mine from 2008 until Indo Mines’ economic position 
had deteriorated beyond feasibility.  
By 2015, the global iron price had fallen,6 leading Indo Mines to close the pilot plant and focus 
on “operating cost optimisation” (Indo Mines ltd 2015, 7) while still pursuing outstanding 
approvals. Indo Mines (2015, 11) has stated their intention to make the project compliant 
with the Equator Principles (Chapter Four). This would entail a higher standard of consultation 
and participation with mining affected people while opening up the range of capital investors 
available to Indo Mines. At the same time, the Indonesian government was overhauling 
Indonesia’s mining laws, (see Chapter 4) which changed the CoW system to a licencing system, 
imposed domestic ownership requirements and restricted the export of unprocessed 
concentrates.7 This led one independent expert valuation to discount the value of the project 
by 80% (Naidoo, Pertel, and Ghavalas 2017). By 2017, Indo Mines was facing risks that it might 
not remain a going concern until Rajawali placed a takeover bid, increasing their ownership 
to 76.49% and then delisting Indo Mines from the ASX on 21 August 2018 (Chambers 2018).  
Before the fall in global iron prices and reform of mining laws, the most significant obstacle 
to the mining project were the peasants themselves and complicated landownership claims. 
Despite JMI’s powerful political allies, they failed to execute the primitive accumulation (land-
grab) required to establish the mine.   
Land acquisition 
Negotiations for land acquisition were complicated by contested ownership of land.  
Within the project area (about 3,000 hectares), there are three categories of land: certified 
land owned by individuals or families outright, including homes and some cultivated land; 
public (state) land; abandonded land; and uncertified cultivated land and heaths (tegalan) 
managed by individuals or families. About 30% of land falls into this third category and is 
subject to contested claims of ownership (Widodo 2013, 125). On the one hand, the majority 
of peasants who had been farming there for generations believed themselves to own the land, 
                                                     
6From December 2014 to October 2015 the price of pig iron in China fell by 30%. 
7 See Chapter Four for detail about changes in Indonesian mining regulations.  
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even though it is not certified, through Indonesia’s Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 (BAL).8 On the 
other hand, the Paku Alam royal family believed themselves to be the rightful landowners 
through feudal land ownership traditions reaching back to the Treaty of Giyanti of 1755,9 and 
enshrined in the Special Yogyakarta Law of 2012 (UUK).10  
The BAL is the main legal reference for land title in Indonesia, written as a postcolonial 
compromise on land reform between the dominant factions in Indonesian politics at the time: 
the communists, Soekarno’s nationalists and the military. Land reform provisions include 
adverse possession of land and redistribution of land owned by absentee landlords, based on 
the principle that land is a social relation between the people of Indonesia rather than a 
commodity. Conflict over land redistribution, including direct action and occupations by 
peasants has been a consistent feature of Indonesian politics (Lund and Rachman 2016). The 
BAL has, however, been interpreted and applied differently by every government since 1960 
(Lucas and Warren 2013; McCarthy and Robinson 2016).  
On September 24, 1948, Sultan Hamengku Buwono XI, father of the current Sultan declared 
that the BAL applies in the province of Yogyakarta, implying that peasants working untitled 
land (tanah garapan) are entitled to certification (Aditjondro 2013). However, the Special 
Yogyakarta Law states that all untitled land in the province of Yogyakarta is owned by the 
Sultanate (Sultan Ground) or the Pakualaman (Paku Alam Ground).11 
Under the contracts written by JMI and offered to peasants, the land would be formally 
classified by BPN (Badan Partanahan Nasional – the national land office) in Kulon Progo. In 
the areas of contested land ownership, the land would be recognised as being owned by the 
Pakualaman but with land use rights (hak garap) belonging to the local peasants. Therefore, 
for these areas, the peasants need to sell their use rights to JMI and agree that the 
                                                     
8Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 5 Tahun 1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-Pokok Agraria. 
9The Treaty of Giyanti ended the sovereignty of Javanese kingdoms and established the Yogyakarta 
Sultanate as subordinate to the Dutch East India Company. The Paku Alam was established as a 
dutchy directly responsible to the colonial government in 1813 and given control over territory to 
the west of the Progo river (Carey 2007, 394; de Jong and Twikromo 2017, 76). This began the 
pattern of the royal families facilitating land grabs by foreign investors (C. Brown 2003, 63, 76–77).  
10Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 13 Tahun 2012 tentang Keistimewaan Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta. 
11 Dutch colonial laws Rijksblad Kasultanan No 16/1918 and Rijksblad Kasultanan No 18/1918 
contained similar provisions and facilitated land grabbing for European owned factories and 





Pakualaman is the ultimate owner. In return, they will receive land certificates from BPN and 
compensation (PT Jogja Magasa Iron 2013). JMI’s Contract of Work with the national 
government entitles them to mine the land for 30 years, during which time rent will be paid 
to the Pakualaman (Indo Mines ltd 2015). In areas where land ownership is not contested, 
peasants have been free to decide to sell their land or not. In areas where the peasants are 
withholding their consent and refusing to certify their land, a stalemate has ensued. JMI is 
dependent on the Pakualaman and the government enforcing their claims to land ownership. 
However, at least until the time of writing, they seem unwilling to move against the organised 
PPLP. Only in Karang Wuni have negotiations proceeded; events that are discussed in the final 
section of this chapter.  
As it became clear that these peasants would not merely move aside, JMI attempted to 
establish participatory mechanisms to both control patterns of conflict and to change social 
relationships within the coastal villages. Yet these failed to effectively engage the peasants 
whose land was required, indeed they created further divisions and polarisation within and 
between villages. 
Participation Failed 
Local staff implemented several participatory strategies as part of their community relations 
efforts. Sosialisasi (consultation) meetings were held from 2005, designed to present 
information about the project, convince the audience of its benefits and identify potential 
allies. Village teams were established to facilitate activities and give JMI a local presence. 
Korporasi or micro-credit cooperatives were established in each of the six affected villages. 
Negotiations for land acquisition were complicated by contested land ownership and 
resistance.  
Sosialisasi 
JMI began sosialisasi activities in 2005. Peasants whose land would be affected by the mining 
project were not invited to the initial round of meetings, leaving them to find out about the 
plan via word of mouth from some who did attend. In contrast, JMI officially invited 
representatives of village governments, civil servants and local business people, who lived 
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and worked outside the contract area.12 Support from these groups was almost guaranteed, 
as all would potentially benefit from employment opportunities and community development 
programs without facing adverse consequences directly.  
After it became clear that there was potential for resistance to the mine, JMI made attempts 
to invite peasants to the meetings. One PPLP member was invited to a sosialisasi meeting 
facilitated by the head of her hamlet and the son of the Paku Alam. When she asked a 
question about how the mining will affect the height of the dunes and seawater incursions, 
her question was dismissed, and she was never invited again. She told me: “Maybe they are 
afraid my knowledge and questions will provoke other people to think more. They only invite 
people who agree and nod.”13 By this stage, PPLP members decided they would not engage 
with the company. The PPLP demonstrated and blockaded subsequent sosialisasi events. On 
May 24, 2007, the sosialisasi team was stuck inside the building which was surrounded by 
PPLP members until Brimob14 officers cleared the way. 
Village teams 
JMI established coordinator teams in each affected village. Made up of residents, their role 
was to socialise the mining project within the community, convince their neighbours of its 
benefits, and organise support for JMI. One farmer I interviewed worked his small piece of 
land before 2006, however it was not enough to produce an income to support his family. 
Once he heard rumours about the mining plan in 2005, he attended a sosialisasi meeting 
organised by the Pakualaman: 
There were many questions and many rejections at the start. First, I refused the mine, but then 
I was unemployed, like lots of other people were unemployed. I asked them what is the benefit, 
what is the impact on the people here? They told stories. They said that the project would 
absorb labour.15 
After six months of consideration, he decided the promise of employment in the mine could 
be the best way to support his family. He became one of six community coordinators from 
two villages. Life became hard for him and his family as his village was overwhelmingly anti-
                                                     
12 Village head, Kulon Progo, interview with the author, Feburary 24, 2017. 
13 PPLP organiser, interview with the author, September 27, 2016. 
14 Brimob (Mobile Brigade) is Indonesia’s paramilitary and riot police force. 





mining. He was ostracised from public life and his activities were disrupted, prompting him to 
move with his family outside the area, until 2015 when the situation was calmer.  
PPLP members also talk about ‘horizontal conflict’ between residents who were pro- and anti-
mining. PPLP members refused to attend events organised by anyone they considered pro-
mining, ostracised pro-mining neighbours from anti-mining mosques, and stopped their 
children from playing with their friends if their parents were pro-mining and vice-versa.16 This 
ostracization was in part a result of a deeply polarizing issue dividing a community and in part 
organised and encouraged by both the PPLP on one side and JMI’s community coordinators 
on the other. In the five villages where there was an overwhelming rejection of mining, this 
had the effect of completely undermining the work of JMI’s community teams. In contrast, in 
Karang Wuni the community team fulfilled its functions, ultimately facilitating the acquisition 
of land by JMI. 
Korporasi  
In 2011, JMI established korporasi in each village. The korporasi provide microfinance to 
members and an official mechanism through which JMI can procure local goods and services 
(mostly labour or food). Membership is open to all residents of each village, not only those 
affected by mining. Both functions bring JMI into the field of economic and community 
development and attempt to create new community interests which are aligned with JMI’s.  
Each korporasi was established with fifteen million rupiah. If they were successfully 
established after one year, JMI granted another 35 million, and if after the end of another 
year the korporasi was still functioning, it was granted a final payment of 50 million, bringing 
the total funding to one hundred million rupiahs (total AU$10,164). Eight village korporasi 
received the initial 15 million, three received the second grant of 35 million and only in Karang 
Wuni was the final 50 million IDR grant made.17 In all the other villages, it appears that the 
money was mismanaged or unaccounted for. One village head told me that the initial 15 
million payment was divided up amongst friends of the coordinator appointed by JMI.18 Like 
with the other participatory mechanisms, PPLP members refused to participate in the 
                                                     
16 University student and resident of coastal Kulon Progo, interview with the author, September 27, 
2016. 
17 Member of Karang Wuni Korporasi, interview with the author, March 3, 2017. 
18 Village head, Kulon Progo, interview with the author, February 25, 2017. 
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korporasi. In Karang Wuni, as we will see below, this was not the case. This refusal to 
participate seems to have both effectively undermined the korporasi and left them open to 
corruption.  
Of the participatory mechanisms, the village teams, sosialisasi, and support for community 
events succeeded in finding and securing the support of some allies: village elites, 
entrepreneurs, some underemployed and some peasants with very small parcels of land. 
Likewise, the korporasi had the potential to align the interests of peasants with JMI’s. 
However, in the areas dominated by the PPLP, all mechanisms were undermined by 
opposition to mining. Indo Mines misread the situation, believing that the Pakualam was the 
unambiguous land owner and that the support of the Pakualaman and Sultanate would be 
enough to secure land for the project. They relied too heavily on an institutional reading of 
the political situation and the advice of their local partners who had their own interests and 
downplayed conflicts with local farmers. Its articulation of consultative problem-solving 
representation was too narrow to secure legitimacy from affected people.  
Unlike in Gosowong, the coastal peasants were not well integrated into existing state or 
corporate relations of production, reproduction or ideologies. While the participatory 
strategies of Indo Mines may have fitted well with the ideology and institutions of feudal 
Yogyakarta, they stood in direct opposition to the peasants’ interests and understanding. 
With the failure of all participatory mechanisms in five out of six villages affected by the mine, 
the key question becomes why did the coastal peasants from the PPLP choose to militantly 
reject JMI’s participatory mechanisms? Furthermore, what was the base of their power and 
how were they successful?  
Farming is fighting 
Peasants living in the area first heard about the project either through rumour or when 
company people came to collect samples. Resistance began almost immediately when some 
farmers brought questions to their village governments asking why people were coming to 
their land without permission or notification.19 After the debacle of JMI’s sosialisasi program,, 
several of the hamlet (dukuh) based peasants’ groups (kelompok tani) from six villages met 
                                                     





on April 1, 2007 to decide for themselves how to respond to the mining proposal. The 
inaugural meeting unanimously decided to oppose the development of iron sand mining on 
their land, to “bertani atau mati” (farm or die) and formed the PPLP as the primary 
organisation of resistance (Widodo 2013, 11). The PPLP adopted a combination of militant 
confrontation, sabotage, blockades, rejection of mainstream NGOs, and solidarity actions 
organised through networks of peasants and urban-based activists. 
Tactics 
Between May 2007 and 2012 the PPLP and their allies engaged in a series of militant direct 
actions, protests and blockades. During this time, the coastal areas of Kulon Progo became 
notorious as dangerous places for outsiders to pass through. Roadside posts (posko) were 
constructed all through the PPLP’s area, adorned with anti-mining slogans, from which PPLP 
members monitored the coming and going of everyone. Parades were organised as both 
celebrations and demonstrations of support, attracting thousands of farmers who marched, 
packed into trucks or rode motorbikes without mufflers. Roadblocks were frequently 
established, anyone suspected of involvement with mining activities was turned away, and 
sosialisasi meetings were blockaded.  
On a couple of occasions, at demonstrations at government offices in the regency capital of 
Wates, ten kilometres to the north, protestors fought with riot police who were attempting 
to break them up, using improvised weapons like rocks and bamboo against the police batons, 
tear gas, shields and water cannon. On 23 October, 2008, PPLP members protested at the 
regency parliament Kulon Progo over the issuance of mining licences. They occupied the 
parliament buildings for three days and three nights. In January 2009, when PPLP organiser 
Pak Tukijo was on trial,20 thousands of farmers surrounded the court building, threatening to 
storm it if he was found guilty. He was found not guilty. The largest demonstration outside 
Kulon Progo was held at Gadjah Mada University on June 21, 2008 when more than five 
thousand people demonstrated about UGM staff providing expert assistance to JMI’s 
environmental assessment and rehabilitation study processes.21  
                                                     
20 Charged with ‘pencamaran nama baik’ (slander or defamation). 
21 Solidarity activist, interview with author, September 8, 2016; see also Aditjondro (2013, 93). 
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Two days after the occupation of the regional parliament, around 300 hired thugs (preman) 
entered the PPLP’s area and burnt down several posko.22 Fortunately, they left after PPLP 
members rallied to confront them and interpersonal violence was avoided.23 Pak Tukijo was 
arrested again, following a confrontation between PPLP members in Karang Sewu and JMI 
employees. This time he was jailed for 28 months from May 1, 2011 (Widodo 2013, 30). 
Through these militant tactics, the PPLP managed to hold off development of the mine until 
the drop in global iron prices forced Indo Mines to suspend operations, Indonesian mining 
laws changed, and Indo Mines ran out of capital. As activity around the mine site decreased, 
so too did the frequency of demonstrations. The PPLP still holds parades on their anniversary, 
attracting thousands of peasants and supporters, as a celebration and as a demonstration 
that they can still mobilise large crowds. 
Even more than these militant actions which stir controversy and made the PPLP infamous, 
all members interviewed expressed that, for them, their most important and effective 
strategy is to simply keep farming and managing their land well. One peasant who I 
interviewed on her land told me:  
Planting and farming are the most important, don’t let this land be empty. If it is empty, people 
will think it is not productive, it won't be useful for the people... I think it is more important to 
manage our land. There are so many discussions, so much theory, the practical is more 
important.24 
Likewise, Pak Tukijo, told me: 
Maybe JMI is just waiting for my generation to die - but the younger generation will step up as 
long as the land is productive. If the harvests are good and the land is managed well, people will 
be willing to defend it. … I'm just scared if the harvests fail, then people won’t feel so strong and 
defend their land. That is why as long as we keep busy managing the land and don’t get 
distracted, we won’t be defeated.25 
And so, the coastal peasants do not allow the attempted land grab or even the struggle to 
defeat the mining project distract them from what they are struggling for – their land. Hence 
                                                     
22 Exactly who the attackers were or were hired by is disputed, Hamlet head, interview with the author 
March 3, 2017. 
23Solidarity activist, interview with author, September 20, 2016; PPLP organiser, interview with the 
author, September 21, 2016.  
24 PPLP member, interview with the author, September 27, 2016. 





the most famous slogan of the PPLP: “Menanam adalah Melawan” (Farming is Fighting). What 
they are struggling for is the same as the struggle itself.  
Why was the PPLP so successful? Why did they choose militant resistance to mining? Why did 
they refuse participation and negotiation with the company and the government? To answer 
these questions, I turn to explain the development of the means and relations of production, 
social reproduction, ideology and alliances amongst the peasants.  
Sand and chillies 
To understand the decisions of people affected by the mining proposal, it is important to first 
understand a little about farming systems on the coastal strip of Kulon Progo.26 It is the 
political economy of chilli and vegetable production along with relationships of production 
that have given these communities their staunchly independent and communal character (Jati 
2013). Peasants here do not grow rice in irrigated plains like peasants in most areas of Java, 
they do not grow tobacco like peasants in mountainous areas and there have never been any 
large plantations or forced agriculture on this land. The soil – or rather sand – on the coastal 
strip is very different from the soil found on the plains and mountains of Java and is not 
suitable to these major agricultural commodities (Kusumaningrum and Mustafa 2015). The 
farmers grow chillies, melons, aubergines and other fruit and vegetables. This means that 
they are less integrated into the agricultural political economy of Yogyakarta or Java and are 
relatively unaffected by the government and private conglomerates that control trade in rice, 
sugar cane, tobacco, tea, cloves and other major agricultural products. They are also less 
integrated into regency and provincial systems of political patronage.  
More significant for our purposes is the history of the development of farming techniques 
along the coastal strip, which has occurred since 1985 – extremely recently compared with 
other agricultural systems in Yogyakarta and Java. Before 1985, farming in the “gersang dan 
tandus” (arid and barren) (Suliadi 2015, 82) coastal strip was extremely marginal. Farming 
occurred during the wet season, only very low value yams, cassavas, peanuts and some corn 
were cultivated without irrigation while pandan leaves and bamboo were collected from the 
                                                     
26 These practices are not entirely confined to the regency of Kulon Progo but extend westward along 
the coast into central and even west Java – the borders are determined by natural geography and 
history rather than state lines.  
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wild. In the dry season people searched for work, either as farm labourers in rice fields further 
north or as migrant labourers in large cities or even abroad. Residents were extremely poor 
and say they were marginalised from Yogyakarta society as wong cubung. 27  This 
marginalisation is the result of the colonial plantation system, of sugar cane production, and 
continued feudal systems of land ownership in Yogyakarta, creating landless peasants who 
moved to the unpopulated coastal strip to eke out a living and avoid state control (Yanuardy 
2012; Jati 2013). 
The story of how current farming practices developed has become something of a local 
mythology. In 1985, one farmer saw a chilli plant growing in the wild and thought to himself, 
“if I nurture this and give it water, it could be very beneficial to the people.”28 He did nurture 
the chilli plant, he planted more and found that if you gave them water, they would also grow 
in the dry season. Once his friends saw his initial success, they joined in the experiment, they 
dug wells with bamboo, experimented with different crops, talked over coffee after work, 
formed peasant groups, levelled and cleared the sand dunes and cultivated fields. Slowly, 
through ongoing cooperation and collective experimentation, they developed new farming 
techniques. Concrete wells replaced bamboo, plastic pipes and electric pumps replaced 
watering cans and the peasants developed a comfortable standard of living.29 Hard data and 
statistics on economic development in coastal Kulon Progo are rare and unreliable even in 
Indonesian and Javanese language sources. The lack of official data from this period confirms 
the oral histories of older peasants that this was a marginal area, outside the interests of state 
and corporate actors. 
From the early groups that formed to collectively experiment with farming techniques, more 
formal kelompok tani (farming groups) emerged. Organised at hamlet level, each group 
coordinated planting and harvesting schedules so that labour could be shared across each 
other’s land. They coordinated construction of roads into the farming area to allow better 
transportation and in the early 2000’s they started to introduce more mechanised farming 
techniques. Some peasants’ groups bought tractors and other tools that are collectively 
shared, while in other places individuals would buy tractors and rent them to their neighbours. 
                                                     
27 Jv. Deprived, sick, uneducated, impoverished people, social outcasts (Widodo 2013). 
28 PPLP member, interview with the author, April 23, 2017. 





Experimentation and land mapping created a “social collective knowledge” upon which 
peasants built their success (Yanuardy 2012, 4). 
The most significant function of the peasants’ groups developed in 2003 when the amount of 
chillies produced grew to be too large to be sold at local markets. Asosiasi Pasar Tani (farmers’ 
market associations), would pool all the chillies harvested at one time and auction them off 
to the highest bidder (Rusdiyana and Suminah 2018). This collective auction system meant 
that chillies could be sold much further afield and that peasants were not competing with one 
another, instead they increased their bargaining power through collectivised sale and 
distribution of their produce.30  
It was this collective process of experimentation, coordination, and distribution that the 
farmers credit with turning wind-swept sand dunes into fertile land and lifting themselves out 
of poverty. Whereas older peasants would have been lucky to finish primary education, they 
now send their children and grandchildren to the city for senior high school and university 
education, yet their children still aspire to become farmers.31 It is a remarkable instance of 
development and poverty eradication over the last thirty-five years. 
Older farmers who led the collective experimentation process starting in 1985 say that the 
cooperative organisation of farming came about because of new methods of cultivation, 
during the process of experimentation.32 Before 1985, when farming was underdeveloped 
there was no coordination, there was no collective organisation or peasants’ groups 
(Kusumaningrum and Mustafa 2015). It was also important that all the shoreline farmers were 
social outcasts, viewed by inland peasants as isolated and unproductive. While common 
experiences of being outsiders, working as itinerant and migrant labourers, and living through 
poverty produced a sense of solidarity, forms of collective organisation only evolved in 
response to the new agricultural practices.  
The kelompok tani are a central pillar of the coastal communities, they institutionalise the 
collective, anti-hierarchical spirit of the farming communities.33 Organisers rotate through 
                                                     
30 PPLP member, interview with author, April 23, 2017. 
31 Youth group, interview with the author, April 23, 2017. 
32 PPLP member, interview with the author, April 23, 2017. 
33 Although decision making in these groups is dominated by men, see below for description of the 
gendered division of labour and implications for resistance.  
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positions and all profits are distributed back to members. However, what is most remarkable, 
and perhaps unique in Indonesia, is that since their beginnings in the late 1980s, they have 
been organised independently of government.34 Soeharto’s government made independent 
farming organisations illegal, all farming groups had to be organised through village 
government structures and include representatives from the military. Yet this never was 
enforced in the coastal area of Kulon Progo. The fact that these independent kelompok tani 
were ignored by the state is further evidence that the coastal area remained outside the 
interests and political networks of state and capital. It is these groups and the organisational 
forms that facilitated a rapid formation of the PPLP when the mining company arrived.  
This brief historical sketch highlights that the coastal peasants of Kulon Progo have a relatively 
autonomous history of development, an intense pride in the quality of their crops and land, 
a system of agriculture that is collectively and independently managed and peasants’ groups 
that are used to being left alone to determine their own business (Kusumaningrum and 
Mustafa 2015). That is to say, they have developed collective social relations of production 
and reproduction independent of state and capital. They also have experiences of working 
abroad, in cities, as rural day labourers, and more recently as students in the cities. They know 
what urban and rural poverty is like, understand precarity, and they have witnessed 
development failures in other areas. Having already succeeded at pulling themselves out of 
poverty without outside assistance, they were extremely sceptical when a mining company 
arrived with promises of modernisation. 
Ideology 
Along with the development of cooperative relations of production and reproduction, the 
coastal peasants developed ideologically too. Their disposition towards cooperative 
autonomy and self-development found expression through old and new ideological frames. 
Mas Widodo, a prominent PPLP organiser told how one of the first tasks of the PPLP was to 
refine and increase awareness of ‘filosofi tanah’ (philosophy of land):  
We continuously spoke about these things. So that everyone knows that peasants’ living space 
is our land (ruang hidup petani adalah tanah) … People must take care of the environment and 
then the environment will take care of them, protect their life. It is like a mutual connection. So, 
they understand if somebody wants to take the land or build something or change the function, 
                                                     






it will destroy everything.35 
This philosophy of land developed from experiences with cooperative systems of agricultural 
production, emphasising custodianship of nature, land and soil as a living resource, anti-
hierarchical collective organisation and self-reliance. It is of course also strongly influenced by 
and integrated back into existing ideological, philosophical and spiritual beliefs. The PPLP 
became an ideological vehicle in disseminating and sharpening knowledge to help each other 
understand and react to the mining proposal with coherence. 
One peasant interviewed rejected the idea of mining mainly, although not only, because it 
will destroy traditional sacred places, particular hills and natural springs where people still 
meditate and conduct rituals specific to those places.36 A landscape imbued with place based 
spiritual practice reinforces and is reinforced by the belief that land is not a commodity to be 
bought and sold, it serves a higher social function. As one activist put it:  
land is understood not only as the means of production but also as their identity as farmers and 
living space. If land can be sold, that means it is a commodity. If land is living space (ruang hidup), 
it cannot be sold. Because if you sell your living space, you cannot live.37 
Land also occupies a significant place in the post-colonial left-nationalist imagination of 
Indonesia. Land has been forcibly taken by colonialists, multi-national corporations and the 
military and it has been won back by peasant and union struggle (Lund and Rachman 2016). 
For peasants with this awareness, land is precious and should not be commodified (see: Lucas 
and Warren 2013, 16–37).  
The newest element to be introduced into the ideological mix is anarchism. Although arguably 
the coastal peasants have long held collective anti-hierarchical tendencies, the word 
anarchism was brought in when urban activists began supporting the struggle of the PPLP. As 
a relatively isolated, marginalised, collective and autonomous groups of hamlets, it isn’t 
surprising that the PPLP found friends in anarchists or that anarchists were inspired by the 
history and philosophy of the PPLP. Anarchism has been significant for lending legitimacy to 
the PPLP’s rejection of both the state and big capital. It has also helped develop their critique 
of state institutions and NGOs. Anarchists also brought feminist understanding of struggle 
                                                     
35 Interview with the author, September 21, 2016. 
36 Peasant and resident, Kulon Progo, interview with the author, March 3, 2017 
37 Solidarity activist, interview with the author, Yogyakarta, July 15, 2017 
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with them, initiating many conversations about the gendered division of labour in activism 
and supporting women organisers.38 Long-term ideological engagement helped to reshape 
the gendered division of resistance (see below). 
None of this is meant to suggest that there is a single grand official ideology of the PPLP. Each 
individual will adopt a different combination of elements based on their lived experiences. 
Some are more pious, some more anarchic. To be sure, there are also strongly held beliefs 
that have hindered the development of an ideology which enables resistance to mining. First 
amongst these is the traditional deference usually given to the Sultanate and Pakualaman in 
Yogyakarta society (Colbron 2016). This belief took a long time to overcome within the PPLP 
dominated villages, in Karang Wuni it was one factor in the success of JMI and has been a 
source of difficulty when searching for allies in Yogyakarta. Rejection of the Sultanate and 
Pakualaman has been grounded in the claim that it was the Sultan and Paku Alam who first 
betrayed Javanese tradition to capitalism.  
This ideological constellation places peasants as experts at the centre of their own knowledge 
systems and empowered them to reject the economics and science of the sosialisasi meetings, 
legal systems and even NGOs: 
The peasants of Kulon Progo’s coastal beach land are also inventors, developers and protectors 
of sustainable farming processes. We do not need the babble of whatever professor or engineer 
with legitimation from the state, school or agency who can only theorise with their theories 
(Widodo 2013, 44). 
The ideological constructions of the PPLP are important because they justify and give 
members confidence to pursue particular tactics and alliances over others. Crucially, this 
ideological construction is antithetical to the consultative ideologies of representation 
espoused by JMI and state actors. Peasants rejected ideologies of corporate led development, 
they rejected consultative ideologies of representation and they rejected the feudal 
ideologies of the Pakualaman. Nevertheless, localised resistance, however well organised and 
militant, is always vulnerable to investors and their elite allies. The PPLP needed to build 
alliances of their own.  
                                                     






Deep cultural reverence for the royal families in Yogyakarta made it difficult for the PPLP to 
find sympathy or allies within Yogyakarta (at least initially) and drove them to search for 
environmentalist, anarchist and international allies (Jati 2013). The PPLP is notoriously 
sceptical about the involvement of outsiders and NGOs, who they see as bringing their own 
hidden interests which might not be aligned with the PPLP’s. They are critical of NGO attempts 
to represent them and negotiate or make compromises with corporations. NGOs tend to 
accept consultative ideologies of representation as an opportunity to have influence, while 
the PPLP rejected consultation because it precluded their autonomy or democratic rights. 
PPLP organisers were also reluctant to allow their movement to be used as a vehicle for 
aspiring politicians or NGO fundraising. The PPLP thus adopted a model for engaging with 
allies that stipulated allies could act in their respective domains of expertise but could not 
represent the PPLP outside of strictly agreed guidelines. Alliances formed organically too, 
based on continuing friendships and long-term connections that were built through mutual 
struggle. Meanwhile, alliances were forged with other peasants’ groups, anarchists, activists 
and artists across Yogyakarta and Indonesia.  
The PPLP was a founding member of the FKMA (Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Agraria – the 
Agrarian Communities’ Communication Forum). They also formed long term relationships 
with anarchists, artists and activists in Yogyakarta, Indonesia and globally. JDA (Jogja Darurat 
Agraria – Agrarian Emergency Jogjakarta) was founded by a group of people acting in 
solidarity with the PPLP. The one NGO which has had the biggest impact on the struggle is 
LBH (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum – Legal Aid Indonesia). These allies helped expand the struggle 
from an isolated land conflict into a challenge to land grabs and the ‘exceptional’ feudal 
characteristics of Yogyakarta politics.  
Anarchists and solidarity 
The PPLP, their militant tactics, opposition to the state and big capital, and autonomous 
organisation of land became a cause célèbre for anarchists internationally. When I asked 
about his preference for making alliances with anarchists and other peasants, one PPLP 
organiser emphasised the friendly informal nature of such connections: “I am friends with 
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anarchists and peasants, it is nicer, more enjoyable, happier, just like that. Like with other 
peasants, our minds just meet.”39 
Anarchist activists worked on the international aspect of the campaign, translating 
information into English, publishing on blogs and international websites, and through 
informal international networks. Small demonstrations were organised at Indonesian 
embassies in London, Athens, and Melbourne and at the offices and meetings of Indo Mines 
in Perth, Australia (Matheos 2011). Declarations of solidarity were sent from France, the 
Philippines and other places. These international ‘solidarity actions’ played a limited but 
important role: once both the Australian and Indonesian companies knew there was 
international attention, there were no more attacks by preman and police violence decreased. 
PPLP members assume this is because the companies wanted to avoid controversy. 
LBH and legal strategy 
The most significant NGO ally is LBH (Legal Aid Institute) Yogyakarta, as it plays a specialised 
role that farmers and other activists cannot easily do for themselves, providing legal 
education, support and advocacy. With LBH’s assistance the PPLP formed a paralegal working 
group, members of which received basic legal training in 2008. They did this so that the PPLP 
could build their own understanding of the legal system. These paralegal activists have taken 
a lead role in educating other PPLP members as well as broader public debates in explaining 
that their claims to land rights are based in the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) and rejecting the 
Special Yogyakarta Law (UUK).40  
LBH and PPLP have considered mounting a Supreme Court challenge to the UUK however they 
view formal legal prospects with pessimism. Neither have they sued the state or company for 
rights violations. There are several reasons for this. As with LKMTL in Kelian and WALHI in 
Gosowong, the paralegal team considers the court system in Indonesia to be complicated and 
corrupt, they do not have confidence in their ability to succeed in court systems when they 
will surely be outmatched in terms of funding and lawyers by the Sultanate.41 They view 
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courts as enemy terrain. Instead, legal strategies are focused on defending activists and/or 
farmers who are criminalised because of their campaign work.42 
In five villages, peasants have not perused land certification. PPLP members there understand 
that certifying their land will make it legible, countable and tradeable under the laws of the 
state, that certification is a step towards enclosure. They also have no faith in any legal 
institutions to intervene on their behalf in a dispute. They see engagement with the state and 
corporations as full of risk without corresponding benefits. Instead, they prefer to secure their 
individual rights through collective action and communal organisation.  
Their preferred strategy is to use their legal understanding to strengthen the confidence, 
legitimacy and assertiveness of the coastal peasants on their home ground. The 
understanding of BAL and rejection of UUK is integrated into and supports existing ideologies, 
legitimising PPLP’s ideological position and claims to own the land they are farming (see also 
Peluso, Afiff, and Rachman 2008 on the ideological importance of the BAL).  
The legal training that the paralegal team received helped the PPLP in other areas. Directly 
related to the land conflict, the paralegal team helps with legal defences when members are 
arrested and/or charged by police. This legal support gives members greater confidence to 
confront police and government. Secondly, not directly related to the struggle, the paralegal 
team has also assisted and advocated for members on issues ranging from domestic violence 
to obtaining driving licences. This helps strengthen the role of the PPLP in the community, 
especially during periods of relative quiet.  
From FKMA to an exceptional Yogyakarta 
The PPLP, together with two other location-based groups, formed the FKMA in 2010. One 
year later there were 15 member groups across Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi. Each of the 
member groups benefited from the swelling of numbers at their events (Widodo 2013, 77). 
However, FKMA had its own problems, as farmers from different groups felt different 
pressures, produced and traded within different political economic conditions and favoured 
different strategies. This led them to search for other allies, who were more directly involved 
in the struggle against feudal land systems in Yogyakarta.  
                                                     
42  Interviews with three members of PPLP’s legal working group, April 11, 2017; LBH Yogyakarta 
advocate, interview with the author, July 13, 2017. 
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The sand iron project was the first time that the land ownership provisions contained in the 
UUK were used as the legal basis of land grabbing in Yogyakarta. Since then it has also been 
used in Parangkusomo, Watukodok Beach, and Temon. While the PPLP was initially isolated 
as the only group to attack the legitimacy of Sultan Ground and Paku Alam Ground, other 
allies emerged as they faced their own land conflicts. The multiplication of land conflict in 
Yogyakarta led to activists, artists and academics in Yogyakarta city becoming more vocal 
about the Sultan and Pakualam’s abuses of privilege (Colbron 2016). PPLP organisers are now 
frequent guests at public events, discussions and seminars in Yogyakarta that seek to create 
a broader resistance to feudal land ownership in Yogyakarta.43 
Gendered division of labour and activism 
The gendered division of labour in farm and domestic work is reflected in community and 
activist organising.44 On the farm, women are responsible for planting and harvesting most 
crops, while men are responsible for the ‘heavier’ work of preparing the land, construction 
and applying pesticides. 45  In the household, women are responsible for most, if not all 
domestic labour, especially preparing food and looking after children. Likewise, at large 
organised demonstrations women most often play support roles, such as organising food and 
looking after children. The gendered division of labour and privileging of masculinity also 
means that men have a more flexible schedule and more available free time, and thus can 
participate more easily in activist groups and events. The lack of free time and flexibility 
available to women is a direct barrier to women’s participation in decision making and 
strategy formation.46 This is mitigated somewhat by the ideology of the PPLP, which respects 
the spontaneity of each member and each hamlet sub-group. There are important exceptions 
to this, with some women who can overcome barriers to participation. One PPLP organiser 
told me her participation is made possible through cooperative arrangements with her 
neighbours; they will look after her land or children while she is busy with PPLP activities and 
she does the same for them.  
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44 Talking about gender and the role of women specifically was the topic of interviews that generated 
the most divergent responses from participants, therefore these comments are generalisations. 
45 Farm labourer, interview with the author, April 15 2017. 





As mentioned above, anarchist allies brought feminist approaches to their organising. One 
anarcho-feminist activist remarked: 
Even though we have seen a lot of women in the villages that are so brave and smart and have 
all these great ideas and everything, but they have never been given more spaces to be, to have 
important roles in the movement … we haven't found out what is the best way how to break 
this, you know, traditional views and values about gender in this movement without being 
offensive.47 
Solidarity activists did not attempt to impose their feminist values on the PPLP, but 
consistently held respectful conversations about the gendered division of resistance, while 
identifying and supporting women organisers.  
The struggle itself has had some impact on gender relations amongst the peasants. Almost 
every interviewee said that at demonstrations, especially local spontaneous ones, women are 
often at the front and more militant than men. Demonstrations gave women a chance to 
prove their strength and bravery. In 2013, in the village of Bugel, one PPLP organiser and 
several other women formed the first women’s farming group (kelompok tani wanita) in 
coastal Kulon Progo. Their hope is this group will build the capacity of women and facilitate 
information sharing, to increase their ability to act independently and work land 
independently or more equally with their husbands.48  
Ideological engagements with anarchists, together with the demonstrations of bravery 
helped reshape gendered divisions of labour. This is further evidence of the dialectical 
relationship between social relations of production and activist organisational structure, 
tactics, ideology and alliances. Just as control of land, organisational history, alliances, and 
ideology shape the capacity and desire to resist, so too does resistance reshape those four 
factors.  
Karang Wuni  
The exception to the failure of participatory mechanisms to take hold is the village of Karang 
Wuni, one of the six villages within the mining area. In this village both negotiations to acquire 
land and korporasi were successful for JMI. There are several factors that explain this: the 
PPLP was always weaker there; the ‘betrayal’ of a PPLP organiser; the involvement of NGOs 
                                                     
47 Solidarity activist, Yogyakarta, interview with the author, September 8, 2016  
48 PPLP organiser, interview with the author, May 12, 2018. 
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that facilitated participation in corporate processes; the success of the village team; and a 
reduced ability to withstand intimidation. Initial successes in negotiations for land acquisition 
and with the korporasi supported each other. I will discuss these in sequence below. It is also 
interesting to note, that in this village, the same collective spirit that led the PPLP to reject 
mining with such militancy has led to a democratically structured and transparent korporasi.  
PPLP and Land Acquisition in Karang Wuni 
JMI conducted negotiations with peasants to acquire land between 2012 and 2013 and signed 
contracts with all but four families. The PPLP and opposition to the mine was weaker in Karang 
Wuni from the beginning. PPLP leaders told me that their biggest oversight was not building 
the organisation there to the level of the other villages. Only a few people from Karang Wuni 
would attend PPLP events and demonstrations while local branch meetings suffered from low 
attendance. On the other hand, a couple of NGOs gained influence and ‘deradicalised’ or 
‘tamed’ some of the peasants.49 
There were a couple of key figures who played leadership roles in the Karang Wuni village 
branch of the PPLP who, at some point, ‘changed sides’. These leaders engaged with JMI in 
negotiations and were involved with NGOs, which encouraged both negotiation with the 
mining company and land certification to secure farmer’s land rights within the complex 
national and provincial legal systems. Without as strong an organisational base, other PPLP 
members were less coordinated and militant in their rejection of mining and participation in 
corporate initiatives. The distinct perspective on NGOs, militancy and negotiation created a 
split between PPLP organisers in Karang Wuni with those in other villages. According to PPLP 
organisers, because the organisation was not as strong , people were more easily intimidated 
or tricked into relinquishing their land.50  
News of the (former) PPLP organiser selling his use rights to JMI shocked PPLP organisers in 
the other villages. Described as an influential figure, he became a middleman or broker, 
encouraging others to relinquish their land too. Before a response could be organised by the 
PPLP, other peasants followed suit. Amongst the first was one peasant who owned a larger 
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plot of land and a store. Through quirks of inheritance, he came to own about three times as 
much land as the average peasant on the coastal strip.51 His relationship to production and 
with other peasants changed accordingly as he rented out some land and employed people 
to work his land. 52  He had more to gain financially from selling land, certification and 
negotiation with the corporation. After the first wave to accept in early 2013, other peasants 
followed suit while others tried to hold out. In Karang Wuni, peasants who held out against 
the mining plans were marginalised within village life. Suliadi (2015, 88–89) quotes one 
resident stating that “those who don’t agree [with mining] are ostracised. I am not strong 
enough to face these social sanctions.” Those reluctant to agree felt like they had no other 
option.  
I interviewed one couple who said they were reluctant to relinquish their land even though 
they could not access it because the surrounding land and access roads were already 
controlled by JMI. They felt intimidated as excavators would cross into their land and lived in 
fear of being charged with trespass for walking to their own land. Eventually, they agreed to 
attend negotiations to see what the offer from JMI would be. They claim they were tricked 
into signing the agreement to relinquish their land use rights. They received a one-off 
payment of 75,000 rupiah per square meter for 904 square meters of land53 as well as the 
loan of an alternative allocation to farm until their original land is returned to them. JMI also 
has undertaken to return the land to them once mining activities are complete, however no 
maximum time is stipulated. At the time of writing, the mine is not operating yet they are not 
allowed to use their old land, so it just lies abandoned.54 Today there are only four families 
that have not consented to relinquish their land, however they remain in a stalemate, they 
cannot access their land because it is surrounded by land controlled by JMI yet have not 
received compensation either.  
Because the contracts with JMI were for the use rights (hak garap) (see above) and contained 
the admission that the Paku Alam royal family is the land owner (hak milik), the peasants who 
                                                     
51 The average land holding in Karang Wuni is approximately 0.18 ha with most peasant families 
owning between 0.08 and 0.26ha.   
52 PPLP organiser, interview with the author, April 19, 2017. 
53 The total of 67.8 million rupiah or approx. AU$6,738. 
54 Karang Wuni residents, interview with the author, April 25, 2017. 
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did sign contracts are left more vulnerable to further land grabbing. In the village immediately 
to the west of Karang Wuni, the New Yogyakarta International Airport is currently under 
construction. Karang Wuni residents worry that their land could be taken again by the 
Pakualaman for use as hotels, malls and other airport related infrastructure.55 Thus the sand 
iron mining project has triggered land conflicts that have the potential to escalate further 
beyond the current scope.  
The Karang Wuni Korporasi 
The Karang Wuni korporasi, formed in 2011, has around 300 members and is further divided 
into branches, one for each hamlet. Loans, repayments and fees are paid only at monthly 
meetings, which have representation from each of the hamlets (dukuh). The korporasi 
management board is directly elected by members once a year at their annual general 
meeting. New members pay a 100,000 rupiah (AU$9.89) joining fee and each member 
contributes 5,000 rupiah (AU$0.49) per month. Members in good standing can borrow up to 
one million rupiah (AU$98.88),56 to be paid back over ten months with one percent interest 
per annum. The maximum limit of the loan can be increased for members who have a good 
credit rating.57 
These conditions, especially the requirement that money is only exchanged at monthly 
meetings, is remarkable. It ensures that this korporasi functions transparently to all members. 
The two members I interviewed were both immensely proud that they had established a 
transparent and democratic microfinance institution and were continually searching for ways 
to continue to ensure their korporasi operates free of corruption. This, combined with the 
requirement to pay fees, ensures the active participation of members. These unique 
processes were designed by members themselves, JMI did not provide strict guidelines about 
how the korporasi should operate.58  
                                                     
55 PPLP organiser, Karang Wuni, interview with the author, May 8, 2018; Peasant and resident, Karang 
Wuni, interview with the author, May 12, 2018. 
56 At average 2013 exchange rates. 
57 Korporasi member, interview with the author, March 9, 2017; Karang Wuni Korporasi member, 
interview with the author, April 11, 2017. 
58 Korporasi member, interview with the author, March 9, 2017; Karang Wuni Korporasi member, 





Inevitably, from 2011, economic interests of Karang Wuni residents began to align with JMI’s, 
smoothing the way for land acquisition negotiations, which started in late 2012. The lack of 
organised rejection of participation in corporate processes means that there were more 
people willing to engage in both the korporasi and negotiations for land acquisition. The 
reverse is also true, having relinquished land, peasants needed to access capital to cultivate 
new land or fund alternative livelihoods, and the korporasi provided this opportunity. That is, 
it helped to smooth the changes in relations of production by funding the creation of 
alternative avenues for production and reproduction of livelihoods. These practices help 
make citizens less interested in militantly opposing mining and more likely to demand a fairer 
process. They institutionalise alternative means to demand accountability and secure 
resources while constraining the issues that are available for discussion.  
Peasants in Karang Wuni had established the same patterns of relations of production and 
reproduction as those in other villages. However, through some idiosyncratic circumstances, 
they were left more receptive to ideologies of corporate consultative ideologies of 
representation. This difference can be explained further if we return to the theoretical 
understanding of common-sense:  
an amalgam of historically effective ideologies, scientific doctrines and social mythologies … a 
syncretic historical residue, fragmentary, and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations and 
potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and political projects (2006, 93–
94). 
In all six villages, common sense understandings were based in histories of Javanese culture; 
left-nationalist understandings of land; and cooperative and autonomous management of 
land, production and reproduction. However, in Karang Wuni, the feudal elements of 
Javanese culture that stress deference to elders, upper classes and, above all, the Sultan, 
became dominant, under the influence of a few landowners who stood to benefit from the 
mine’s development. This fitted well with modern, individualistic and corporate ideologies of 
development and modernity. However, in the other five villages, deference to the Sultan was 
rejected in favour of traditional Javanese values of land and place and left-nationalist belief 
in the right of the people (rakyat) to self-determination. These elements were given 
additional legitimacy and material support by anarchist allies who helped expand the struggle 
to provincial and international scales. In the first village, peasants lost their land to the mining 
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company, with little compensation, while in the other five, peasants maintain control and 
continue to cultivate their land.  
Conclusion  
Resistance in coastal Kulon Progo shows how participatory mechanisms can fail to contain 
conflict resulting from primitive accumulation – despite a powerful elite alliance in support of 
mining. The mode of participation in this case also significantly differs from those in the other 
two cases. This is because of the mining company’s close relations with the Sultanate and 
Pakualaman. While still influenced by international governance standards, ideologies of 
representation here were more influenced by local feudalism. This feudalism treated 
peasants with arrogance, denying them rights to participate in decisions about mining. Once 
the mining company realised the mistake of this strategy after peasants began mobilising 
autonomously from the state and corporation, it was too late and the peasants too powerful.  
The basis of the PPLP’s power is their organisational capacity directly resulting from the social 
relationships of production and reproduction developed through collective agricultural 
experimentation. The capacity and desire of peasants to resist mining are directly related to 
their control of land, histories of organisation, ideological development and alliances. The 
independent organisation of the PPLP is rooted in histories of farmers’ organisation of finance, 
production and distribution. This has a strong ideological dimension which has legitimated 
militant tactics and unconventional alliances with little receptivity to corporate, feudal or 
consultative ideologies of representation. The PPLP had both the organisational capacity and 
the belief that they could and should reject any participation in corporate processes. They 
had the power and alliances to successfully undermine participatory mechanisms and hold 
the attempted land grab off until the project was suspended.  
Even though the mining company’s land-grab was unsuccessful, it has still disrupted local and 
even provincial social, economic and political relations. The proposal to mine has triggered 
latent conflicts over land ownership that until then had no visible expression. With the defeat 
of the proposal to mine, the main conflict is now about the legitimacy of Sultan 
Ground/Pakualaman Ground versus peasant rights and the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960. This 





Indonesia and Southeast Asia. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis and will be 
explored elsewhere.  
This case demands an emphasis on the importance of the social relations of production and 
reproduction as factors that create possibilities for action. Rather than a simple source of 
resources, the relationships that people engage in to make their land productive deeply affect 
the organisational form of resistance, their ideological development and alliance preferences. 
Yet the analysis of resistance has also eschewed any deterministic relationship between 
historical social relations and resistance. Indeed, the examples of LBH’s legal training leading 
to social empowerment and women’s participation in resistance leading to changes in 
gendered divisions of labour show that resistance work also influences the continued 
evolution of social relations of production and reproduction.  
The case of Karang Wuni shows how syncretic common-sense understandings of the world 
can be developed in very different ideological directions. Minor changes in the distribution of 
land, of leadership quality and ideology can reverse outcomes. In Karang Wuni corporate 
participatory mechanisms – the korporasi and the village team – has been able to shape how 
conflict is expressed. Interests between the farmers and the mining company are brought 
closer together through the loans and work contracts from the korporasi. However, it was 
through negotiations for land acquisition that the company representatives were able to 
separate out the interests of a couple of influential figures from those who opposed the mine. 
While this leads some participants to conclude that the conflict has been overcome, it remains 
latent, the bitterness of the dispossessed may find a new expression in the future. 
Nevertheless, through participation, the company has negated the risk that conflict poses to 
its operations in one out of six affected villages. It is also significant that even in the location 
where resistance is weakest, peasants still have a strong collective, horizontal and 
independent korporasi which they have been able to recreate within corporate participatory 
mechanisms to smooth disruptions to their social, economic and political conditions. Their 
independence and organisational experience manifested within rather than in opposition to 




Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
This thesis has presented two main and interrelated arguments. First that mining corporations 
develop participatory mechanisms to manage risky manifestations of conflict and these, 
through multi-scalar contestations and crises, have been institutionalised as modes of 
participation at global scales. Second people affected by mining are able to gain the most 
from participation or resistance based on their control of land, forms of organisation, 
ideologies and alliance structures. The strategies of mining corporations enacting 
participatory mechanisms and people affected by mining are structured by acts of primitive 
accumulation and the disruption that associated land grabbing causes to local economic, 
social and political relations. Therefore, to understand the diversity of participatory 
mechanisms, people’s reactions to them and their outcomes, the analysis starts from 
historically produced social relations of production and reproduction and the strategies that 
various actors employ to adapt, resist or facilitate political, economic and social change. 
Ongoing contestation and participation over land, livelihoods, ideology and profitability do 
not remain confined to local scales but have ongoing influence on the evolution of regulation 
at national and international scales, including the global governance standards that constitute 
modes of participation in the mining sector.  
The theoretical approach developed here, based in social conflict theory, social reproduction 
theory and the Gramscian concept of common-sense was chosen and developed to explain 
the complexity and diversity in conflict and participation over the social dimensions of mining. 
Other major approaches in the literature – institutionalism and business studies – are unable 
to capture this complexity (see Chapter Two). Both these approaches assume development is 
a ‘good’, and that ‘win-win solutions’ can be found through reform to business practices or 
institutional intervention. While the quest for win-win solutions is a noble endeavour and may 
be possible in some cases, it cannot be assumed. Furthermore, both institutionalism and 
business studies are limited by their epistemological and ontological assumptions. For 
institutionalists, conflict is produced by vested interests and rent-seekers who corrupt 
development processes which can be overcome through good institutional design. This 
overlooks the ways that institutions themselves are products of ongoing contestations over 
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competing versions of development (Hameiri and Jones 2020). Meanwhile, business studies 
is limited in its study of conflict to manifestations that threaten corporate profitability. 
The modes of participation framework, concerned with the “institutional structures and 
ideologies that shape the inclusion and exclusion of individuals and groups in the political 
process” (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007a, 774), places the study of political institutions and 
conflict within broader contestations resulting from capitalist development. In this analysis, 
institutions, including participatory mechanisms, are not elevated above society but always 
remain embedded in and criss-crossed by conflict occurring within and outside corporate and 
state sites of participation and across multiple political scales.  
The application of the modes of participation framework to the study of multinational mining 
corporations yields an analysis of their scalar strategies. First is the institutionalisation of 
modes of participation through standards and mechanisms of corporate self-governance at 
the global scale (Chapter Four). Second are the specific participatory mechanisms that are 
implemented at local scales. These are based in globalised modes of participation, influenced 
by national regulatory regimes and ideologies, but designed in response to local 
manifestation of conflicts (Chapters Five, Six & Seven). Together, modes of participation and 
participatory mechanisms attempt to restore or maintain the legitimacy of large-scale 
corporate mining, contain risky manifestations of conflict and facilitate changes to political, 
economic and social relations supportive of extractive capitalism. Participatory mechanisms 
attempt to change local power relations within affected communities, but they also create 
new subjectivities, new ideologies and forms of knowledge.  
Primitive accumulation, conflict and scale 
In this approach, conflict is understood to originate in acts of primitive accumulation or land-
grabbing. Yet acts of primitive accumulation have different effects depending on the previous 
land use of a mining area, the forms of organisation of people affected by mining, and how 
they relate to pre-existing or latent conflicts (Chapter Three). The establishment of the Kelian 
mine (Chapter Five) is the most straight forward example of a land-grab by a multinational 
miner entirely disrupting the land, productive, reproductive and subsistence activities of a 
community. The violent displacement of 4,000 small-scale miners from their land led to them 




making demands of Rio Tinto. The confrontation found multiple expressions as political 
circumstances, alliances, and corporate ideologies shifted.  
In Kulon Progo (Chapter Seven), the act of primitive accumulation also directly pitted the 
corporation against peasants within the proposed mining area, yet was not successful in five 
out of six affected villages. While peasants militantly rejected the attempted land-grab, the 
proposal triggered latent land conflict between the royal families of Yogyakarta and peasants 
that then expanded across the province. In Gosowong (Chapter Six), the mining area was 
forest and there was not a substantial direct threat to the residence or livelihoods of local 
people. Therefore, the ensuing conflict was concerned with environmental pollution, respect 
for traditional cultures and appropriate benefit sharing, and there was less disruption to 
political, social and economic relations. In each, the original act of primitive accumulation 
structured the contours of conflict. 
In all cases, conflict did not remain confined to local scales, but through alliances with other 
actors jumped to provincial, national or international scales. In Gosowong (Chapter Six) 
people affected by mining made a series of shifting alliances with regency politicians and the 
national NGOs, WALHI and AMAN, in order to extract more benefits from the mine. In Kulon 
Progo, provincial, national and international alliances played a defensive role by making it 
harder for the corporation and state actors to use excessive violence during confrontations. 
However, it is the in Kelian (Chapter Five) where the politics of scale are most significant. 
Alliances were instrumental in bringing the issue to international audiences and forcing KEM 
to negotiate with people affected by mining. Temporary alliances combined with concurrent 
challenges from other organisations to Rio Tinto’s legitimacy as a responsible corporation and 
helped prompt the development of a global response to crises. This case was instrumental in 
the internationalisation of mining activism which drove the reactionary, consultative, 
participatory agenda of Rio Tinto and coalitions of multinational miners (Chapter Four).  
The CSR techniques developed by Rio Tinto at Kelian with the assistance of the World Bank 
have since been adopted as global standards, which in turn inform how other mining 
corporations engage with people in other locations, legitimised through consultative 
ideologies of representation. Although the primary driver of Newcrest’s Community 
Development and Empowerment program at Gosowong was conflict with local communities, 
the design of the program was informed by company policy and global standards. The 
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collectively established mode of participation at the global scale thus provides a blueprint for 
how mining corporations can reconstitute their power in relation to local communities and 
domestic states. However, rather than being elevated above ‘politics’, the Gosowong case 
demonstrates how CSR programs remain susceptible and evolve in reaction to ongoing and 
new patterns of conflict.  
Participatory Strategies 
The key strategy of each corporation in response to threatening multi-scalar conflicts was to 
implement participatory mechanisms. Of course, each case also featured violent repression 
of opposition, yet even in the case of Kelian where violence was the most severe, participation 
proved to be a more effective response. A variety of different participatory mechanisms were 
used: consultation, negotiations for compensation, local employment and procurement 
agreements, support for adat, and education. Conspicuous in its absence from these three 
cases is any kind of participatory environmental monitoring. Significantly, each corporation 
implemented participatory community development programs: JMI with micro-finance, NHM 
with its 1% village fund and KEM with village grants. Although each were structured 
differently, they all had the effect of generating support and legitimacy for the corporation. 
They were most effective in gaining legitimacy from people affected by mining where people 
were already sympathetic or less directly affected – in 27 villages around the Kelian mine, five 
sub-districts around Gosowong and Karung Wuni, Kulon Progo – yet had little affect where 
opposition to the mine was already consolidated.  
The common feature of these participatory mechanisms is their base in global governance 
standards that provide the institutional guidelines and ideological legitimacy for consultative, 
non-democratic forms of participation at localised corporate sites of participation. 
Consultative ideologies of representation, and particularistic ideologies where adat is 
concerned, seek the advice of participants or representatives about how to best manage the 
impacts and opportunities of mining. Corporate consultative ideologies of representation 
were most successful where they fit with pre-existing participatory institutions – such as 
village governance in North Halmahera (Chapter Six). Of course, consultative representation 




questions that threaten the continued operation of mining. They operate to smooth conflict 
and limit what issues are open for discussion and who can discuss them.  
Yet, as emphasised in Chapter Three, corporate sponsored sites of participation are 
constructed in the shadow of existing and emerging state and autonomous sites of 
participation. People affected by mining and NGOs strategically choose to either participate 
in corporate, state or autonomous sites of participation depending on calculated benefits and 
their capacity. This shifting between corporate negotiations and legal remedies is a feature of 
Kelian and Gosowong cases, while in Kulon Progo peasants opted for purely autonomous 
participation. Therefore, corporate participatory mechanisms should be designed to offer 
more benefits, or be easier to access than available alternatives.  
Land, Organisation, Alliances & Ideology 
Participatory mechanisms found varying levels of success in managing conflicts. Here, the 
reactions of people affected by mining to attempts to elicit their participation are critical. 
Although there is growing literature detailing what the responses of people affected by 
mining are to participatory mechanisms, the question of why, how and when groups decide 
to participate or not, and on what terms, is under examined (Chapter Four; cf Conde and Le 
Billon 2017). This section expands on the four factors that I found determine the capacity and 
desire of people affected by mining to participate or not in corporate processes – all 
structured by social relations of production. Table 5 summarises these findings. 
Table 6 - Comparison of Four Factors 














































































































Control of land is the most critical factor in determining the capacity of people affected by 
mining to resist. Control of land is practical and can be divided into physical control or the 
ability of groups to exclude other actors; claims which may be based in agrarian law or 
tradition (adat); and legal title or certification. In Kelian, where people affected by mining 
stood no chance of resisting violent eviction by a combination of military, police and 
corporate security, it took decades for groups to find alternative sources of power to 
challenge KEM and demand compensation. In Kulon Progo, peasants’ control of their land was 
not legally recognised – they held no land certificates – however, the density of farming plots 
together with their physical presence on the land provided them with the capacity to resist 
not only participation but also the mine’s development. In Gosowong, where the mine site 
was excised from protected forest, people affected by land had neither formal title nor 
physical control yet were able to establish claims based on traditional ownership as a basis 
for negotiating compensation. 
Following control of land, forms and histories of organisation are the next most crucial factor 
in the ability of groups of people affected by mining to participate or resist. In Kulon Progo 
and Kelian, people affected by mining had strong histories of cooperative production, 
solidarity in social reproduction, and distribution of produce. Their social relations of 
production, reproduction and subsistence operated independently of state institutions and 
large capital. These more communal and independent organisational forms transitioned well 
into organisations of resistance. In the case of Kulon Progo (Chapter Seven), peasant groups 
(kelompok tani) which organise production at village and hamlet levels, quickly morphed into 
an effective resistance organisation. In Gosowong, where histories of production and 




capital, organisations were slower to develop and their ability to organise outside corporate 
and state influence or supervision was curtailed.  
Alliances are a further factor in how effectively people affected by mining can campaign if 
they decide to reject participation – or how much knowledge and support they receive to 
participate. As mentioned above, national and international allies help conflicts to ‘jump-
scales’ where more resources and a wider audience is available. This is especially critical 
where the opportunities and local sources of power are limited. This is most clear in the Kelian 
case, because people affected by mining lost their land and livelihoods, and because KEM 
ensured the support of other villages in West Kutai through community development 
programs, LKMTL did not have access to resources except the support given by national and 
international NGOs. The national WALHI alliance including Gosowong, by linking together 
groups in 13 locations, made it possible to mount a constitutional court challenge to mining 
in protected forests. Aside from jumping scales, allies also provide material support and 
knowledge to improve the power of groups within or in opposition to participation. A final 
important role of alliances is in ideological development. This is most evident in Gosowong 
where alliances with both Regency politicians and AMAN were based in ideas of defending 
and promoting adat as indigenous rights. Yet as these alliances proved effective, it also both 
strengthened adat as an organising ideology and facilitated changes in how gender is 
organised within Pagu culture.  
Ideology is the most difficult of the four factors to assess. The ideologies of people affected 
by mining are both influenced by and influence the three other factors. It is through ideologies, 
or common-sense understandings of the world, that people affected by mining understand 
their tactics and agency, relationships to land, how they construct organisations, and select 
allies. In Kelian, local organisers looked to redress past grievances and demanded 
compensation from Rio Tinto. The left-nationalist and even socialist beliefs of LKMTL 
leadership fit well with the liberal human-rights approach of national and international NGOs, 
providing common ground to publicise tragedy and claim compensation. Ideologically, both 
LKMTL and their allies would have preferred a process of justice and accountability, however 
the negotiated compensation package was a compromise they had to accept. 
Of course, how compatible the common-sense understandings of people affected by mining 
are with consultative ideologies of representation – their ideological receptivity – determines 
Chapter 8  
198 
 
the desire of people affected by mining to participate in corporate processes. In five villages 
of the Kulon Progo case, the concept of land as a social relation was so central to their 
understanding of the world (and their livelihoods) that any compromise on this was 
impossible and they therefore rejected participation.  
Ideological development, supported by different alliances, stands out as the key factor 
separating the outcomes in the first five villages from Karang Wuni. In Chapter Seven, I 
explained how common-sense understandings of the world are not deterministic as 
ideological development can take opposite directions. This depended on how experiences, 
leadership and outside groups influenced their ideological development, leading one village 
to accept feudal elements of Javanese culture that stressed deference to the Sultan. This 
fitted well with corporate ideologies of development and modernity. While in the other five 
villages, deference to the Sultan was rejected in favour of the PPLP’s Javanese ‘filosofi tanah’ 
and left-nationalist beliefs in self-determination. In the first village, peasants lost their land to 
the mining company, with little compensation, while in the other five, peasants maintain 
control and continue to cultivate their land. Ideological contestation in the field of common 
sense is tangled with material interests, influencing but not determining decisions and 
practices of people affected by mining.  
The diversity of outcomes 
Although each of the cases examined in this thesis have many similarities, each produced 
wildly divergent outcomes. These are explained by the way that acts of primitive 
accumulation are refracted through evolving contestations over relations of production and 
social reproduction that spill across multiple political scales. Hence, in coastal Kulon Progo 
conflict occurred over competing purposes of productive land, it could either be farmed, or 
mined. Peasants believed they were fighting for their lives, hence their slogan ‘bertani atau 
mati’ (farm or die)! Their capacity and desire based in the four factors discussed above were 
sufficient to block the mine’s development. In Gosowong, conflict and participation are over 
the distribution of revenues from mining, the land occupied by Newcrest is forest land and 
the impacts on farming and other productive activities have been either insignificant or 




access to their land and have adopted more autonomous and representative strategies, 
respectively. In North Halmahera, this led to obtaining a greater share of benefits of mining.  
In Kelian, the small-scale miners and Dayak people were dispossessed of their resources 
under the New Order dictatorship and they had no power to oppose the military and police 
violence used to secure the area for Rio Tinto. After reformasi, conflict took the form of a 
campaign to redress previous human rights violations, which entailed participation and 
mediation. It was the coincidence of international pressure, local mobilisations, the 
independent investigation and a change in the national regime that opened the political space 
for LKMTL to act and forced KEM to negotiate compensation. This shows also the importance 
of political context. Under the New Order Regime, Rio Tinto could more easily get away with 
eschewing participation, however, with the emergence of new state-sponsored sites of 
participation, KEM opened negotiations to avoid the risk of legal action, including potential 
criminal action against individual managers. For LKMTL and allies, participatory mechanisms 
were a practical compromise. The justice that they sought was not realistically available. 
Therefore, when their campaigning led to the offer to participate in negotiations with KEM, 
they took this opportunity to secure what they could.  
The ability of people affected by mining to extract benefits from participation or resistance 
was the outcome of their ability to exercise power based in their relations of production and 
social reproduction and how this was amplified or supplemented by alliances. Ideology is the 
lynchpin here, as it determines the receptivity of groups towards participatory mechanisms, 
their desire to participate, resist, or not. But receptivity and desire needs require the capacity 
to act, found very practically in control of land and the ability to organise autonomously from 
state and capital. Alliance then play the special role of boosting the capacity for action beyond 
the local scale – a decisive element in resisting or securing more benefits from a mining 
corporation.  
Gendered impacts of mining, participation and resistance 
The impacts of conflict, participation and resistance on gendered relations within each 
affected group was the most varied and unpredictable outcome across the three cases. In 
Kelian, despite previously enjoying relative equality with male small-scale miners, women 
were subjected to additional forms of violence and discrimination both during evictions and 
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the mine’s operation. Shifts away from communal relations of production, subsistence and 
reproduction towards corporate and state mediated development disproportionately 
disadvantaged women. Unlike in the other two cases, these patterns of disadvantage were 
not overcome through resistance or participation as there was no social basis for equality.  
In Gosowong, NHM’s 1% fund reinforced existing social hierarchies, including the dominance 
of men in village politics. However, the remarkable story of Ibu Afrida shows how the 
opportunity to participate in the benefits of mining, despite the negative impacts on 
traditional culture, can produce lasting changes in gendered social and political relations. This 
also demonstrates how adat is not a static traditional construction but may change towards 
increasing equality, especially when supported by allies. In Kulon Progo, because of the 
historical gendered division of labour, women were the ones tending the fields and formed 
the front lines of defence against incursions by the mining corporation. This, combined with 
long-term engagement with anarcho-feminist allies, led to humble but lasting changes in the 
gendered division of labour and social reproduction along the five coastal villages. Despite 
ongoing inequalities, women have now established kelompok tani wanita (women’s farming 
groups) and enjoy higher social status compared to before the resistance movement.  
While there is much particularity and variance between and amongst these cases, a closer 
analysis of gendered impacts of mining, participation and resistance has strengthened and 
contributed to the theoretical explanation developed in this thesis. The differentiated power 
of women and men to participate or resist mining is found in the gendered social relations of 
production and how these are disrupted by primitive accumulation. However, the gendered 
division of participation and resistance can also produce changes in social, political and 
economic relations. Similar conclusions might be drawn about other social divisions, such as 
age, ethnicity, religion and sexuality and the intersections of these.  
For the literature on gendered impacts of mining (Jenkins 2014), these implications follow the 
call to move past the view of ‘women as victims’ (Lahiri-Dutt 2011). To move ‘beyond 
victimisation’, analysis of gendered legacies of mining must include the effects of participation 
and resistance that may provide sources of agency (Sinclair Forthcoming). The implication for 
organisations, regulators and corporations is that gender equality requires deeper changes in 




impacts of mining. Any interventions must be based in awareness of evolving productive and 
reproductive social relations.  
Understanding participation and conflict in mining 
The theoretical explanation and empirical data in this thesis has immediate implications for 
the study of community-company mining conflicts, but also for the study of corporate power, 
global governance and political participation more broadly. The most obvious implication of 
the data and analysis for the study of company-community mining conflicts is that 
understanding the ways that governance standards, corporate policy innovations and 
participatory mechanisms play out requires actor-oriented methodologies. Institutional 
interventions, including reform to corporate practices do not always operate as intended. 
Participatory mechanisms, including community development programs are shaped, not only 
by corporate and institutional forces, but the power, decisions and strategies of people 
affected by mining. In this sense, this thesis confirms the value of ethnographic work that 
takes the agency, ideologies and strategies of people affected by mining seriously, including 
research by Welker (2014), Li (2015), and Liefsan et. al. (2017). 
The major original contribution is in moving past describing the various reactions and 
strategies that groups of people affected by mining adopt towards participation to explain 
why, how and when they have the capacity and desire to participate or not. Understanding 
the diverse outcomes of participation requires an appreciation that the capacity, desires and 
strategies of people affected by mining matter. This demands an analytical refocusing onto 
fundamental power asymmetries between actors. Theoretically, the capacity and desire of 
people affected by mining to participate or not depends on their historically produced social 
relations of production and reproduction. Empirically, in this study this translated to control 
of land, forms of organisation, alliance structures and ideological development.  
Mining affected communities can expect better outcomes when they build independent 
power, either instead of or simultaneous to participating in corporate controlled mechanisms. 
There are copious examples of people affected by mining building independent power 
through grassroots organisations, protest and direct action, alliance building, and political 
campaigning. Maintaining sources of power that are not sanctioned by the state or corporate 
actors gives mining affected communities more power to challenge the terms of participation 
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or to demand participation on issues otherwise deemed out of bounds. This is not to suggest 
that institutional and corporate reform do not matter at all. Rather, the implication is that 
improvements in regulation, legislation or corporate policy must be matched by supporting 
and broadening the base of power of people affected by mining.   
To demonstrate these implications, consider Free Prior Informed Consent – the most 
prominent aspirational reform that environmental groups and indigenous rights campaigners 
advocate for. FPIC would guarantee people affected by mining the right to consent or reject 
natural resource projects on their land. If implemented in good faith, FPIC has the potential 
to upset dynamics between affected communities and multinational corporations by granting 
de facto veto rights to communities. This is why the World Bank and multinational mining 
corporations have deceptively endorsed the right to Free Prior Informed Consultation 
(Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor 2016).  
Prima facie, FPIC might appear to balance corporate power, state sovereignty, and 
community rights. Aside from documented difficulties with implimentation (MacKay 2004; 
Phillips 2012), we should not expect even radical reforms to transcend the power relations 
already embedded within contestations over the social dimensions of mining. Where FPIC is 
granted by a state or international organisation, it is an assertion of power by that institution, 
ostensibly made in the name of and legitimated by human-rights discourse. On the other 
hand, if communities affected by mining projects mobilise, obtain and assert the power to 
ensure their consent is respected, they can do this regardless of any institutionalised right to 
FPIC. 
Understanding institutions as the outcome of social conflict, we cannot expect FPIC to be 
institutionalised until there is a shift in the balance of power between affected communities 
and mining corporations. Increasing risks to extractive developments that violate the consent 
of affected people, either on a project level or as a generalised crisis of legitimacy drive further 
reform. The point is, groups critical of or opposed to extractive industries will do better to 
build resilience and alliances to increase their power vis-à-vis mining capital regardless of the 




Social movements and contentious politics 
This thesis shares a focus on the strategies, motivations and capacities of people affected by 
mining, local organisations and alliances with social movement literature. Social movement 
theory approaches to extractive conflicts are valuable for placing these within broader cycles 
of contentious politics – referred to as ‘political opportunity structures’, ‘resource 
mobilisation theory’ and ‘message framing’ (eg Arce 2014, xvi). This includes the ways that 
social movements create autonomous sites of participation to build legitimacy and contest 
the impacts of mining (Dietz 2019). Social movements can then elevate greviances to 
international scales and create institutional change (Ş. Özen and Özen 2009; Byambajav 
2015). 
Despite much to agree on, the implications of this thesis are that social movement theory 
suffers from two blind spots. First, that people affected by mining may resist or participate in 
ways that are not easily recognisable as ‘contentious politics’ and may be overlooked by those 
whose study begins from an analysis of protest movements. This aligns with the political 
economy literature on ‘everyday forms of resistance’ and ‘everyday political economy’ (Scott 
1985; J. Nem Singh and Camba 2016). Second, and most important, social movement scholars 
are rightly concerned with the capacities of movement organisations, leaders, political 
opportunities and the processes of resistance (H. Özen and Özen 2011; Deonandan 2015). 
This however, overlooks the roots of the capacity and desires of people affected by mining in 
their social relations of production and reproduction, including historically produced 
ideologies.  
Corporate power and global governance 
Much literature on the power of multinational corporations in International Political Economy 
and International Relations frame corporate power as either a zero-sum, in the case of 
hyperglobalists and sceptics, or positive-sum game, as in state transformationalist 
approaches. 1  However, the approach and empirical results here suggest an analysis of 
corporate power must go beyond analyses of globalisation and national scale conflicts 
between states and corporations. Like Welker (2014) and Macdonald (2017b), this thesis 
                                                     
1 See Mikler (2018, 28–33) for a detailed summary of these debates.  
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emphasises the ways that corporate power is produced through conflicts with both local and 
transnational non-state actors. This understanding is built on the analysis of corporations as 
political, social and governance actors with economic interests (Wilks 2013).  
The way that corporations manage their relations with people affected by their operations 
and their critics and the way these techniques are enshrined in global standards is the 
outcome of ongoing and historical conflicts which traverse multiple political scales. As a 
collective, multinational mining corporations created governance mechanisms that 
reconstruct the legitimacy of the industry as a whole, not merely of individual corporations. 
The collective exercise of corporate power is important to confront threats of more stringent 
regulation by state institutions. Yet this is less about the power of corporations versus the 
power of states and more about the competing interests and powers of corporations versus 
their critics making opposing demands of state actors. By epistemologically and 
methodologically centring conflicts between multinational mining corporations, people 
affected by mining and transnational NGOs, global governance is understood as an expansion 
of corporate power in response to contestation and crises (Sinclair, forthcoming).  
Although profitability is the primary purpose of corporations, and although controlling the 
risks of conflict is undeniably important for profitablility, corporate interests and strategies 
are not entirely reducible to measurable or predictable effects on profitability. As mining 
corporations take on more ‘responsibility’, their interests expand to include community 
development and environmental management. This affects an exchange of interest between 
mining corporations and people affected by mining. As this cycle continues, MNCs are 
mutually constituted with the societies they interact with as they are crisscrossed by diverse 
interests and demands (Welker 2014). Participatory mechanisms provide corporations with 
the opportunity to enlist community representatives in the service of corporate interests. 
However, they also provide opportunities for those community representatives to pursue 
their own interests, sometimes with other community groups and sometimes against the 
interests of others.  
Political participation 
The results of this thesis confirm the explanatory power of the modes of participation 




how modes of participation operate across political scales. This demonstrates that there is 
fertile ground for applying the framework beyond its proven analysis of political participation 
as an alternative to democracy in Southeast Asia (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007a; Nguyen 2014; 
Bal 2015b; Rodan 2018). 
Yet, this study also continues to problematise sharp distinctions between ‘the state’, ‘society’ 
and ‘corporations’. This emphasises the analytical power of Jessop’s (2007, 123) state theory 
where states are a “strategic field formed through intersecting power networks.” Indeed, 
such intersecting power networks also constitute social relations and corporations. For 
example, in Kulon Progo, the Sultan, also the governor of Yogyakarta, owned a significant 
amount of stock in JMI. In all three cases, boundaries between the state and mining 
corporations blurred when police and military where paid by the corporations for security 
services. Even when murders, wrongful arrests and so forth have been proven to have 
occurred, responsibility is deflected from one party to the other. Therefore, even while 
demonstrating the utility of corporate sites of participation as an analytical category within 
the modes of participation framework, these should not be understood as wholly constituted 
separate sites. Corporate sites of participation blur into state-sponsored sites and 
autonomous sites and are constituted in relation to the political opportunities available 
through alternative sites and modes of participation.  
Limitations 
The participatory mechanisms, modes of participation and conflicts analysed in this thesis are 
immediately relevant to the governance and management of the social dimensions of mining. 
While multinational corporations in any industry can and do create similar modes of 
participation, the precise form that these take will depend on the historical development and 
political conflicts surrounding each industry. The degree of success will depend on the 
dynamic multi-scalar contestations surrounding specific issues or industries. 
The historic development of global governance in response to crises (described in Chapter 
Four), that led to the institutionalisation of modes of participation, is particular to a subset of 
powerful multinational corporations. These are the members of the ICMM and signatories to 
other major international standards and are headquartered in North America, South America, 
Europe, South Africa, Australia and Japan. Smaller and domestically owned corporations are 
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still influenced by the same global modes of participation, yet are also more imbedded within 
national and provincial ideologies of representation – as was the case in Kulon Progo. Most 
importantly, it is yet to be seen how multinational corporations from China, India, and Russia 
will implement CSR in their overseas operations, if they will join existing international 
associations or if they will create rival standards for participation. The continued growth and 
influence of China may also “disturb the international and domestic power relations” (Hatcher 
2020, 334) that constitute governance regimes in the extractive industries .2 
All three cases considered in this thesis are located in Indonesia. I have argued that national 
legislation and regulation in Indonesia has had little impact on the outcomes of conflict and 
participation. That is, except in the case of Kelian, where reformasi and democratisation were 
key events in opening opportunities for resistance. This geographic limitation is also mitigated 
by selecting cases from across Indonesia – one in Kalimantan, one in Java and one in Maluku. 
Each area has very different cultures, economic and political histories control for bias. For 
example, if all had been located in Java, it would be almost impossible to separate the effects 
of corporate participatory mechanisms from the politics of Javanese peasant movements.  Yet, 
while I have argued that we could expect to find similar patterns of conflict in many other 
countries, the ways that global and regional patterns manifest in different domestic and local 
contexts remains a matter for empirical investigation. 
The point to make about the empirical limitations of this study is that the specific patterns of 
conflict and participation identified between multinational corporations and people affected 
by mining in Indonesia should not be extrapolated beyond their limits. However, the 
framework developed here can continue to be tested and provide explanations for conflict 
and participation elsewhere and provide theoretical replication given the intrinsically 
conflictual nature of capitalist development regardless of specific manifestations of conflict.  
Future directions 
Given the implications and limitations outlined above, there are several directions where 
future research would prove fruitful. The most immediately obvious avenue is to apply this 
framework to Chinese owned multinational mining corporations. As Chinese capital is rapidly 
                                                     




expanding internationally, it is critical to understand how different their drivers and 
mechanisms of participation will be. Especially for state owned Chinese corporations, will they 
face a similar crisis of legitimacy to established multinational corporations, or will they 
produce alternative and competing global standards to manage the environmental and social 
dimensions of mining? Especially where Chinese corporations are state owned, what forces 
will drive integration into or the creation of rival modes of participation at global scales? Early 
evidence shows that while Chinese mining corporations are not joining international 
associations or signing up to standards, they are largely conforming to market and social 
norms of host countries (Gonzalez-Vicente 2012; Carmody 2017). However, if local 
participatory mechanisms are based in modes of participation institutionalised at the global 
level, the long-terms effects of Chinese refusal to engage global governance associations 
remains to be seen.  
Comparative work across different regime types could also uncover further dynamics of 
conflict and participation. Is land, organisation, ideology and alliances as important for people 
affected by mining in authoritarian or developed countries? Do they find different sources of 
power? Uncommon comparisons across regions or across the developed/developing divide 
could also uncover unexpected similarities and differences between the ways that mining 
corporations implement participatory mechanisms.  
Likewise, global governance regimes in other industries, such as forestry, textiles or palm oil, 
or specific mineral supply chains, such as lithium and batteries, will provide useful 
comparisons of empirical results and theoretical explanations. The modes of participation 
framework should prove fruitful for examining conflict and participation in any industry in any 
location. The power of this approach is to examine the contestations that shape and 
determine corporate strategies, regardless of institutional context. The way that corporations 
decide to manage relations with people affected by their operations and the way these 
techniques are enshrined in global standards is the outcome of ongoing historical conflicts 




Appendix: Methods, Ethics & 
Positionality 
The section on Methodology and Methods in Chapter One provides an outline and 
justification of the epistemology, methodology, methods and case studies employed during 
this research. This appendix provides further details on the methods, process, ethics and 
positionality that affected primary data collection. All fieldwork data were collected over the 
course of several fieldtrips between 2016 and 2018. The fieldwork procedures described here 
were fully approved by Murdoch University’s Human Research Ethics Committee permit 
number 2015/215 and Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology Foreign Research 
Permit Number 25/EXT/SIP/FRP/E5/Dit.KI/VI/2017. 
Two fieldtrips in 2016 constituted preliminary research where I assessed the scope and 
feasibility of each case study, met key informants and established networks. This time 
involved consulting with NGO workers and activists, academics in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and 
Samarinda. During this time, I also established working relationships with two research 
assistants/interpreters who assisted me on field trips, with translations and reflective practice. 
I made several trips to coastal Kulon Progo and one to Samarinda, the capital of East 
Kalimantan to meet key informants. Their input at this stage gave my research design a 
participatory dimension, making sure that I focused on questions that are of relevance to 
participants as well as ensuring that I was not too limited by my own preconceived notions of 
extractive conflicts. For example, consultations with NGO workers in Jakarta and then key 
informants in Samarinda convinced me to drop an initial planned case study and focus on the 
historical Kelian case by revealing that there were still significant untold stories about that 
mine, whereas my initial proposed case study was never developed as a mine. Exploratory 
interviews and observations allowed themes and connections to emerge that I would not 
have been able to predict and proved quite useful for clarifying the central factors of the study 
and developing preliminary hypotheses (Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte 1999, 149–50). 





For most of 2017, supported by an Endeavour Postgraduate Scholarship for Long-term 
Fieldwork I was based south of the city of Yogyakarta and conducted multiple trips to each 
research location, Jakarta and relevant provincial and district capitals. It was during this time 
that the bulk of formal interviews were conducted and the answers to my research questions 
took shape. Representative sampling was used to ensure that participants included each of 
my defined target groups: Mining corporation employees, especially from community 
relations departments; national and international NGOs; local organisers; public servents and 
politicians; and community members.  
In each village, we (an interpreter and myself) initially approached the Village Head or Village 
Secretary (Kepala Desa or Sekritaris Desa) as required by my Indonesian Foreign Researcher 
Permit. Meeting village officials was an efficient way to explain the objectives of my research, 
gain permission to move about the village and, more often than not, the village official would 
want to participate in an interview and introduce us to other villagers, who might introduce 
us to yet more contacts, creating a snowball sample. Snowball sampling also began from NGO 
networks as activists would want to introduce us to their local contacts. Activists would 
usually, but not always, recommend people opposed to mining while village officials would 
usually, but not always, recommend people supportive of mining. Snowball sampling 
continued until we reached data saturation amongst each group, paying attention to the 
representation of people of different ages, genders and ehtnicities (Schensul, Schensul, and 
LeCompte 1999, 262–64). Most participants were people affected by mining, with a range of 
pro, contra or neutral voices included from each area. I also conducted targed sampling for 
prominent figures, such as district and provincial politicians, public servents and employees 
of mining corporations.  
Semi-structured interviews followed a procedure. We gave participants an information letter, 
in Indonesian, outlining who I am, the objectives of the study and that their participation is 
voluntary. My interpreter or myself answered any questions and read out the consent script 
as approved by Murdoch University’s Human Research Ethics Committee, explaining their 
rights to privacy, anonymity and to withdraw at any time. Participants gave explicit verbal 
consent, which was recorded at the beginning of interviews. Only once was consent 




Many interviews involved discussing sensitive content. Participants often discussed events 
that involved illegal or otherwise compromising activities involving themselves or others. This 
included both pro-mining figures, for example in disclosing corruption, and anti-mining 
figures discussing trespass and related protest activities. In these instances, myself and my 
research assistants, in consultation with the participant would decide how much information 
to record, erring on the side of avoiding self-incrimination. Sensitive content also included 
discussions of traumatic events, including human-rights violations and sexual violence. This 
was particularly the case in the Kelian case (Chapter Five) where many participants had 
suffered at the hands of Rio Tinto employees, contractors, and police. We never pushed 
survivors to tell their stories but were open to hearing and holding space if any community 
members wanted to share their stories. I recognise that while for some survivors telling their 
story may provide healing and hope, for others silence is an equally valid strategy that 
researchers must respect. Silence should not be equated with powerlessness but seen as an 
active choice in survival (Parpart 2010). 
Interviews lasted for 60-90 minutes, were recorded, and both myself and my interpreter took 
notes during and after. While I had a set of research questions, I allowed interviews to remain 
open-ended, tangents and themes developed based on the participants’ experience. Again, 
leading to unexpected avenues of inquiry. The best example of this is the conversations with 
peasants in coastal Kulon Progo about their farming techniques, daily life, and social 
organisation. In coming to understand how much their historical forms of organisation and 
ideologies informed their modes of resistance, I became more aware of how the political 
economy of everyday life affects participation. It was after these conversations that I cast 
around for new theoretical explanations, eventually finding feminist social reproduction 
theory to understand the ways that people engage in modes of participation. Social 
reproduction theory was not in my pre-fieldwork theoretical framework.  
Upon returning from field trips, interview data and fieldnotes were analysed using NVivo 
qualitative research software. Most Interviews were not transcribed, but all were annotated, 
and selected sections and potential quotes were transcribed and translated. Coding of 
interviews used both deductive codes – drawn from established research questions and the 
conceptual framework – and inductive, as patterns emerged from the data (LeCompte and 




Semi-structured interviews were supported by informal conversations and unstructured 
interviews, participant observation and fieldnotes. The length of fieldwork and number of 
trips allowed a constant comparison of old data, identified themes, refined research 
questions and new data (LeCompte and Schensul 1999, 75–77). During this time, I kept 
detailed journals and drafted monthly reports summarising the evolution of my thinking 
which I also shared with my supervisors. These reflective pieces identified patterns, additional 
avenues for enquiry, research questions, and formed the basis for draft chapters. 
Interpretation involved constant ‘zigzagging’ between literature, fieldwork data, coding, 
analysis, theoretical development and drafting.  
In 2018 I conducted two follow up field trips, which focused on filling identified gaps in data 
and corroborating or disproving tentative conclusions. Drafts of case study chapters (Chapters 
Five, Six & Seven) were translated into Indonesian and copies provided to key informants, 
providing a further opportunity for informants to approve quotes, correct information or 
provide further detail. Final case study chapters were then both interpreted through, and 
informed refinements of, Chapter Three’s theoretical and analytical framework. 
Writing up data collected in post-authoritarian contexts comes with a unique set of ethical 
considerations. This is especially true when participants have faced or are at risk of human-
rights violations, conflict, or lack protections for political rights (Krystalli 2018; Morgenbesser 
and Weiss 2018). In writing up the three cases, I have made every effort to keep participants 
anonymous. This includes ensuring that they are anonymous to people who may be familiar 
with the cases, including other participants. For this reason, I have not given participants’ 
names or assigned pseudonyms. Neither did I collect demographic data or compile a table of 
informants as even a de-identified list may present some risk of reidentification (Krystalli 
2018). Where giving the location of an interview of a participant could potentially lead to their 
identification, I gave the name of the district instead of the name of the village, or the name 
of the province instead of the name of the district. This practice follows procedures 
recommended by Morgenbesser and  Weiss (2018, 11). I applied this data security policy 
universally, regardless if the risk to a specific participant was high or low. The researcher may 
not “always know what information might be potentially compromising for her interlocutors” 
(Krystalli 2018, 4), while anonymising some participants and not others singles out those at 




few participants who are public figures whose opinions and experiences are already on the 
public record and gave enthusiastic consent to being named. Identification of these people 
could not add any extra risk to their situation. 
These ethical decisions created a trade off in the transparency and replicability of my research 
(Morgenbesser and Weiss 2018). However, these traditional standards of rigorous research 
should not outweigh ethical considerations for participants involved in ongoing land conflict. 
Triangulation of primary data with academic and grey literatures is one strategy to increase 
credibility. It is also worth noting that postpositivist critical ethnography is less concerned 
with uncovering an objective truth as it is with doing justice to the narratives of participants, 
even where multiple narratives contradict each other (Dutta 2014, 98). Therefore, 
“positionality and reflexivity are the core tenets [of ethnographic research], rather than 
replicability” (Krystalli 2018, 4). 
Indeed, Bainten and Owen (2019, 767) argue that researching mining conflicts necessarily 
requires ethnographic researchers to engage in ‘zones of entanglement’ where:  
The complexity of the social terrain that individuals and institutions encounter when 
they become involved in research, advocacy or consultancy around large-scale mining 
operations demands a set of reflexive dialogical strategies that favour the voices of a 
diverse cast of actors, and avoids portraying local encounters in simple, binary terms. 
This entanglement involves making ethical decisions about which actors to treat as more 
relevant than others. These authors’ solution to this is not in resisting entanglement to 
produce ‘objective’ accounts of conflict but adopting a plurality of positionalities over time 
and space. 
The decision about which actors to centre during fieldwork is not only an ethical question, but 
a methodological one. If governments and corporations have already published reports and 
statements, while people affected by mining have not been able to, it is the (lack of) their 
voices that is a gap in literature. It is also practical: who wants to talk to researchers and who 
wants their stories to be told? For these and other reasons, critical ethnographic approaches 
are “committed to the construction of knowledge that privileges the perspectives of those 
who have been subjugated” (Dutta 2014, 92). I consciously prioritised obtaining the 




producing a more original empirical contribution than would have been the case if I focused 
equally on corporate and government representatives.  
Furthermore, in ethnographic research more generally, it is true “not only that maintaining 
positivistic neutrality is impossible to achieve, but that it constitutes poor research practice” 
(LeCompte 1999, 9). Researchers must be aware that “access to the research setting, the key 
informants, and other participants who constitute the focus of the study depends on the 
appearance, presentation of self, social skills, and specific behaviours of the ethnographer in 
the research setting” (LeCompte 1999, 1).  
The three most relevant examples of this affecting my research was my independent funding 
source, institutional affiliation with Universitas Gadjah Mada and the social, class and gender 
presentation of myself and my research assistants. On several occasions, upon realising that 
this research was not funded, directed or associated with a corporation, participants visibly 
relaxed and became much more candid in their criticism of mining. Research funded by 
mining corporations is more likely to produce data and analysis less critical of mining (Kirsch 
2014, 12). Secondly, my institutional affiliation with UGM gave me instant rapport and 
legitimacy with public servants and politicians, many of whom are graduates of or send their 
children to UGM (see also Morgenbesser and Weiss 2018, 8 on choices around institutional 
affiliation). This facilitated access to local elite actors and smoothed suspicions that we might 
be 'troublemakers’.  
Finally, the classed, gendered and aged social appearance of myself and research assistants 
often both confused and relaxed participants. Both of my research assistants are Indonesian, 
but neither are native to the areas in which we conducted research while I am bule (foreigner, 
white) While we consciously adopted a relaxed semi-professional presentation, we did not 
cover tattoos or gender non-conforming style. Of course, this immediately marked us as 
cultural outsiders, yet also separated us from the usual kinds of outsiders who conduct 
research in villages – we did not appear to be typical professors, corporate representatives or 
consultants. Sometimes this confused potential participants and led to awkward 
conversations, it also solicited a measure of curiosity. Our frequent reflective conversations 
and comparison of notes with other academics leads me to believe that participants were less 
likely to stick to the script that they would usually give to outsiders. Positionality and research 




Indonesian ability was basic, and I relied heavily on interpreters and translations to conduct 
fieldwork. By the end of 2017, my Indonesian ability reached a professional fluency, 
nevertheless I still preferred to use interpreters both to aid in understanding nuance of 
language and to provide a second opinion on interview analysis and participant observation. 
Data collection and analysis procedures, ethical decisions, decisions about which actors to 
focus on, and positionality all affected data collection and analysis. Theoretical interpretation 
across the three case studies and triangulation of primary data with secondary sources 
provides additional credibility to potentially idiosyncratic data. The empirical perspectives in 
this thesis provide unique and original insights, adding to “a plurality of perspectives and a 
multiplicity of interfaces and arenas, actors and interests” (Bainton and Owen 2019, 769). 
When placed within comparative and theoretical literature on extractive industries and 
Southeast Asia the original empirical contribution, shaped by positionality, methodological 
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